THE NOTION OF PERSON AS SELF-TRANSCENDENCE
IN BERNARD LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY

by

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PART ONE

THE PERSON AS A SUBJECT

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation represents an attempt at a systematic presentation and interpretation of Bernard Lonergan's notion of person as self-transcendence. The proposed question leads us quite directly into the core problem of his philosophical work, Insight. As Lonergan himself states, the procedure followed in Insight was to examine three interrelated questions: What am I (as a person) doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I (as a person) know when I do it? The first question was the exploration of the cognitional problem, the second the exploration of the epistemological problem, and the third the exploration of the metaphysical problem. One thing, however, has been too little emphasized: that the justification of the cognitional, epistemological, and metaphysical theories given in Insight is anthropological in character. In these theories and behind their intricate technical trappings one may put together a coherent doctrine of human personality. To give a comprehensive intimation of this has been my fundamental aim.

The major moment in Lonergan's philosophical development of the notion of person as self-transcendence is undoubtedly Insight, first published in 1957. In this book, Lonergan explains the basic operations constitutive of personhood. His aim in setting forth these operations of experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding is to aid his reader in self-appropriation. Lonergan contends that if a person thoroughly understands his dynamic, self-constituting operations, he will thereby appropriate both his operations and himself.

In Insight, Lonergan makes the following important observations about the set of operations constitutive of personhood. He states 1) that the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding are conscious; 2) that they can be consciously analyzed and appropriated; 3) that they are interrelated; 4) that they form a patterned whole; 5) that this patterned whole is dynamic and unrestricted. Each of these points will be investigated in the thesis since each is crucial for Lonergan's notion of person as self-transcendence. Take, for example, the fact that Lonergan considers these operations to be unrestricted. If a person follows Lonergan's method of self-appropriation given in Insight, he comes to realize that because the operations he appropriates are unrestricted, he is constantly transcending himself. The operations of the person in their self-constituting dynamism call for an on-going transcendence. The person if he is to appropriate himself through his operations must transcend himself. For instance, whenever a person experiences anything, he has a natural desire to try to understand his experience. To do so, he must transcend the level of experience for the level of understanding. Once he understands, he wants to verify his understanding. This exigence makes him seek to transcend mere understanding for judgment. If his judgment deals with a value to be realized, he is morally constrained to transcend the realm of knowing (judgment) for the domain of doing (decision). Each of the four operations are thus interrelated and can only be appropriated by transcendence. By urging his reader to pay close attention to his acts, of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, Lonergan invites him to appropriate himself through self-transcendence.

In the writings of Lonergan since Insight, the emphasis on self-transcendence has become more pronounced. By viewing the person as self-transcendence, Lonergan keeps the initial emphasis on the activities of the person. Person, for Lonergan, is not something to be defined but rather it is something each one must do to be authentic. An exposition of this notion of person as self-transcendence is the purpose of this thesis. Part One will deal with the person as the subject of the constitutive operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. In explaining what Lonergan means by each of these activities, we will also be following Lonergan's technique of inviting the reader to pay attention to his own operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Concentration on these acts, Lonergan believes, aids the person in self-appropriation, bringing him to realize that these transcending acts are his. The importance of being able to make this distinction between one's acts and their objects will become clearer in Part Two of the thesis, where we will talk about the worlds of meaning constituted by the person through his acts. For, once the acts are specifically identified as belonging to the person, then the objects constituted through those acts are seen as his.

In Chapter One we will treat of Lonergan's novel view of consciousness as experience. In the popular mind, consciousness is equated with perception, with a person's awareness of objects and, perhaps, his awareness of himself as an object in introspection. While not denying this cognitive or intentional function of consciousness, Lonergan's notion of consciousness as experience features another more basic function--that of the experience of one's self *as a subject*. This elusive quality of consciousness can be reached only if the person heightens his awareness, his consciousness of himself not merely as an object but more importantly, as a subject. This constitutive aspect of consciousness will be treated at length in the chapter. It is vital to Lonergan's notion of consciousness as the experience not simply of objects but of oneself as a subject as well. For Lonergan, consciousness in addition to knowing objects is the experience which both constitutes and reveals me *as a subject*. It makes me capable of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding as well as making me cognizant of *what* I experience, understand, judge, and decide. Consciousness is the ground of, and *conditio sine qua non* for, all my *acts* of knowing and deciding, as well as that which makes me aware of the *objects* of my acts.

Furthermore, because Lonergan's theory of consciousness is multi-leveled, it undergirds each level of self-transcendence which the individual strives to attain in his personal development. Lonergan's notion of consciousness as experience is unique in the experience it provides of one's subjectivity, of oneself _as a subject_. Indeed, it is this aspect which forms the bedrock of Lonergan's notion of person as self-transcendence. While the unique emphasis of the theory is difficult to grasp, some clarification should come in Chapters Two and Three, where the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding will be exposed in their direct dependence on this meaning of consciousness as experience.

Chapter Two discusses the role of integral, human knowing (rational consciousness, to the level of judgment) in the development of Lonergan's notion of person. The chapter will be divided into five sections. Just as it is true to say that the notion of person presented by Lonergan is rooted in an analysis of the structure of consciousness as experience, so it is evident that this consciousness is integrally connected with the activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging by which the person transcends himself in knowing. Lonergan urges the person to "know what he is doing when he is knowing and why doing this is knowing,"[1] so that he can more easily transcend his biased subjectivism and reach objective reality. For, it is by self-transcendence that one operates as a rational subject, as a true person. Chapter Two offers Lonergan's explanation of how a person gains intentional self-transcendence through the activity of insight.

In the opening section of Chapter Two, insight is described as the conscious, fruitful activity of the conscious person which terminates in formulated meaning. First, insight is explored as the activity of understanding. From this perspective, the reader is invited to pay attention to his own acts of insight--his own efforts to catch on, to grasp the point, to understand. If he can ignore the object, the meaning sought, the what-is-to-be-understood, and concentrate on catching himself in the act of trying to understand, he will gain "an insight into insight." He will begin to distinguish the act of understanding from the object, the understood, the meaning. Gradually, he will begin to appreciate the importance of the subject's role in the dynamic, self-correcting process of knowing. Lonergan wants his reader to come to see that he as a person is the source of the self-transcendence achieved in knowing.

After discussing the characteristics of the act of understanding (which is also an invitation to the reader to verify in his own experience the validity of Lonergan's theory), we proceed in the second section to examine the formulation which is the natural outcome of any act of understanding or insight. It is only when a person formulates his insight that he can test its truth and discover whether he has really transcended himself and reached reality, or whether his "insight" is merely wishful thinking. To give a context to this discussion of formulated meaning, we will sketch briefly Lonergan's explanation of various carriers or formulations of meaning, by which a person spontaneously or reflectively seeks to express the understanding he has of himself and his world.

From this focus on meaning as formulated, the third section of Chapter Two treats of the need of judgment to pass on the validity of the formulation. Therefore, the dynamic drive for meaning (the person's exigence to understand) calls forth the desire to understand truly, to reach a "virtually unconditioned," a verified state of affairs. When he does this, the person gains intentional self-transcendence through judgment. Only when he can say, "This is true," not, "I wish this were true," or "This seems true," has he transcended himself and reached objective reality.

Thus far, in the three sections we have been examining and describing each operation of experiencing, understanding, and judging in detail, but in isolation from the others. Next, in the fourth section, we take up Lonergan's structural view of cognition, trying to explain the meaning and implications of noetic structure. Here we will see how each operation is interrelated and interdependent within a dynamic pattern. The set of operations seen from this perspective gives us an appreciation of Lonergan's structural approach to cognition as centered on the person as the source of these operations and, ultimately, as the source of self-transcendence. Similarly, the structural view of knowing finds a corollary in a structural view of formulated meaning. This, too, will reinforce Lonergan's thesis that the person as self-transcendence is the source of the meaning that he is and by which he constitutes his worlds.

Finally, in the fifth section of the chapter on integral, human knowing we will deal with the role of the emotions in knowing, and ultimately, in the overall development of the person. The drive for meaning which is epitomized in the emotion of wonder is the catalyst which prompts the questioning that generates and sustains all human inquiry. This basic wonder, blending with various other human emotions, is what gives life its mass and momentum.[2] Just as our knowing is accompanied by an unrestricted desire to know, so, too, our willing is matched and motivated by an equally unrestricted desire to love. All of a person's emotive responses color the operations of each level of his consciousness. They can enhance his experience, quicken his understanding, hone his judgment, and spark his decisions. The positioning of this section on emotions at the end of the chapter on knowing and before the chapter on deciding is a deliberate effort to show that in Lonergan's view emotions are integrally connected with both our knowing and our living. Just as they enrich our efforts toward intentional self-transcendence, so they support us in the "lived-transcendence" involved in our decision-making.

In this Chapter Three, we will describe the process of decision-making (again with the hope that the reader will test the premises by his own experience). Lonergan contends that through the decisive results of reflection and deliberation, a person existentially effects not merely the shape and scope of his world, but, more profoundly, the shape and scope of his personhood. How both of these occur will become more apparent in the second half of the thesis. Here, we only attempt to explain the elements that enter into making a decision and how this level of moral consciousness is related to the preceding levels of experiential, intelligent, and rational consciousness. Finally, decision-making is seen as the actualization of the meaning that was first experienced, then understood, and lastly affirmed to be a value. When the person transcends himself to live out the meaning of the values he affirms in judgment, he begins to grow and develop as a person.

In Part Two of the thesis, we will explore the various "worlds" of meaning in which a person lives and which he discovers or constitutes through his operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Chapter Four introduces the reader to Lonergan's meaning of "world." World is the objectification or thematization of the meaning which a person finds or constitutes. The worlds in which I live are "my" worlds: correlative, concomitant, and opposite to me as a person. I live in one or several worlds, whether or not I am able to articulate their meaning. Here we come to the crux of Lonergan's contribution to the philosophy of person. For, in clearly delineating the structure of human consciousness, Lonergan not only gives explanatory precision to the operations which constitute a person, he also shows how personhood can be appropriated and developed. This can be accomplished, Lonergan claims, by first differentiating and appropriating one's operations, and then by differentiating and appropriating one's various worlds.

Throughout the chapters of Part Two, we will be writing from a moving viewpoint, i.e., one which continually changes and expands. To illustrate this concretely we will use Lonergan's concept of horizon. Horizon is, for Lonergan, the precise limits of a person's interests and knowledge (or of his operations and worlds) determined by the range of questions he finds meaningful or significant. It is a person's horizon, then, which delimits the stage of development of his operations at any given period, as well as the manner in which he views reality. Reality, in turn, is determined by the range of his interests and knowledge. In other words, his horizon determines the level of personhood possessed at a particular stage of development. While horizon in this sense does determine the person, it also possesses as an essential quality an openness to the possibility of refinement and conversion. Because a person's horizon can be converted, it is possible to describe his development from a moving viewpoint, one which allows for the changes and expansions wrought by conversion.

Conversion is the actual transformation of the person, of his operations and orientation, and hence, of his worlds. In the first half of the thesis, we describe the operations of the person. This is a propaedeutic to an invitation to an intellectual and to a moral conversion which will be treated fully in Chapter Seven. Conversion is normally a prolonged process. However, it is usually recalled as a concentrated judgmental and decisive response to a few key questions. It is through questioning that a person "converts" his horizon. For, only through questioning is he able to transcend his present horizon and so transform it. Thus, the role of the question is vital to Lonergan's method of self-transcendence. In fact, questioning plays a dual role in his method. Lonergan sees the person as a questioning being, driven by his natural exigence to know and love. It is through questioning that the person moves beyond the already-known to the unknown-to-be-known. For instance, in the first half of the thesis, we see that a person's dynamic orientation forces him to question his experience in order to go beyond it to understanding--what is it? why is it so?. Once he achieves some understanding, further questions--is it so? is it true?--push him from understanding to the point where he has sufficient evidence to make a judgment. Affirmation on the level of judgment confronts him with the ultimate question, one of value--is it worthwhile?. If he judges it is, then, he is morally obliged to act. This lived-performance, this on-going questioning is the specific characteristic of Lonergan's person. This is the role of the question which we exposed in the first half of the thesis.

In Part Two of the thesis, we discover that Lonergan's methodical use of horizon shows that if a person questions his very ability to raise questions, he can move from an understanding of his operations, as they function in his development as a person, to an appropriation of his personhood. This self-understanding and self-appropriation ground the intellectual and moral conversions by which a person transforms his horizon. Further, he can then raise the questions which bring about a religious conversion which will ground in a transcendent God the meaning and value discovered by the previous conversions. So, the role of the question in Lonergan's method of self-transcendence is two-fold. It is the catalyst by which the individual person moves himself from the level of experience to understanding, from understanding, to judgment, and from judgment to decision. However, the question is also the technique by which the person transforms and enlarges his horizon through conversion. Questions like, "What am I doing when I am knowing?", and "Why is doing this knowing?" usher in an atmosphere conducive to an intellectual conversion. My response to the question, "If my understanding of my personhood is true, what must I do about it?", precipitates a moral crisis which can lead to a moral conversion. The search for a reply to the question, "What is the ground of my personhood?" brings about the possibility of a religious conversion. In each instance, the questioning process roots the basis for horizon not in external reality, nor in the operations of the person, but in the person as subject of these operations and of the worlds of meaning in which he lives. In the final analysis, it is up to the person himself to opt for conversion. He must be willing to take the risk involved in raising questions which will transform both himself and the meaning he calls reality.

Methodologically, Lonergan's use of horizon in his approach to the notion of person as self-transcendence is very propitious. For, horizon, in Lonergan's terms, consists of two poles, each of which is conditioned and constituted by the other, and neither of which can be changed without its affecting a change in the other. In the first part of the thesis, we examine the subjective pole of one's horizon, which consists of the basic operations of the person. In the second part of the thesis, we explore the objective pole, i.e., the worlds of meaning which the person finds or constitutes through his basic operations. The advantage of using horizon as a methodological tool for treating the person is that it permits Lonergan to expose the person as a dynamic, self-transcending subject who demands and constitutes meaning. Through the concept of horizon, Lonergan can analyze in detail the subjective pole (i.e., the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding) and ultimately can go beyond the operations to the person as the subject of these operations, Experience, understanding, judgment, and decision are linked ineluctably to the person who is their source and subject. What Lonergan aims at constantly is to give a method by which the reader will be able to read the blueprint of his own personhood. Experience is always my experience;

understanding, judgment, decision are likewise preceded by the personal pronoun.

Further, the bi-polarity of horizon invites an investigation of the reality reached by the person through his multi-leveled operations. (This is the concern of Part Two of the thesis.) If person, for Lonergan, entails a search for and constitution of meaning, then the meaning grasped by the person is of vital significance for his own self-understanding and self-appropriation. More importantly, since we have already examined in detail the operations of the person, we are now in a position to specify the objects of these operations: the worlds of meaning the person constitutes through his operations. Such worlds are indisputably the worlds of the person because they are known and realized through his experience, understanding, judgment, and decision.

Since one of the characteristic features of horizon is the intrinsic dependence of each pole upon the other, it is neither possible nor accurate to treat them in isolation from one another. However, for the sake of analysis, the thesis attempts to emphasize and elaborate upon each pole separately, without losing sight of their mutual dependence. An illustration of this mutual dependence (and, hence, of the interdependence of the two parts of the thesis) is to characterize the subjective pole as dealing with the "integrated subjectivity" of the person and the objective pole as concerned with "meaning." Each of these is reciprocally related and each is rooted in the person. An integrated subjectivity is one that is rigorous and normative, rather than merely emotional or sentimental. If one's subjectivity is integrated, it involves the total person in his physical, affective, intellectual, and spiritual facets. Such a total response of the person is rigorous, demanding of him a strenuous adherence to the promptings of his naturally unrestricted, disinterested, detached desire to know and love. Similarly, an integrated subjectivity is normative, since, for Lonergan, the criteria for truth and reality lie within the person himself.

Furthermore, the meaning which epitomizes the objective pole is not *any* meaning; it is precisely the meaning the person seeks through the operations of his integrated subjectivity. This meaning forms "his" world because it is known and constituted specifically through "his" operations, "his" integrated subjectivity. This is why Lonergan's use of horizon argues that there is no strict dichotomy between subject and object, person and world, act and meaning. Within the framework of horizon, the two poles are correlative, concomitant, and opposite one another, with each constituting the other and neither functioning apart from the other. The person through the operations of his integrated subjectivity knows and constitutes the meaning of his world and in doing so, he constitutes the meaning that he *is* as a person.

In Chapter Five we treat the world of commonsense, in which the person lives as a spontaneous subject dealing with the concrete, practical matters of ordinary living. Such a specialization in the practical is necessary and good in itself. However, the world of commonsense cannot provide a theory for its meaning. This is where the authenticity of the person becomes decisive. The authentic person basically is one who is faithful to his exigence to raise further questions about the meaning he seeks. Within the horizon of his commonsense world, he will not be able to find the answers which will give him a theory that will explain the meaning of his world. Theory is exactly what lies beyond the horizon of the world of commonsense, and what, therefore, it finds meaningless and insignificant. If, however, the person is authentic, he will raise the pertinent questions which will cause him to transcend himself as a spontaneous subject, and to transcend his world of commonsense. He will, then, be converted to the world of theory. The world of theory is not simply the world of commonsense at a higher viewpoint. Rather, as Chapter Six will show, it is a totally different world, supplying a different horizon that transcends commonsense.

Similarly, Chapter Seven investigates the world of interiority, which transcends both these (external) worlds of commonsense and theory. The world of interiority opens out when a person tries to answer the question, "Which of these worlds--commonsense or theory--is the really real?". In this chapter we find the justification of the first half of the thesis, for the world of interiority is reached by the intellectual and moral conversions whose groundwork is laid in Chapters One through Three. In Chapter One the distinction between consciousness as intentional and consciousness as the experience of one's self as a subject gives the basis for Lonergan's contention that a person can "heighten his consciousness"--can attend not merely to objects (intentional consciousness) but also to himself, the intending subject. In Chapters Two and Three, the reader is asked to be aware of himself--to heighten his consciousness, to attend to himself as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Doing this can bring about what Lonergan calls an intellectual and moral conversion: an affirmation and appropriation of oneself as the source of self-transcendence. And, so, the first half of the thesis is an exercise in living in the world of interiority. For, it is within the world of interiority that the person differentiates his various operations and appropriates them. In doing so, he also differentiates and appropriates the several worlds in which he lives. Through the intellectual conversion he transcends himself and affirms that he is the source of both his operations and the meanings--the values--he constitutes. Through the moral conversion he chooses himself as this source and lives according to this choice.

Each of these conversions affects both the person and his world. Each causes the person's horizon to be enlarged, transformed. Finally, each mediates the possibility of a religious conversion--an understanding and appropriation of the basis for religion, for a personal relation to the Absolute. This is discussed in Chapter Eight. With religious conversion, the peace, joy, and love of an awareness of God become grounded. One is "grasped by ultimate concern."[3] He experiences a total and permanent self-surrender, which, rather than being simply an act, is a dynamic source, from which all his actions flow. The religious "convert" has a new basis for all his valuing and living. He has reached full self-transcendence and Lonergan sees him on the path to fullest personhood.

The general movement of the thesis, then, is from an exposition of Lonergan's theory of consciousness and its relation to the basic acts constitutive of personhood to an investigation of the worlds of meaning which the person constitutes through these conscious acts. The exposition of the acts of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding carries Lonergan's invitation to the personal appropriation of these acts in and for oneself. Self-appropriation is rooted in self-transcendence, the key to Lonergan's notion of the person. Therefore, the movement of the thesis can be considered a movement from self-appropriation to self-transcendence. The key moments of the movement are Lonergan's theories of consciousness, cognition, and horizon (the latter as determinative of personhood, though open to unlimited expansion and conversion if the person is authentic).

CHAPTER ONE

CONSCIOUSNESS: THE INTERNAL EXPERIENCE OF ONESELF AS A SUBJECT

Consciousness is a phenomenon with which we are all familiar. We are certain we know what it means to be conscious--until we try to explain it. Theories of consciousness are varied and, because Lonergan's manner of defining consciousness is vital to his notion of person, it is necessary to explore first what Lonergan means by consciousness.[1]

CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXPERIENCE

"Consciousness is the internal experience of oneself and one's acts."[2] Such a bald definition can lead to misunderstanding without precise clarification. One way to approach an explanation of consciousness as experience is to contrast it with another commonly held view of consciousness: consciousness as perception of an object.

If consciousness is equated with the perception of an object, consciousness is limited to a cognitive function. At first glance, this seems to be sufficient. Knowing is of two kinds: direct, in which the object is not the subject (e.g., "I know this room."); and reflexive, in which the subject is the object (e.g., "I know myself."). In the perception of theory of consciousness, reflexive knowing is consciousness. In consciousness, the subject is the object of consciousness and in consciousness, the subject--the knower--is known.

In this way, consciousness is strictly a matter of knowing oneself as the object of consciousness. Consciousness is a cognitive act and merely reveals the "object" which previously was unconscious. The inadequacy of this theory becomes evident as soon as one applies it to a concrete case.[3]

For example, if without consciousness as perceptive and reflexive, I am merely an opaque unconscious substance (not a subject), then by consciousness, I should merely be revealed to myself as an opaque substance. Again, if without consciousness I have no other psychological unity beyond the unity found in objects of my knowledge, then by consciousness I am simply manifested as having no psychological unity beyond the unity found in the objects of my knowledge. Further, if without consciousness I cannot possibly be the conscious subject of physical pain, then by consciousness I should realize I, in my previous state, am incapable of suffering. Thus, the fallacy of the perception theory of consciousness is that it is simplistic. It allows for the fact that by consciousness the subject is known by the subject. It overlooks the fact that consciousness is more than cognitive; it is constitutive.

So, consciousness, for Lonergan, is both cognitive and constitutive. In fact, consciousness is cognitive, not of what exists without consciousness, but of what is constituted by consciousness. In consciousness, I am not only revealed to myself as a subject but my very subjectivity is, in fact, constituted. That is, I am conscious of myself not as what I am prior to consciousness, but as what I am BECAUSE of consciousness. For consciousness, Lonergan claims, does not reveal a prime substance but a psychological subject that can then be subsumed under the category of prime substance. Similarly, consciousness does not reveal the psychological unity that is known in the field of objects; rather, it constitutes and reveals the basic psychological unity of the subject as subject. Again, consciousness not only reveals me as suffering but also makes me capable of suffering.

Consciousness, then, for Lonergan, is the experience which constitutes and reveals me as a subject. It makes me capable of sensing, of understanding, of judging, and deciding. Precisely, consciousness is "the internal experience of oneself and one's acts." However this internal experience is of a certain quality: it is a previous and unformed awareness or experience.[4] Previous because it is prior to any cognitive activity which presupposes and can complete it. Unformed because cognitive activity would be superfluous if it were already intelligently formed. Lastly, it is internal experience. External experience is of sensations: of sights and sounds, of odors and taste, of things hot and cold, hard and soft, etc. Internal experience is of oneself and one's apprehensive and appetitive activities. The use of descriptive adjectives "external" and "internal" is, Lonergan reminds us, metaphorical since such terms refer only to spatial objects. While experience can be of spatial objects, it itself is not such an object.

CONSCIOUSNESS AS PRESENCE

A better grasp of what Lonergan means by calling consciousness an internal experience of oneself and one's acts might be gained through a discussion of various types of presence.[5] Material presence is the physical or local positioning of some material object:--the presence of this desk in this room. Material presence does not involve knowing. Intentional presence is of two types and in both knowing occurs. The more readily understood kind of intentional presence is that of the object to the subject, of the spectacle to the spectator, of the event to the observer. We experience this kind of intentional presence most of our waking moments. However, there is a more fundamental presence: that of the subject to himself. By this is not meant introspection, in which the subject views, considers, analyzes, perhaps judges himself as the object of his conscious investigation. Rather, in the presence of the subject to himself _as subject_, there is that elusive but genuine awareness of a presence concomitant, correlative, and opposite to the presence of any object.

By heightening my awareness (my presence) I can become more sharply aware of myself as a subject. When I am looking at a picture, my attention is on the picture. It is present to me as an object because objects are present by being attended to. Simultaneously, I am also present, not as an object, but as a subject because subjects are present by attending. This presence of subject as subject is, thus, concomitant and correlative and opposite to the presence of an object.

We are only subjects if there are objects to which we can attend and de facto the presence of subject as subject is opposite the presence of object to subject. This internal awareness of myself as subject and of my acts is consciousness.

CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXPERIENCE VS. INTROSPECTION

The difference between consciousness as experience and introspection is simply that the latter is an effort on the part of the subject to attend to himself as an object while the former is his prior presence to himself as subject. In introspection I direct my conscious attention to myself and my acts just as in direct knowing I direct my conscious attention to some object or event "outside" myself. Both direct and reflexive knowing (introspection) presuppose consciousness; for in both the subject in act is constituted and known, not as an object, but as a subject. This constitutive knowing and being known is consciousness. Direct knowing means the subject is known but once--as subject. In reflexive knowing the subject is known twice--as subject by consciousness, and as object of the reflexive activity.[6]

There is a further functional relation between consciousness and introspection. The data for direct knowing is supplied by sensation: what I see, hear, taste, smell, touch, imagine, etc. The data for introspection is supplied by consciousness: the "I" with whom I am concerned is reached by a backward reference to the conscious subject. For judgments made concerning material objects or judgments made about our feelings, our minds, our wills, the story is the same. For verification of our understanding of material objects we turn to the data of sense. Insights into our state of mind or emotion can only be verified in the data supplied by consciousness. Such introspection demands some structure if it is to be genuinely fruitful in yielding knowledge of oneself. Even the most informal type of reflection is consequent, intellectual investigation and, as such, it presupposes some level of consciousness.[7]

LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Consciousness, then, is a previous and unformed experience or awareness which can be distinguished by different levels. One is unconscious if one is in a deep coma or dreamless sleep. Actions are labeled unconscious if they occur outside the sphere of consciousness. Such actions as the circulation of the blood, the growth of capillaries, metabolism, etc. are considered unconscious. Once a person attains at least a minimal degree of awareness, e.g., that of a dreamer, he and his actions are to that extent conscious. According to the quality of operation one can distinguish experiential, intelligent, rational, or moral consciousness. The person who reacts to the stimulation of hot coffee spilled on his hand is experientially conscious of himself and his feeling of being burnt. The person who is inquiring in order to understand the intricacies of a stereo system is intelligently conscious. The person who is weighing the evidence for and against the legality of the United States' presence in Vietnam is rationally conscious. The person who moves beyond the realm of knowing into the domain of doing, and so decides to join the Peace Corps is morally conscious of himself and his acts. (Lonergan holds that an action is moral if it is the result of a consistency between what one knows and what one decides to do.)

On each of these levels the person is normally attentive to the objects of the actions he is performing, and his advertence to himself or his acts is negligible. Advertence to consciousness or to oneself as conscious is not necessary for consciousness to occur but consciousness is essential for advertence to consciousness. Likewise, although a person may be more conscious of his acts than of himself, he is not, however, conscious of himself except through his acts.[8] For example, I cannot be intelligently conscious unless I am wondering or inquiring or seeking to understand. Nor are the levels of consciousness of equal value. Just as it is better to be conscious than unconscious, so, too, a person is more of a subject the higher the level of consciousness on which he is operating. The dreamer is but a minimal subject. Awake, one is more of a subject. Actively probing, reasoning, deliberating, choosing--each level of consciousness reached by the conscious subject augments his autonomy. For Lonergan, the morally conscious subject is the person who freely and responsibly by his choices makes himself what he is to be and his world what it is to be.

SUMMARY

Thus far this has been an effort to determine Lonergan's meaning of consciousness. Having shown that it is neither the perception of an object nor introspection of oneself, Lonergan insists that it is a quality of specifically human acts, a quality which differs on different levels but a quality which concretely unites the acts of each of the levels.[9] When my curiosity is aroused by a strange sound and I go to investigate its origin, my experiential consciousness changes into intelligent consciousness. When I discover and affirm the cause of the disturbance, my actions are neither experientially nor intelligently conscious but rather they are rationally conscious acts. My decision to repair the loose window sash is an act of rational self-consciousness.

Just as there is a unity on the side of the object, so there is a unity on the side of the subject. Conscious acts are not isolated atoms of activity, but many acts which coalesce into a single knowing or doing.[10] All the diverse acts have in common the same quality--consciousness. Furthermore, the multi-levels of consciousness come together in the person-who-is-conscious-through-his-acts. Essentially, consciousness is rooted not in the diverse acts of a person but in a certain "previous and unformed presence of the person to himself." Therefore, consciousness is the conditio sine qua non for all knowing and doing and their unity. Only when one is conscious is he capable of sensitive, intelligent, reasonable, or moral activity. Only in consciousness can these various, diverse activities be distinguished.

So, Lonergan's consciousness is the awareness the person has of himself not as an object but as a subject. This previous and unformed awareness is able to grow and expand, continually supporting the burgeoning development of the person. Because Lonergan's notion of consciousness is this previous and unformed awareness of the subject as subject, it can bear the burden of being both cognitive and constitutive. As both cognitive and constitutive, Lonergan's notion of consciousness is essential to his treatment of person. As we shall see, since it makes consciousness both cognitive and constitutive, Lonergan's theory grounds the person's capacity to transcend himself in successively fuller ways, and to reach and effect the meaning of his world. Equally, this view of consciousness can account for the person's ability not only to know himself as an object but also to know and appropriate himself as a subject. It shows that when he is acting as a fully responsible, conscious subject, the person constitutes both himself and his world.

This unique notion of consciousness as experience can be verified, Lonergan tells us, only by the person for himself, Lonergan claims that such verification can be had if the person _heightens his presence to himself_, attends to himself _as an intending subject_. While this is difficult to grasp theoretically, some practice in doing it should be had in Chapters Two and Three, where we will consider the basic acts of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding precisely in their dependence on this notion of consciousness as experience.

CHAPTER TWO

INTEGRAL, HUMAN KNOWING

I. INSIGHT AS ACTIVITY

As we saw in Chapter One, Lonergan holds that consciousness as experience is a dynamic, on-going state of self-presence and simultaneously presence to objects. Further, he claims that this view of consciousness is the foundation of personhood because it provides the person with the experience of his subjectivity, of his being a self-constituting subject. In this chapter, we will explore what, for Lonergan, is the most basic activity of the conscious subject. This activity is insight.

Surely, one might counter, love is a more fundamental activity of the person. If not love, then, the knowledge that leads to love should be his most basic act. Yet, as love needs knowledge if it is to be more than blind passion, so knowledge itself is not possible without the activity of insight. Insight generates knowledge: knowledge of the good, or value, generates love. If the good or value is to hold any attraction for a person, he must know it as a value. It is through the activity of insight that he gains his knowledge. Thus, the activity of insight is fundamental to the development of the person.

Obviously, the factors which contribute to the constitution of a fully responsible and free person are multiple. The person cannot develop fully without communal support. His emotional and even physical well-being demand close, warm interpersonal relations. His growth requires a free atmosphere where he can afford to err without fear of personal rejection. He needs to learn to love: himself and others. He must accept himself and know others accept him if he is to be capable of achieving complete personhood. On and on could the list of the constitutive elements of authentic living extend. Still, if one is to reach some activity which can be considered the invariant starting-point for genuine human development, it would seem necessary to begin from the activity of insight.

Insight is the activity of organizing intelligence that places the perceived data in a unique explanatory perspective.[1] It is the activity of the conscious subject by which he grasps the meaning present in data. While its description may seem abstract and consequently dull, its function is so central to human living that to understand its conditions, its occurrence, and its results is to confer a fundamental and amazing unity on the performance, and ultimately on the meaning of, the person. In the discussion of insight which follows, it will be necessary to concentrate on this activity itself, with the inevitable danger of seeming to divorce the activity from the subject whose operation it is. Obviously, insights do not occur apart from the persons who have them. However, if there is to emerge any clear notion of what it is that Lonergan means by the word "insight," the phenomenon must be isolated. Just as it was necessary to divide consciousness into levels, so it will be necessary to speak of insights occurring in various patterns of experience. In both cases, it is important to keep in mind that such "divisions" within the person are not metaphysical but merely methodological.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSIGHT

Insight as an activity in which intelligibility or meaning is grasped or constituted is marked by certain descriptive characteristics: Lonergan mentions five.[2] First, an insight comes as a release to the tension of inquiry. Inherent in each person is a desire to know, to understand, to find the answer, to discover the cause. So deep is this drive to understand that it can over-ride, for a time, all other desires. The computer analyst who spends hours trying to locate the flaw in the system may forget to eat or feel no need for sleep until the problem is solved. Everyone has had the experience of being so absorbed in a task that time seemed to evaporate. A weighty problem can preoccupy a person to the extent that he seems indifferent to the ordinary concerns of his loved ones. The dedication of the scientist in search of a vital breakthrough in medicine is often cited as the model of single-mindedness. Each of these is an example of the tension built up prior to the attainment of the insight. The release from this tension may vary from mild pleasure to wild relief; but its presence, in whatever degree of intensity, testifies to the reality of the change which insight causes in the person.

Second, insight comes suddenly and unexpectedly. It can occur when one is nearly exhausted from grappling with the difficulty one is trying to solve. It can happen after one has despaired of solving it and turned to other activities. Sometimes it is not until near the end of a semester of work that the insight into what the course is about occurs and only then do the parts all fall into place. No one can be forced to learn--is an old saying. Nor can anyone force the occurrence of an insight in himself or in others. Insights are spontaneous happenings. I can be taught to follow certain rules and thus obtain a correct answer, if the problem lends itself to a mechanical solution. However, no mere following of rules will guarantee that I will understand the problem and see why this is a correct answer. The insight that is this very understanding may occur or it may elude me forever.

Third, insight is a function, as Lonergan puts it, not of outer circumstances, but of inner conditions. All of the students in a classroom are exposed to the same outer circumstances: they can all see the blackboard, and the problem written on it; they can all hear the teacher and his explanation of the problem. Still, the degree of understanding often varies greatly. Some will have the answer before the teacher has concluded his explanation. Some will grasp the point as he takes them through the process step by step. Others will need additional help before they will understand. A few will find the reasoning involved is totally beyond them. If insight were a matter of experiencing similar sensations all should have gotten--or missed--the insight simultaneously. The differences encountered in any classroom are a matter of variations in native intelligence and alert, inquisitive attitudes. The incessant "Why?" of the child is a better indication that he will acquire many insights than his possession of 20/20 vision. Given the accurate presentation of the problem, the possibility of getting the needed insight to solve it is in direct proportion to the aptitude and attitude of the inquirer.

Fourth, insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract. Lonergan explains that the concrete is always necessary as the ground of the insight. Human knowing must begin from the sensible, although it need not remain there. An insight into the means of solving a concrete problem in physics may have significance far beyond the problem at hand. Nevertheless, the insight must be into the concrete world of sense and imagination. Afterwards, the insight gained can be formulated in mathematical symbols or scientific formulas. The pivotal aspect of insight allows it the flexibility to be of the world of sensation, expressed in theoretical terminology, and applied concretely to problems far different from the one which first evoked the insight.

Fifth, insight passes into the habitual texture of one's mind. Once understanding has occurred, further explanation is superfluous. How often have we not exclaimed, "How simple! Why didn't

I see that all along?". This characteristic of insight by which it remains simple and obvious once it is acquired is the foundation of learning. Learning, for Lonergan, is a process of adding insight to insight and having these cumulative insights coalesce into higher viewpoints which are insights capable of a more comprehensive and in-depth grasp of the total picture. This nature of insight is what makes learning a process marked by initial confusion, becoming vague and then, ever clearer competence in an area.

Therefore, insight is the familiar and homely experience of catching on, getting the point, seeing the light. An experience which, while ordinary, nonetheless, separates the intelligent from the dull by the frequency or rarity of its occurrence. Its importance, then, as the conscious activity of the human person through which he grasps or creates meaning, is inestimable. The insistent drive to understand--what Lonergan calls the pure, detached, disinterested desire to know--is a drive for meaning. An example of insight which Lonergan himself has used is the act of "remembering" of the slave boy in Plato's Meno.

Socrates in his effort to determine whether or not virtue can be taught uses the slave boy to illustrate the Platonic teaching that all learning is a matter of remembering what was once known clearly and completely in life before birth. Lonergan explains what is happening not in terms of Platonic remembrance but rather in terms of Aristotelian insight into phantasm. While the slave boy obviously had no formal education in mathematics, he was able to solve the problem because he was able to grasp the meaning in the relation involved. Socrates set up the problem, giving him a set of clues which seen in correct perspective would yield the answer. The boy's initial response is wrong because he assumes that the way to double the area of a square is to double the length of each side. When he diagrams the supposed solution, however, the error is immediately evident. Puzzled by the problem, the tension to understand is palpable as the boy confesses his ignorance. Commenting on the value of "felt-ignorance," as a goad to knowledge, Socrates askes, "Do you think he would have tried to find out or to learn what he thought he knew, not knowing, until he tumbled into a difficulty by thinking he did not know, and longed to know?"[3]

Step by step Socrates leads the boy back over the drawing, until the boy sees--gets the point--understands the relationship between the diagonal and the area of a square. Once the relationship is understood, he is able to find the area for this square and any other, given the proper statistics. All the characteristics of insight are present: the tension and its ultimate release triggered suddenly by the discovery, which the boy made through the concentrated application of his native intelligence to the concrete problem, with the result that he understood the abstract relationship involved and would be able to use the knowledge gained in the future.

Plato's failure to comprehend insight into phantasm, i.e., into the concrete, forces him to view knowledge as primarily confrontation between a knower and his ideas. Both of these, he feels are subsistent entities. In the Phaedo, Plato's manner of speaking about the Ideas seems to imply that they exist in a world apart. In the same work he also teaches that the soul pre-exists the body in this transcendental realm where it beholds the Ideas. After birth, the person who has lost his direct contact with the Ideas, learns through a process of remembering what he once saw clearly. Plato's doctrine of remembrance, then, is tied to his World of Ideas and both stem from his theory of knowledge as confrontation.

For Aristotle and Aquinas no such an elaborate schema is needed to explain knowledge. For them, knowing is primarily and essentially a perfection, an act, an identity.[4] (Sense in act is the sensible in act. Intellect in act is the intelligible in act.) Understanding, therefore, is an activity of the conscious subject through which he grasps meaning. Without the methodological sophistication possible today, they nevertheless state repeatedly that the human intellect, unlike material things which are known only by what they do, is known by what it is. The intellect is the very drive for meaning that Lonergan contends causes the slave-boy and us to puzzle over a problem, to try various ways to solve it, to reach an answer only to puzzle again over its accuracy, and finally to rest confident that the verifications have established the correctness of the insight. For Lonergan, the role of the person in knowing is paramount. Lonergan can outline the structure of knowing but, he says, each one must test that structure by his own performance.

While the metaphysical terminology may sound stilted and sterile, the meaning contained in speaking of the intellect in terms of potency, habit, and act is dynamic. The intellect as potency refers to the capacity we have to understand--an ability shared, though not equally, by all men. An intellectual habit is a facility of understanding. Habits make the repetition of any act easy and pleasurable. When one's intellectual habits are finely honed, he experiences an ease in understanding. Quickly he grasps the point (nous) and its implications (episteme), realizing what it is (sophia) and what is to be done (phronesis), and how to do it (tekhne). The presence of such habits mark the difference between the novice strapped to the manual of directions and the accomplished professional able to improvise and apply his theory in ways the book never mentions.[5]

The role of the book, claims Lonergan, is analogous to Socrates' role in relation to Meno's slave-boy: both set forth the data clearly so the problem can be seen in proper perspective. However, it is the person who, possessing well-developed, intellectual habits, grasps the meaning inherent in the problem. When this occurs, the intellect is in act. Again, obviously, this means the person is actively using his intellect. Just as the person uses his intellect to know objects so he can use his intellect to reflect on his knowing and how knowledge happens. He is thus capable of both direct and reflexive knowing. This is what Aristotle and Aquinas mean when they say that the intellect in act is the intellect, as knowable and known by what it is, is thus the known sufficient ground of what it does.[6] So, because of his active intelligence which is its own ground, understanding is possible to man--understanding of the worlds of meaning in which he lives, understanding of himself as constituting and constituted by these worlds, understanding of understanding itself. "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding."[7]

Up to now, the effort has been to seek an insight into insight: to try to grasp in what this activity of understanding or insight consists and how it is characterized. Insight has been defined as the activity of the organizing intelligence of a person through which he grasps or constitutes the meaning inherent in data. The five characteristics of insight as activity point out that insight 1) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry; 2) comes suddenly and unexpectedly; 3) is a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions; 4) pivots between the concrete and the abstract; and, 5) passes into the habitual texture of one's mind. Finally, the example used to illustrate the activity of insight has been deliberately chosen to show how an insight occurs in the intellectual pattern of experience. An example of insight drawn from this pattern serves two purposes. First, Lonergan himself does this in Insight when he devotes the earlier chapters of the book to examples of insights taken from mathematics and science. Secondly, the intellectual pattern is relatively free from the distractions of emotion and sense, allowing one to see the drive for meaning with greater clarity and precision.

PATTERNS OF EXPERIENCE

The intellectual pattern into which Meno's slave-boy was hesitantly venturing at the prodding of Socrates' questioning is one of the six patterns mentioned in Insight. The other five are: the biological, the aesthetic, the dramatic, the practical, and the mystic. The notion of a pattern of experience is explained by Lonergan in this way. Insight, as the activity of a person, never occurs in isolation. Insight is always "into phantasm;" i.e., into some concrete act or acts of sensing--seeing, hearing, imagining, etc. But these acts never occur in strict isolation from one another nor from all other events. Sensation has a bodily basis. If it is to yield an insight, however, it must be linked with what is variously called conation, interest, attention, purpose.[8] For example, human looking is not a matter of mere gaping. Looking involves the concentrated attention of the person who, therefore, bring to bear his varied sense faculties of listening, remembering, imagining, and so forth, as well as the focusing of his eyes. The pattern is precisely this set of intelligible relations that link together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements within which any insight occurs.[9]

Perhaps a concrete way to show Lonergan's meaning of pattern is to describe two of the patterns--the intellectual and the dramatic patterns.[10] When a person is operating in the intellectual pattern his sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements all cooperate in focusing his consciousness on his drive for understanding. The seasoned theoretician finds his senses shake off their biological binds and take on a selective alertness that helps him decipher the data over which he is puzzling. Even his subconscious, Lonergan claims, is at work yielding at unexpected moments the crucial images of clues, of missing links that evoke the sought insight. When through reflective insight he seeks to determine the correctness of his understanding, the theoretician functions in a passionless calm. Memory digs out instances that would run counter to the perspective judgment. Imagination conjures up possibilities that would prove the judgment wrong. So strong is this pattern's hold on the person that all his sensitive and affective powers are activated only in behalf of furthering his intellectual pursuit.

We turn now from the cerebral atmosphere of the intellectual pattern to describe the pattern that governs ordinary, human living. The dramatic pattern is the one in which we operate when we are interacting with others. In the drama of daily life, however, there are no trial performances. The dramatic pattern provides the atmosphere in which human living possesses a style which marks it off decisively from animal living. The insights which emerge from this pattern yield a sensitivity that enable the person to know how to respond to the needs and desires of others. As other insights are corrected through the trial and error that produce new questions and further insights, so in the dramatic pattern of living, a person discovers and develops the various roles he will play in life. Obviously, as he grows older, a person's ability to reflect critically on his knowledge and actions will exert a decisive influence on his character. Still there is no deliberation or choice about becoming stamped with some character. We cannot deny that past behavior shapes present attitudes nor can we accurately foresee the direction our future spontaneity will take. Even before we can subject any purposed course of action to reflective criticism or evaluation, our imaginations and intelligence must collaborate in representing it. Already in the prior collaboration of imagination and intelligence, the dramatic pattern is operative, outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with aggressiveness or affectivity. Thus, for Lonergan, the dramatic pattern shapes our human living in a way that is both fundamental and flexible.

And so, the intellectual pattern, because of its detachment, its lack of "subjective" concerns, allows the person to concentrate his attention on observing, understanding, judging. The person as subject is involved but as involved he personally is subordinated to the dictates of method, to the discovery of the theory, to the pursuit of the scientific goal. His commitment is to achieve this end. He himself enters into the picture only within the objective field, as a particular case in a broader totality. The data of his consciousness may be a source of information, but they are relevant not as *his*. The dramatic pattern, on the other hand, demands the intervention of the person as subject. Living entails a constant flow of choices; not to decide is to decide. The judgments and decisions necessitated by daily life are made frequently in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The lack of full certainty means that a person accepts as part of life a living-with-risk. The judging and choosing which take place in the context of social and communal interaction not only settle courses of action and objects, they also make the person what he is to be in himself and in his relationship to others.

In the final analysis, the person seldom operates in any one pattern for a long period of time. For even scientists must eat and sleep. Nor do most persons operate in a pure pattern very frequently. Normally persons get an insight into their experience while operating in a pattern that is a blend of intellectual and practical, aesthetic and mystical, dramatic and aesthetic, or some other combination.

Another way of speaking of this melding of patterns is by the phrase "a stream of consciousness."[11] By calling it a stream of consciousness, Lonergan means that there is, in consciousness, a temporal succession of contents occupying one's attention. This means that any understanding of the person must be cognizant of the fact that he operates in patterns of experience that are fluid; his conscious activity is not a series of static, isolated acts but a flow, a stream. Moreover, this stream has direction which is both dynamic and variable.

What we have been doing, then, is investigating the activity of insight which Lonergan sees as the basic activity of the person. Insights never occur in isolation but rather emerge out of whatever the pattern(s) of experience in which the person is currently operating. The various patterns of experience form the subjective milieu in which the person, motivated by his drive for meaning, seeks insight into the concrete reality of his world and, ultimately, into himself.

II. INSIGHT AS FORMULATION OF MEANING

Insight, as the activity by which a person gets the point, catches on, grasps what is relevant, understands the meaning present in the data, is of two kinds: direct and reflective. The last section dealt primarily with the direct insight, its characteristics, and the patterns of experience in which it occurs. This section will treat the meaning grasped by a direct insight. Insight as activity normally results in the definition, the concept, the hypothesis, or the theory. In other words, there is always some formulation of the meaning grasped by insight. We will presently explore Lonergan's views concerning this formulated meaning. However, once the meaning grasped by insight has been formulated, there is still the further question of its validity. Lonergan notes that not every bright idea is a true insight. It is the task of the reflective insight to seize the evidence sufficient to warrant the judgment that the meaning as grasped and formulated is correct. Reflective insight and its termination in judgment will be discussed in the next section.

Lonergan explains that insight as formulated in a concept or definition means that the act of understanding yields a meaning. This meaning is called by Aquinas an inner word. Before it is affirmed the inner word is a concept; after, it is a judgment. The inner word is what is meant immediately by the outer (spoken, written, imagined) word.[12] The inner word is the meaning and refers to some objective reality if it is true. Outer words communicate the meaning of the inner word, to which they refer. The inner word is the object of thought. It is abstract; a product of the mind. Because it is a known product, it is an object of thought. For example, the invention as it first is known by the inventor is not an existing reality. Much work, financial support, cooperative effort, and a market will be needed before the invention will come to exist in fact, as it now does in the fancy of the inventor. Lastly, the inner word is intelligent with the basic and essential rationality of consciousness. Thus Lonergan cites Aquinas to show that the inner word as concept is the embodiment of meaning, culled from data.

What is this "meaning" so vital to human life and fulfillment? A person has been defined as "one who demands and constitutes meaning."[13] Meaning, is the constitutive element in human reality. It is the expression of lived experience, of conscious intentionality, and finality. Moreover, meaning as expressive of human consciousness has levels. It is what one seeks in all that he experiences. It is what one grasps when he understands. It is what one affirms in every judgment. But meaning is not limited to what can be conceptualized or verbalized. It can also be found and communicated in a smile, a symbol, or a work of art. Meaning, then, is as wide or as narrow, as rich or as shallow as human consciousness. The task of this section of the thesis is to investigate what Lonergan has said about meaning. We will speak about the carriers of meaning; that is, the various ways in which persons have and can express meaning. The divisions of the carriers of meaning are two: phenomenological and technical.[14]

PHENOMENOLOGICAL CARRIERS OF MEANING

Phenomenological carriers of meaning refer to those expressions of meaning that are essentially pre-reflective, presenting themselves authentically and spontaneously. Three forms of phenomenological meaning discussed by Lonergan are intersubjective, incarnate, and symbolic.

A. Intersubjective Meaning

An understanding of human intersubjectivity as a communicator of meaning must be prefaced by an understanding of intersubjectivity of feelings and the actions which automatically flow from these feelings, indicating the existence of a human solidarity more fundamental than that expressed in the "I-Thou" relationship. This oneness of humankind is neither reflective nor deliberate. One becomes conscious of it usually in the action that stems from it. For instance, on a crowded street I would spontaneously reach out my arm to prevent another person from falling. This response is vital; not rational, functional, more than sociable. There are numerous actions of this type: the cry that rises to our lips to warn another of danger, the gesture which silently signals the presence of an unseen threat, the effort by which one shoves another out of the path of an approaching car. All embody pre-reflectively--instinctively--the common bond of brotherhood by which we are members of one another on a level far deeper than that of our individuality.

As our feeling of oneness can be seen in these actions, so it can also be expressed in shared feelings. Lonergan refers to Max Scheler's discussion of three expressions of such shared feelings, explaining them as follows: 1) Community of feeling and fellow-feeling. A community of feeling is produced by the intentional responses which result from the common apprehension of objects that arouse the feeling. In other words, in a community of feeling two or more persons respond in parallel fashion to the same object. An example Lonergan cites is the feelings shared by worshipers as they pray to God together, or the joy shared by a couple watching their child take his first step. Fellow-feeling is the response of an outsider who sees and shares in the feeling manifested by another or others. For example, my friend sees and is elated by the flash of a robin's plumage in the tall grass. I, though I look too late to see him for myself, still "see" the robin in my friend's eyes and share her excitement.

2) Psychic contagion. This involves a sharing of another's emotion without adverting to the object of the emotion. Examples of psychic contagion include laughing at the sound of laughter although one does not know what is funny; crying at the sight of another's tears, again, without knowing their cause; experiencing pain when one sees another contorted with anguish. Obviously, this response is more vital than intentional. As such, it is potentially dangerous. Lonergan warns that psychic contagion is at the root of the irrational

panic which causes crowds to stampede at the suggestion of danger. It is likewise the mechanism which triggers the often irresponsible behaviour in mass demonstrations or the destructive activities of revolutions and strikes. Through psychic contagion personal responsibility is usurped by mob rule, intelligence is abdicated in favor of the domination of drives, and individual initiative and sovereignty readily succumbs to the dictatorship of a leader. Past and present history hold countless examples of the unity forged by such means. In a less blatant but no less extensive manner, the mass media employ psychic contagion. The principle is the same whether it is used by the medicine man of the Old West, the faith-healer, or Madison Avenue. The mass hysteria which can seize a crowd, the hypnotic spell which words--inflamatory or conciliatory--weave over a group, the influence of advertising on the sub-conscious conditioning desires and whetting appetites: all display not only our vulnerability but also our common humanity.

3) Emotional identification. This refers to another vital, rather than intentional, response which is intersubjective on a level more fundamental than that of a carrier of meaning. In emotional identification, Lonergan says, one's ability for personal differentiation is either undeveloped or abandoned temporarily. An example of the former is the intensity of a little girl's doll-playing: she identifies herself with her mother and simultaneously projects herself into the doll. Examples of the latter include sexual intercourse

where both undergo a suspension of individuality and fall back into a single stream of life; also, the oneness of feeling experienced by spectators who identify with their team.

These multiple cases are all cited by Lonergan to show the unity which underlies human intersubjective living. This unity or bond seems to be the basis for the possibility of intersubjective meaning. Intersubjective meaning is what is constituted by and constitutes interpersonal situations. It is the situation itself--so much so that if this meaning is destroyed, so, too, is the relationship or situation. Prelinguistic, preconceptual, and pre-reflective, it antecedes the "I-Thou" relationship because it simply is the bond of the relationship prior to any mediation of meaning. In a sense, Lonergan writes, it is the lived-experience of what reflection calls an "I-Thou" relationship.

The best illustration of intersubjective meaning is the phenomenology of a smile which Lonergan borrows from Langer's Feeling and Form. A smile has meaning. The proof of this is that a merely physical description of it as a certain combination of movements of the lips, facial muscles, and eyes would not be accurate unless it included the meaning the smile conveys. This meaning differs from other combinations of lip, eye, and facial movements which we label frowns, grins, scowls, glares, smirks, etc. Perhaps, Lonergan comments, the ultimate proof that we know smiles convey meaning is the fact that we do not go about in public smiling indescriminately. Smiles as bearers of meaning are highly perceptible, natural, and spontaneous. Perception, Lonergan insists, is not merely response to ocular stimulus. Human perception is selective: it picks out only those impressions which connote a meaningful pattern. Just as one selects the sound and meaning of the words of a friend with whom one is conversing from all the street noises surrounding them, so, too, one can perceive a smile, because it has meaning, from all other possible facial expressions or appearances due to shifts in lighting or visual perspective. Not even a fleeting smile goes undetected. Because it is a gestalt, a patterned meaning, a smile is seen and recognized as a whole.

Perception of the meaning of a smile is not learned as one learns the meaning of words. This meaning seems to be a personal discovery each one makes for himself, and it is a meaning which needs no translation since it does not appear to vary from culture to culture. In a similar fashion to the naturalness and spontaneity of perceiving the meaning of a smile, there is the naturalness and spontaneity of the act of smiling. One neither learns to smile as one learns to walk nor does one normally think of smiling prior to doing it. One simply smiles and in doing so conveys the meaning that the smile is. Finally, the smile has an irreducible quality. It can neither be explained apart from meaning nor can it be elucidated by other types of meaning. A comparison of the smile with that of language will bring out this irreducibility.

Linguistic meaning tends to be univocal, while the meaning of a smile has an enormous range of variations. Smiles, Lonergan explains, express joy, humor, peace, excitement, curiosity, satisfaction, contempt, acceptance, refusal, scorn, weariness, gladness, etc. Linguistic meaning differs from the meaning of a smile in that words can be true either as opposed to mendacious or as opposed to false. A smile can be true in the former way because it can be simulated but a smile cannot be true as opposed to false. Again, linguistic meaning makes numerous distinctions between what we feel, know, wish, fear, intend, desire. On the other hand, the meaning of a smile is global: it conveys what one person means to another. A smile has the meaning of a fact;,not of a proposition.

A final difference is that language is objective: expressing what has been objectified; while a smile is intersubjective, both conveying and constituting the interpersonal situation. The meaning of a smile--unlike linguistic meaning--is not about some object, but is an immediate revelation of the subject. Not the basis of an inference, a smile makes one incarnate subject transparent to, or hidden from, another in a manner that antecedes all subsequent analysis. While using the smile as an example of intersubjective meaning, Lonergan makes it clear that our feelings reveal or betray us in all our facial and bodily movements. The voice with its nuanced tone, pitch, volume, or silence is another obvious conveyor of intersubjective meaning.

B. Incarnate Meaning

Incarnate meaning, like intersubjective meaning, both expresses and constitutes the situation. The expression in both IS the meaning. However, unlike the intersubjective, incarnate meaning pertains to the individual and does not necessarily include the presence of another person. Rather than the interaction depicted in interpersonal relations, incarnate meaning is embodied in the physical expression of the person as a concrete individual. Rahner speaks of the person as "incarnate consciousness." It is in this way that the person as "enfleshed spirit" can express through his body the meaning, not that he has or gives, but rather the meaning that he is. The almost legendary aura which surrounds the memory of JFK is an example of how a person can become an expression of incarnate meaning. In JFK a sense of national pride and elan are epitomized. More than his words or acts, the man himself--or here the memory of the man--is said to express such a meaning. The Christian understanding of Christ as the incarnation of the meaning of God is another instance. Similarly we hold that the actions of a person's life express the meaning that is his life. Incarnate meaning is not what a person says he is, nor even what he thinks he is but it is the meaning he expresses by his very bodily being, without conscious advertence to, or even knowledge of, the meaning that he is.

C. Symbolic Meaning

Symbolic meaning is a more general category. It is still, like intersubjective and incarnate meaning, a carrier of meaning that is pre-reflective and hence, phenomenological. Like the others, its importance lies in the fact that an understanding of Lonergan's notion of person necessitates an appreciation of the ways in which persons express meaning spontaneously, pre-reflectively, as well as deliberately and reflectively. Person, for Lonergan, is one who demands and constitutes meaning. Meaning cannot be arbitrarily restricted, without harm to his notion of person.

To discover what is meant by symbolic meaning, one must seek a definition for, and then an explanation of, symbol. A symbol, according to Lonergan, is an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling. To clarify this definition, consideration must be given to: feelings, objects and images, and symbolic evocation.

1) Feelings

Feelings are the sources of impetus and power for our conscious living. Through his feelings of affectivity or aggressiveness, a person is related to his world. They supply him with the zest and drive without which life would be bland and pallid. Just as feelings are related to persons as subjects, so they are related to objects insofar as we desire money, fear suffering, enjoy good food, etc. In the same way, feelings are also related to one another--through a shift in the object, my desire for a good that is absent can become my hope for a good that is sought or my enjoyment over a good that is possessed. Similarly, through personal relationships certain feelings form natural groups. Love, kindness, thoughtfulness, tenderness, and union tend to belong together. Feelings can also come together despite conflicts, as when love is found mixed with resentment, joy with pain, or desire with fear.

2) Objects and Images

The feelings which certain images or objects evoke need not be the same in different persons, claims Lonergan. Nor are the same objects necessarily evoked by different persons having the same feelings. In other words, my affective response or my feelings toward a given symbolic object may differ sharply from yours because of a disparity in our ages, sex, education, temperament, vocation, or existential concern. Even more basically, persons may differ in the degree of affective development. The level of my affective maturation will limit my capacity to express my feelings of affectivity or aggressiveness. The person, as a symbolic animal, demands meaning, and when he discovers meaning he symbolizes his expression of it. Therefore, knowledge of person must include knowledge and interpretation of his symbolic expressions as seen in the context of his cultural milieu.

When the response to a symbol stems from the same affective orientation and disposition, the symbol is called undifferentiated.

Undifferentiated symbols are interchangeable--the heart and Cupid with his quiver of arrows both symbolize love--and they can be combined to increase the intensity of the symbolism and reduce the ambiguity. Symbols likewise undergo transvaluation and transformation as the person develops affectively. Symbols which moved one as a child, no longer affect one. Symbols which once meant nothing, now affect one profoundly. As the person's capacities for affectivity increases, as he becomes increasingly able to transcend himself, the symbols change their meanings to correspond to the changes in him. The growth of the person through his varied experiences and the openness of his reactions to these lived-experiences makes the meaning contained in a symbol more highly nuanced. By the same token, symbols that do not transvaluate and transform seem to indicate a block in emotional development. As Lonergan pointedly remarks, it means one thing for a child, and another for a man, to be afraid of the dark.

3) Symbolic Evocation

Symbolic evocation is as wide an area as that of the symbol itself. The meaning evoked by a symbol cannot be explained fully in terms of logical categories. If it could, it would not be symbolic! Symbols obey, not the laws of logic, but the multi-faceted "laws" of feeling and image. For instance, symbols defy the rigidity of mathematical proof by overwhelming one with a manifold of images that converge in meaning. One of the powers that a symbol has is its ability to recognize and express what logical discourse abhors: the existence of internal tensions, incompatibilities, conflicts, and struggles. It expresses the inexpressible and it does so in a manner that strikes a resonance in the core of the person. Further, as Lonergan explains, symbols can embrace what is concrete, contradictory, and dynamic. In other words, it can contain the elements of the dialectic. It did so long before the dialectic became a philosophical tool, and it continues to do so for those unschooled in the use of logic or dialectic. Beyond this, the symbol fleshes out logic and the dialectic, articulating meanings that these sophisticated refinements cannot.

Still treating symbol as a pre-reflective, pre-linguistic carrier of meaning, Lonergan shows that the symbol fulfills an exigence in the person for internal communication. There is a reciprocity of needs between a person's intentional consciousness and his organic and psychic vitality. As was pointed out concerning the role of feelings, a person's vital urges must reveal themselves in his intentional consciousness and, inversely, his intentional consciousness must have the collaboration of his organism and psyche. For it is through his feelings that a person first apprehends values. As feelings reveal to him objects which may become values for him, so objects which are possible values awaken feelings within him. This evocative power of feelings and its relationship to value will be brought out more fully during the discussion of the person's role in making value-judgments and decisions.

These value-objects can be symbols through which a person's affective and intentional natures communicate. The meaning such symbols convey is elemental and must be seen in its proper context of associations, memories, and tendencies. Pre-verbal, the symbol's meaning fulfills a function for the growth or inhibition of a person's intentional consciousness by aiding or hindering the person in his attitudes toward nature, his fellowmen, and before God.

4) Symbolic Interpretation

The interpretation of symbolic meaning is, of course, a going beyond the symbol: a transition from elemental meaning to linguistic meaning. Among persons who share the same basic affective orientation and level of affective development, there is a similarity in their response to a symbol. This similarity paves the way for the possibility of communication. However, the attempt to "translate" symbolic meaning into language is fraught with difficulty. The multileveled nature of symbolic meaning makes it hard to express linguistically with any precision. Both persons may use the same words but "mean" very different things. Symbolic meaning does defy exact linguistic expression: herein lies its value and its potential danger.

A discussion of adequate and accurate methods of symbolic interpretation would be out of place here. Such interpretations are numerous and have diverse aims. Therepeutic interpretative systems such as those of Freud and Jung which historically seemed opposed are now viewed as complementary by some. Non-therapeutic systems of interpretations like the work of M. Eliade gives us invaluable insights into the meaning of primitive religious symbols.

TECHNICAL CARRIERS OF MEANING

Intersubjectivity, incarnate meaning, and symbolic meaning form the pre-reflective basis for the technical expression of meaning. Technical denotes the presence of criteria for exact, rigorous expression of meaning. Technical meaning as exemplified in aesthetic meaning and different forms of linguistic meaning, while presenting itself spontaneously, is not merely spontaneous. Technical meaning diverges from phenomenological types precisely on this point: the former adds to the spontaneity of the latter the conscious effort to articulate the meaning.

Through the activity of insight a person grasps the meaning inherent in data or constitutes the meaning of the data. As a result, there follows the conscious attempt to objectify in some manner the insight. In the intellectual pattern, the objectification usually takes the form of a concept, a definition, or a hypothesis. This process was observed in the case of Socrates and the slave-boy. However, as was said before, insights occur in patterns other than intellectual. The pattern in which the person is operating has a definite effect not only upon the kind of insight he will have but also upon the form of expression his meaning will take. For instance, if a person is operating in a purely intellectual pattern, his sensitive and affective responses are all geared to the service of his theoretical intelligence. His subconscious, his imagination, his memory conspire to present suitable phantasms aimed at furthering his scientific pursuit. His vital urges--desire for food or sleep--are subsumed and his total attention is absorbed in the realm of theory.

A. Aesthetic Meaning

In art and in the pursuit of aesthetic meaning the pattern is different and so, too, is the mode and expression of the meaning uncovered by the insight. Langer defines art in Feeling and Form as the objectification of a purely experiential pattern. Lonergan explains this in the following manner. Pattern includes a dual meaning. There is a pattern of the perceived which consists of the organized data; e.g., an abstract pattern would be a musical score, a concrete pattern would be a set of internally related colors. Besides this, there is the pattern of perceiving and this is experiential. Human perception is selective and organizing, as was mentioned before. Now, a pure pattern is one that excludes all alien patterns. So, a purely experiential pattern is one in which a person operates wholely and exclusively on the level of experience. For instance, here a person is absorbed by the colors that are visible, not the stereotypes that are anticipated; of shapes that are visible and so in perspective and not of shapes as really constructed; of sounds in their actual tone, pitch, volume, overtones, harmonies, and dissonances. In this experiencing a person is open to all the associations and emotions of the experience and to any meaning that may arise out of it--but he does not impose any interpretation or meaning upon the experience.

The experiencing also opens the person to a greater capacity for wonder, awe, fascination. By excluding all other patterns, the person in his aesthetic experience is enriched, not impoverished. He is freed not only from the biological pattern with its vital concerns, but also from the intellectual with its demands for scientific or mathematical verifications, and from the practical pattern with its pull toward the pragmatic and useful. He is freed to experience his own sensitivity, to let his spirit soar to its full complement of feeling and to expand the horizon of his own being.

As experienced the aesthetic meaning is elemental. As experienced the aesthetic meaning is not limited to the professional artist. He, utilizing his native talent and his sophisticated technique, is free to add to the spontaneous joy of conscious living the spontaneous joy of conscious creation. But as experienced, Lonergan insists, the possibility of aesthetic meaning is found in the spontaneous joy of conscious living. The child at play, the youth on the basketball court, ourselves as we thrill to the beauty of a spring day--all are testifying to and participating in an experience that is self-justifying in its joy. The experience IS the meaning. Within this pattern the whole person responds to the total experience that is, potentially, aesthetic meaning.

The experience of aesthetic meaning transforms the person and his world. Lonergan writes that the person is transported from the space in which he lives to the space within the picture; from the time of sleeping and waking, working and resting, to the time of the music; from the pressures and determinisms of home and office, of economics and politics to the powers depicted in the dance; from conversational and media use of language to the vocal tools that focus, mold, and grow with consciousness. By the same experience, the person is transformed. He has been liberated from being a replaceable part adjusted to a ready-made world and integrated within it. He has ceased to be a responsible inquirer investigating some aspect of the universe or seeking a view of the whole. He has become just himself: emergent, ecstatic, originating freedom.

The artist is the person capable of such an experience and possessing the control and technique for its objectification. The elemental meaning lying within the consciousness of the artist is at first only implicit, veiled, hidden, unspecified. Although he is aware of it experientially, he has not yet gotten hold of it so as to bring it to creation. For this he needs what Lonergan labels psychic distance: the detachment from his experience sufficient to free him to objectify it. Artistic composition, Lonergan says, recollects emotion in tranquility. The elemental meaning that is his aesthetic insight must now be joined by a grasp of the commanding form that has to be expanded, worked out, developed. In doing this, he will adjust, correct, and complete the initial insight. The resultant work of art is an idealization of the original, experiential pattern. Further, it is truer than experience, leaner, more effective, more to the point. It is the central moment with its proper implications that unfold without the distortions or interferences of the original pattern.

As the human person is never totally "explained" in words, neither can he verbally explain all his strivings, inspirations, insights. The artist tries to communicate or express his aesthetic insight through some public media which will allow others to participate in, to share, his vision. The aesthetic meaning need not be defined by either the artist or the spectator. Indeed, the obscurity of art is its most generic meaning. A work of art is itself the validation of the insight. More, it is an invitation to participate, become involved, experience for oneself the possibilities of a richer life. For art bares the source of, and object for, wonder: the freedom of the person. Animals are not puzzles to themselves; they raise no questions about themselves, writes Lonergan. Man is and does. In and through art, a person can do and be what he pleases. His sensitivity opens him to new meanings; meanings which, in turn, jar his affectivity. The creativity released is constituted by and constitutive of his intentional consciousness. The person comes to experience self-transcendence in artistic creation or appreciation.

B. Linguistic Meaning

The other form of technical carriers of meaning Lonergan discusses is words. Linguistic meanings subdivide into ordinary language, literary language, technical language, and philosophical language. Paradoxically, meaning is freest when it is embodied in language. Language with its set of indefinitely multipliable conventional signs is flexible in scope, open to development. At the same time, it affords greater control of meaning since the precise denotation of words can be established. In contrast, intersubjective, incarnate, and symbolic meanings are restricted to the spontaneities of human living together and whatever conventions they may develop are limited by the materials in which colors and contours, forms and fabrics, etc. are embodied. The value of words as the conscious articulation of meaning is summarized by Lonergan: "It would seem that the human psyche floats with the weightlessness of images and the caprices of aggressivity and affectivity until it puts things down in words.[15]

The role of language in the history of human development is too vast and complex a topic to be considered here. Lonergan touches on it when he points out that ancient civilizations prized names because in naming things they were able to bring their conscious intentionality into sharp focus. In other words, naming made them more aware of things; made them capable of focusing their attention more readily on objects present or absent. In this way, they could accomplish better the dual task of both ordering their world and situating themselves within it.

An example Lonergan uses of how language affects a person's individual development is the story of Helen Keller's insight into the meaning of her teacher's sign-language. When Helen realized that a series of touches on her hand meant 'water,' the universe opened for her. Now she knew that objects had names and her appetite for learning the names of everything was insatiable. Why? Because through learning and using their names she could bring the objects into her consciousness, her awareness more easily. She could concentrate on them and relate them to herself. Her lack of sight and hearing made the use of signs necessary but now those signs became symbols conveying the meaning of the objects they named. Likewise, this insight freed her from the limits of the concrete experience and gave her access to a more universalized realm. For now that she could "name" the experience of 'water,' she could understand and name all future experiences of water even though they occurred under quite different circumstances. For Helen this insight spurred her on to overcome unbelievable obstacles in achieving a level of education which most would have said was impossible for one so handicapped.

For all of us, our conscious intentionality develops in and is molded by our mother tongue. Although it should be obvious that all human experience is not linguistic, the words of Wittgenstein are, in a certain sense, true: the limits of our language are the limits of our world. We are born into a ready-made language system and it is the normal vehicle through which we express ourselves. Language structures my world relating, by its very form, things to me. Spatial adjectives and adverbs link the place where I am to the place about which I speak. The tenses of verbs relate times to my present. So, too, the moods of verbs convey my intention to urge, command, wish, or declare. Changing the voice of a verb from active to passive lets me shift attention from myself to an object, and vice versa. Thus, language, in this sense, is the limit of my world.

Yet, as Lonergan indicates, such a limit is neither rigid nor immobile. Different types of languages develop to meet the needs of persons struggling to express their understanding of their experiences. These different languages constitute and are constituted by different worlds; e.g., the worlds of theory and commonsense. As language develops, the distinction between ordinary, technical, literary, and philosophical language becomes clearer. These distinctions put up the fact that even linguistic meaning is multifaceted. The novelty that is the human person cannot express itself linguistically in only one manner; just as it cannot exhaust its meaning solely through language.

1) Ordinary Language

Ordinary language is the language used in daily life to express the spontaneous, primary, and transient meaning of each day. Ordinary words are used to express common meaning, which meaning is, in fact, expressed by the ordinary words. Used spontaneously, without the reflection necessary for precision, such language is so basic that it is nearly impossible to define its terms. When forced to try, one is reduced to giving examples, pointing to concrete objects, or falling back on expressions like, "You know what I mean." Ordinary language is transient. It expresses the thought of the moment at the moment for the moment. Characteristically it does not intend permanence (as does literary language) but the meaning it conveys may change with any change in circumstance.[16] The mode of expression is elliptical. In our daily dealings with one another, our conversations are marked by half-sentences, knowing gestures, and facial movements. All of these complete, better than words, the meaning we are trying to convey. Any attempt to speak as though one is reading a treatise would render both him and his intention suspect.

Because it is based in commonsense, ordinary language, Lonergan notes, is meant to reflect the speaker's grasp of how to behave, what to say, how to say it, what to do, how to do it, etc. in the currently emerging situation. The gauche person will quickly reveal his awkwardness by his speech. Subject-centered, ordinary language always expresses the world as related to the speaker. His horizon, his perspective, his world colored by his fears, hopes, joys and pains are the shapers of the meaning of his words. When such meaning is shared by a group, they literally speak the same language. The person whose language betrays the fact that he is out of touch with the common meaning of the group is considered "odd". The group itself, on the other hand, views as strange the common meaning of any other group. "They don't talk our language." Ordinary language obviously is useful in, and basic to, ordinary living. However, it is not without its limitations, limitations which make the development of other types of language essential.

2) Literary Language

Literary language, for Lonergan, complements ordinary language because it tries to capture and hold through words the meaning that, in ordinary language, is expressed through gesture or facial expression.

Unlike ordinary language literary language hopes to be permanent. It wants to expand the fleeting emotions and experiences caught by ordinary language in such a way that others can experience them vicariously. The objectification of affective meaning requires the literary artist to acquire the skills needed to express the meaning he sees and the psychic distance essential for producing it for others. He as an artist needs both sensitivity and technique. For the person who appreciates but cannot produce literary works, literary language appeals to, and affects, his whole being. It is another vehicle for conveying aesthetic meaning and one which, if executed well, gives the reader a total experience.

3) Technical Language

Again, there are roles which neither ordinary nor literary language can fill. The expression of meaning which is reflexive, purely intellectual, and precise calls for a technical language. In human discourse there is a need at times for expressions which convey accurately and unequivocally what we want to say. While vagueness can be a virtue in a poet, it can be disasterous in a chemist. Certain situations demand formal definitions, not descriptions. As human activity becomes more and more specialized, there is a concomitant specialization in language. The technical language used within a given field may be pretentious jargon to the layman, but, used by experts, it is an efficient and invaluable tool for mutual understanding. As Lonergan says this mediation of meaning through technical language is not idle talk but rather a technique for putting an end to idle talk.[17] The need for a technical language evolves when a given culture reaches a level of sophistication that sees a shift in human consciousness from a commonsense to a theoretical plane. Then inquiry is pursued for its own sake. There is sufficient liesure and material prosperity to permit human intelligence to concern itself with theory. Then logics and methods are formulated and a tradition of learning is established in which different branches are distinguished, each bringing in its wake a technical language.

Just as technical language differs from ordinary language by its stress on precision, so it differs from literary language by its use of purely rational discourse rather than affective images. The Greek break-through from mythos to logos marks the break-through of technical language and the attempt to control meaning by developing reason, logic, scientific method, technical definition. The success of this effort to control meaning is the achievement of Western man. By his control of meaning he has ordered his world and civilized himself in the process. Lonergan frequently relates the present crisis in culture to the break-down of the classical norms for controlling meaning. Today particularly in theology there is an obvious struggle to find new ways of controlling meaning, flexible enough not to stifle the human spirit yet firm enough to support the degree of precision essential if meaning is to be maintained and advanced.

Technical language is the sine qua non of progress. Abstraction, far from a debilitating process, is the source of enrichment since it frees one from the limitations of time and place and allows one to evaluate his particular concrete experiences in a more universally concrete context. Abstraction requires a technical language. It can say concisely in one term what ordinary language needs paragraphs to express. Thus, if persons are to be liberated from the mundane structures of the here and now and free to envision new worlds as well as evaluate old ones, Lonergan says, there is a need to employ abstraction and the technical language it entails. His insistence on the necessity for a technical language does not vitiate the need that exists for ordinary and literary languages. No one type holds the corner on meaning. Each explores a dimension of the human person untouched by the others. The fully integrated person should be cognizant of the values and limitations of each.

4) Philosophical Language

This ushers in a consideration of the role of philosophical language, which though technical, has a unique place among technical languages. Philosophical language tries to express philosophical meaning; i.e., to give a critique of meaning. Philosophy is not simply another world added to the multiform worlds of meanings. Philosophy attempts to give to one who has experienced all these worlds a basis from which to criticize them, understand, order, and ultimately, if possible to ground them. Philosophy's function is a critical one. It intends to judge all the worlds of meaning in which a person lives. Tracy calls it a carrier of meaning on a par with the other five while, at the same time, since it uses words, it can be considered a sub-division of language. In either case, its role is of crucial importance, especially today.

The classical horizon offered but a single meaning, holding it to be normative for all. The collapse of the classical ideal is everywhere evident. The communications explosion, the rise of historical consciousness, the influence of modern science have made persons aware of the relativity of all absolutes. No single meaning is sufficient. A person lives in many diverse worlds of meaning simultaneously. The desacralization of tradition--religious and otherwise--has opened the possibility of ever-new worlds of meaning. Change itself is now a value. The effect on the person can be traumatic. He is asked to face this complexity, to relate himself in a meaningful way to all these worlds. Moreover, he must remain open to radical changes as yet beyond his horizon and refrain from absolutizing his own ideas and desires as well as institutions, modes of conduct, or forms of criticism (philosophy) themselves. He must do all this authentically and autonomously. Historical consciousness has been defined as man's realization that individually he is responsible for the life he leads and collectively he is responsible for the world in which he leads it. Philosophy, if it be genuine, should provide the heuristic structure through which he can criticize the authenticity of his worlds and of his relationships to them.

Philosophical language must make explicit the latent critical spirit in a person and thus give him a tool whereby he can discern what experiences or meanings are truly developmental for himself and his world. When it does this successfully, it becomes the carrier of the meaning of meaning and it conveys the power to constitute meaning freely, discriminatingly, and responsibly. As the other carriers of meaning complement one another, so genuine philosophy tries to show precisely and fully how they can be consciously integrated by the human person.

SUMMARY

By a direct insight one grasps or constitutes meaning which he then formulates into a definition, a hypothesis, or a theory. This is the kind of meaning with which Lonergan is primarily concerned. However, the human person is not limited only to meanings that can be conceptualized. And so, Lonergan presents his explanation of both phenomenological and technical formulations of meaning. The chief value for this thesis of the former is that they show the unity which underlies all human relations, making meaning possible among persons. The latter, as technical carriers of meaning, imply criteria for the precise expression of meaning. Yet, the criteria vary greatly, depending on the formulation the meaning takes. For instance, aesthetic meaning, as expressed by an artist, may be quite obscure and is itself the validation of the insight which prompted it. Even within the boundaries of linguistic meaning, there are differences both in their formulations and in the criteria by which they can be judged. The "meaning" of a poem usually cannot be put into ordinary language without the meaning being distorted or changed. This we accept. But, we would not expect the same to be true of a recipe for chocolate cake. Here, if the meaning is esoteric, we have legitimate grounds for complaint.

In differentiating the various linguistic formulations of meaning--ordinary, literary, technical, and philosophical language--Lonergan points out that each fills a unique function. The person in his pursuit of meaning can avail himself of all of them, as well as of aesthetic and the pre-reflective formulations. However, we are primarily concerned with linguistic meaning, especially Lonergan's philosophical formulation of the notion of person as self-transcendence. Within this narrow sphere, meaning is defined in terms of what is grasped in knowledge and realized in decision.

Thus far, we have considered only how meaning is at first experienced inchoately, stimulating the desire to understand. Once the act of understanding or a direct insight has occurred, there is a formulation of the experienced meaning. Now, the further question arises, "Is my understanding correct? Is this meaning of my experience true?" In the next section we will discuss Lonergan's notion of judgment as an affirmation of meaning, a response to this question of truth.

III. JUDGMENT: THE AFFIRMATION OF MEANING

Understanding, as we saw, is never satisfying in itself. A person immediately wants to know if his understanding is correct. The drive for meaning is not content with any meaning, specious or genuine. It is but a further and inevitable application of the person's critical spirit to demand that his meaning be true. This exigence for truth raises questions for reflection which may be met by answering "Yes" or "No." Either reply--or one that lies somewhere between--is a judgment[18] on one's understanding of the meaning of his experience.

Judgments are related to questions. Questions are of two main types. There are questions for intelligence whose answers are the direct insights in which the meaning of an experience is grasped. There are questions for reflection whose answers are the reflective insights which affirm the reality or truth of the meaning grasped. Questions for reflection, as was seen, can be met by answering "Yes," "No," or some expression which lies between them. Because of the nature of judging, all judgments involve a personal commitment. A faulty memory is not considered a failure entailing personal responsibility or blame; a faulty judgment is. The reason for this is that a question for reflection while it can be met by a definite affirmative or negative reply, need not be. One can answer with a variety of responses such as, "I think so," "Perhaps," "It seems not," or "I can't be sure," etc. The nuanced answers possible cover the whole spectrum from the categorical "Yes" to the equally definitive "No." A person is likewise free to challenge the validity of the question itself, to make distinctions, or to raise new questions. Since the avenues of escape are so numerous, the responsibility shouldered when a person answers definitely is both personal and entire. He puts himself on the line. If proven wrong, he cannot plead innocent as in instances of memory lapses. His judgment is his and he must bear the responsibility for it.

Judgment presupposes and completes the understanding a person has of his experience--be it experience of himself in introspection or of other persons, events, and objects in direct understanding. Judgments made with no understanding are mere guesses. This dependence of judgment on understanding parallels the dependence of understanding on experience. Without experience to be understood there can be no understanding. Experience moves a person to seek an understanding of his experience and once the meaning is grasped, he wants to know if his understanding is accurate. We never are content with mindless experience nor are we satisfied with untested understanding. In judgment we reach the total increment in the knowing process, since it is in judgment that the meaning first encountered in experience is now affirmed or denied.

Not only is judgment dynamically related to the other cognitional operations of experiencing and understanding, but also each judgment occurs in a context of other judgments. There is the relation of the present to the past. Past judgments effectively yet silently shape a person's present judgments. They control the scope of one's attention, thus selecting the kinds of experiences one will have. They form the milieu in which insights are more or less likely to occur. They supply the manner in which the formulation--verbal and non-verbal--of the insights will take place. Finally, past judgments influence the person's acceptance or rejection of new judgments. One of the characteristics Lonergan claims for an insight is that it remains in the texture of the mind. These insights similarly bring about fresh insights, aid in their formulation, and provide presuppositions that underlie new judgments whether in the same, or in connected, or in merely analogous fields of inquiry. Therefore, any new judgment is made within a habitual context of insights and prior judgments. This context stands ready to clarify, balance, qualify, defend, or prove the latest judgment.

Judgments are also related within the present. When existing judgments conflict, they release the dialectical process whereby the person seeks to disprove one against the other or to seek a higher synthesis. When they do not conflict, but appear to be totally unrelated, they stimulate the logical effort to organize them within a cohesive whole. Lastly, there are the relations of the present to the future. The judgment is a total increment of knowledge, consisting of many parts but it is still a minute contribution to the whole of knowledge. Just as judgmental knowing is not the whole of knowing so, too, no one judgment can express all we know. Our knowing is irretrievably habitual. Just as a person needs various carriers of meaning through which to express the meaning that he is, so within the area of judgmental knowing, he needs a life-time of judgments in order to express himself. Through his judgments he orders his world, sets up and lives by his hierarchy of values, and constitutes himself as a person. Comprehensive judgments reveal the breadth and depth of his perspective. Concrete judgments reveal his grasp of nuance and detail. Correct judgments show him to be intelligent and open to the drive for meaning. Incorrect judgments betray his fallibility and hold him accountable until he again proves his good sense and good will by correcting his error.

The act of reflective understanding which terminates in a judgment is an insight. A direct insight grasps the meaning inherent in the data of experience and the formulation of the insight which results is called a concept, hypothesis, or definition. The reflective insight grasps the sufficiency of the evidence that the proposed meaning or formulated insight is correct. A person makes judgments long before he is able to express explicitly what a judgment is and how it occurs. He makes and will continue to make judgments even if he never learns to formulate the meaning of a judgment. Such knowledge is not the condition for performance. Rather, such knowledge gives its possessor greater control over the meaning and quality of his judgmental powers. This, of course, will not insure a person against fallibility but an understanding of the dynamics of the judging process should give him a better insight into his own rationality and thus aid him in using his powers more effectively. This aspect of the person will be treated extensively when we speak of what Lonergan calls "conversion."

JUDGMENT AS A "VIRTUALLY UNCONDITIONED"

Between the question for reflection "Is it so?" which arises from an understanding of the data and the judgment "It is so," there is a process which is ordinarily referred to as marshalling and weighing the evidence. To illustrate what happens when one marshalls, weighs, and grasps the sufficiency of evidence for a prospective judgment, Lonergan explains the meaning of a "virtually unconditioned"[19] and gives an example of a concrete judgment of fact.

To grasp evidence as sufficient for a prospective judgment is to grasp the prospective as a virtually unconditioned. A virtually unconditioned has conditions but they are fulfilled. (A formally unconditioned--God--has no conditions at all.) So, a virtually unconditioned involves three elements: 1) a conditioned; 2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions: and 3) the fulfillment of the conditions. The prospective judgment is a virtually unconditioned if 1) it is the conditioned; 2) its conditions are known; and, 3) the conditions are unfilled.

A proposition is a conditioned as soon as and because a question for reflection has been raised. As Lonergan writes, "By the mere fact that a question for reflection has been put, the prospective judgment is a conditioned."[20] "Conditioned" means it stands in need of evidence sufficient for reasonable pronouncement. The function of the reflective understanding is to meet the question for reflection by transforming the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned to the status of a virtually unconditioned. It effects this transformation by grasping the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfillment. Reflective insight grasps the pattern and by rational compulsion there follows the judgment. The link between the conditioned and its conditions is a judgment; so is the fulfillment of the conditions. But before either appear in the act of judgment, they exist in a more rudimentary state within the cognitional process itself. Reflective insight is remarkable because it can make use of these more rudimentary elements in the cognitional process to reach the virtually unconditioned.[21] It can do this because, as Lonergan claims, before the link between the conditioned and its fulfilling conditions exists as a judgment, it exists as a "structure immanent and operative within cognitional process."[22] This is the more rudimentary state of which he speaks. What he means is that the human person has the capacity to grasp when, for him, there is sufficient evidence that thus-and-so is true. In other words, Lonergan is insisting that a person is *de facto* a knower, one capable of making true judgments.

Picture a mailman in Boston in February who, after working outdoors all afternoon, makes the judgment that today is unseasonably warm. Ignoring the correctness or incorrectness of his judgment, let us examine how he arrived at it. The conditioned will be the proposition that today is unseasonably warm. The fulfilling conditions will be two sets of data: the remembered data of past February days and the present experienced data of today. These sets of data are not as yet judgments; nor do they involve questions for intelligence. They are parts of his past and present experience. The link between the conditioned and the fulfilling conditions is a structure immanent and operative within the cognitive process. It is not a judgment; nor is it a formulated set of concepts. It is simply a way of doing things; a procedure within the cognitional field. In the example of the mailman, he not only experiences present data and recalls different data but by direct insights he refers both sets of data to the same thing: today's weather conditions.

The direct insight, however, fulfills a double function. Not only are the two sets of data referred to one thing but a second level--understanding--is added to the first level of experience. Together they result in his understanding what is meant by the term 'change.' Understanding change consists in grasping that a thing exhibits different sets of data at different times. Prior to verbalizing these as statements, they exist as procedures immanent and operative within cognitional process. It is this ability that allows the mailman to link the conditioned with the fulfilling conditions in a concrete judgment of fact.

By reflective insight he grasps all three elements: the two sets of experience (the weather in past Februarys and the weather today); the insight that refers both sets of data to the same thing (February weather); and the realization that today's weather is different from a normal day's in February. The result is the grasping that the evidence is sufficient to warrant the judgment be considered a virtually unconditioned.

JUDGMENT AS INVULNERABLE

The question now becomes "How can one know that the reflective insight is correct?" Direct and introspective insights give birth to understandings in which the relevant meaning is, or seems to be, made evident. How does one distinguish between what is merely a bright idea and a true insight? True insights are invulnerable; i.e., they occur when there are no further, pertinent questions on the subject. As long as there are pertinent questions the issue is open to new insights which may complement, modify, or perhaps, reverse the initial insight. This, too, reveals a law immanent and operative in cognitional process of the person: when an insight meets an issue squarely, there are no further questions and no further insights to challenge the initial position.[23] The matter is settled. If there are questions, no settlement, no judgment can be made until they are answered. Thus, the solution lies within the power of the person himself. Only he can determine the sufficiency of the evidence; and, by the same token, he does have the ability to make such a determination.

What rescues the situation from arbitrary subjectivism is that the conditions for the prospective judgment are fulfilled when no further, pertinent questions occur. It is not enough to say that no further questions occur to me. I may cut off further questions unconsciously because my interests lie elsewhere, or consciously because I fear to face the consequences of my judgment. My impatient nature may cause me to overlook pertinent questions or my intellectual dullness may prevent me from realizing their pertinence. Rashness in judgment is no rarer than indecision. The former judges too quickly; the latter refuses to judge at all. The former does not allow reasonable time for questions to arise; the latter would wait indefinitely so long as the mere possibility of a further question exists. Both show the fallibility of the human person; neither prove him categorically incapable of judgment.

De facto judgments are made. Were there a formula for making infallible judgments, there would be no such thing as mistaken judgments. Yet, the balance between rashness and indecision can be approached in practice. One factor in the solution has already been mentioned: allow enough time for further questions to arise. Pressures of all kinds--time, emotions, circumstances can militate against sound judgments. Obviously, a person is never free from the demands of time, the pull of emotions, or the effects of circumstances. In fact, freedom from these conditions would strip judgments and life of their humanness. What is detrimental is excessive pressure from these sources which can stampede a person into judging before all questions have come up for scrutiny. Allowing time for reflection, soliciting the advice of others, and considering alternatives can give a person the assurance that his insight is invulnerable.

Good judgment about a given insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of many other connected and correct insights. For instance, while children exhibit great intellectual curiosity, Lonergan wryly points out, we do not credit them with good judgment. By similar standards, the law considers those under twenty-one to be minors, and Aristotle doubted that they had sufficient experience to study ethics profitably. Judgment to be good requires more than intellectual acumen. The acquisition of good judgment is the reward of diligent experience and practice. Nor is it a permanent possession once acquired unless one works at keeping in touch. Good judgment, like the competence upon which it thrives, remains with those who strive to stay on top of changes in their field.

This, in turn, brings to mind the role of learning in the promotion of good judgment. Learning, for Lonergan, is the gradual acquisition and accumulation of insights bearing on a single domain. While learning, a person holds his judgment in abeyance. It is maturing through the learning process itself. While learning, a person tests his judgment to see how much competence in the area of his interest he has acquired. Gradually, his competence and, hence, his judgment increase in scope and moment. Failures lessen and with each successful judgment, his confidence in his competence and his ability to form correct judgments grows. Learning breaks the vicious circle: good judgments suppose prior good judgments. Learning gives one the competence, and through the self-correcting process by which one profits from his mistakes and corrects his erroneous judgments, the practice necessary to acquire good judgment. Gradually we find ourselves "at home" in concrete situations. We know what to expect and if the unexpected occurs we at least recognize it as irregular and investigate it. Further, we know how to prevent or cause its recurrence. If the unexpected is so novel that it falls outside our area of competence, we know enough to realize that we must start the learning process over again, until this, too, is mastered.

Finally, there is the possibility that a person's rash or indecisive behaviour is rooted deep in his temperament. Where this is true, learning with its self-correcting process will be of no help to him. The self-correcting process of learning tends to a limit which a person realizes by his habitual ability to know what is up. The rash man presumes too soon he has reached that limit and there is nothing more for him to learn. The indecisive person continues to suspect there are unfathomed depths which will come to light and invalidate what he knows quite well. In either case, the person must come to grips with his temperament first. In extreme cases, such a person would probably need professional psychological help.

Prescinding from the exceptional cases, how can one normally determine if the judgment he has made is certain? Concretely, the proximate criterion of truth is the reflective grasp of the virtually unconditioned.[24] When a person finds that the evidence is sufficient to change the prospective judgment from a conditioned to a virtually unconditioned, he is rationally compelled to pass judgment. In effect, he is operating on the level of rational consciousness and, were he to refuse to judge under these circumstances, he would be denying his own reasonableness. On the other hand, when he does judge, the content of his judgment has the imprint of the absolute. Lonergan holds that a prospective judgment has conditions. These conditions need not be fulfilled. However, if they are fulfilled, then it is de facto absolute.[25] Because the content of a judgment is an absolute, Lonergan continues, it is independent of the subject who grasps it and the time and place of its occurrence. Martin Luther King's murder was a contingent event occurring at a particular time and place. But a true judgment of the event that he was in fact murdered is, for Lonergan, an absolute, "immutable, definitive validity."[26] This public aspect of absolute objectivity is what makes knowledge verifiable. Different persons can arrive at the same conclusion. Such grounds Lonergan makes the basis for the collaboration by which all of us contribute to the fund of human knowledge. Were my judgments strictly my own, they would not be judgments at all, but merely opinions.

Any given judgment is, as has been shown, contextual: hemmed in and shaped by other experiences, insights, and judgments as well as emotional reactions, biases, and tendencies. For this reason, it is essential that a person give as free a rein as possible to his drive to know. This remote criterion of truth is his best safeguard. If he is truly trying to reach certitude, he will realize that there are degrees of certitude. Openness to the views of others can protect him against an excessive personal bias and, thus, strengthen his certitude concerning his final judgment in the matter. The limiting structures of the ways in which one reaches a judgment are in themselves assurances of the possibility of certitude. For instance, following a reasonable process in trying to ascertain the weight of the evidence available for or against a prospective judgment results in a limiting of the possibility of error. Openness and fidelity to the drive to understand do not promise infallibility. A person with greater intellectual prowess or access to better evidence or a more detached view may give a better judgment. However, to question the very possibility of rendering any concrete judgment with certitude is to question the person--the source--himself. Doubts of this kind are not conclusions but rather positions:

efforts to remove them are themselves subjected to doubt in an endless chain.

SUMMARY

Judgment is a personal commitment, yet it partakes of a public quality insofar as what is true is not private. In judging, I assume full responsibility for my judgment while, in its truth-value, the judgment stands independent of me. In judging, I achieve intentional self-transcendence because I am able to go beyond myself to what, in truth, exists outside myself. Intentional self-transcendence means I move beyond what I feel, wish, or abhor to what _is_. My ability to make judgments, then, frees me from the narrow confines of subjectivism. I need not be the victim of propaganda or prejudice. The meanings that I find or constitute I can subject to the critical scrutiny of my judgment. Through a gradual accumulation of correct judgments, I can come to a fuller and more accurate knowledge of myself as a person and the worlds of meaning in which I live. This is a descriptive expression of what Lonergan means by intentional self-transcendence. Judgment as an affirmation of meaning--as the term of intentional self-transcendence--is also explained by Lonergan in the more technical terms of cognitional structure.

IV. COGNITIONAL STRUCTURE

In treating the cognitional process from a structural perspective, Lonergan is able to focus more forcefully on the parts which make up the cognitional process. These parts he can analyze both in themselves and in their relationships to one another. In both instances, he finds the role of the parts to be dynamic. Such an analysis offers a clarity not available if cognition is thought of merely as an undifferentiated whole. Clarity in understanding the functioning of the cognitional process, Lonergan hopes, will facilitate the person's appropriation, and, hence, control of his cognitional powers.

STRUCTURE IN GENERAL

Lonergan begins with an analysis of the notion of structure in general.[27] The notion of structure, while it seems to be of modern origin, is really an old notion: the idea of the whole and the part. Parts of a whole may be material which means they are arrived at by division; e.g., a semi-circle, a piece of a jig-saw puzzle, a slice of bread. Parts are also formal or functional; i.e., they can be understood according to the function they perform within the structure. Material parts, on the contrary, are so-called because they are what are seen as constituting the whole or structure.

Lonergan cites a clock and its parts to illustrate this difference. It would be possible for a person to take apart a clock and reassemble it according to a diagram without having any knowledge of how a clock works. He would be dealing solely with material parts. However, a watch-repairman could do a similar feat, doing it with an expert's comprehension of the work performed by each part and its effect on the clock as a whole. He would be working with functional parts. He would know not only THAT the clock works but HOW it works. His understanding changes the status of the parts from merely what are seen to what are seen and understood.

The functions of the parts are partial and complementary. The main-spring is not the clock but it is part of the clock. Alone, the main-spring is not enough to make a clock. Nor is the main-spring and the pendulum enough. Each is of partial, constitutive value but their complementarity needs additional parts to form the whole. The process is not limitless. Eventually one gets a rounded whole, a complete set of functions. In this internal and complete set of partial and complementary functions, each part is related to all the others and each complements what the others do. Abstractly, the whole or structure is precisely that internal closure of the partial and complementary functions of the parts. Concretely, the structure is the complete set of parts, as informed by those relations. It is the same as the whole _qua_ whole, the whole plus the reason why it is a whole.

A METAPHYSICAL EXAMPLE

Lonergan moves to metaphysics for another example of structure. Matter and form are metaphysical, constitutive parts of material things, Aristotle used structural analysis in his ontology when he used proportion to express the relation of formal parts to one another. The form of this dog stands to its matter as the form of that dog stands to its matter. Aquinas went a step further. The essence of that horse is to its existence as the essence of this horse is to its existence. Two parts of one thing are compared to two parts of another thing and the relations in the two cases are the same. The parts are not the structure: prime matter is not a thing; material form is not a thing; existence is not a thing. But, all three taken together is a thing.

The parts of a structure may be ontological principles like matter, form, essence, and existence. They may also be things: pendulums, springs, levers, wheels. Likewise, the parts may be activities: a dance, a symphony, a play. In the latter case, the structure is materially dynamic. Just as the parts may be dynamic, so the structure itself may be self-constituting, self-assembling. If so, the structure is formally dynamic.

COGNITIONAL ATOMISM VS. COGNITIONAL DYNAMISM

Lonergan views cognition as a formally dynamic structure. Opposed to this is what he calls cognitional atomism. Cognitional atomism says seeing is knowing; hearing is knowing; understanding is knowing; thinking is knowing; judging is knowing. To an atomist all cognitional activities are knowing. The alternative is that if they are not knowing then they have nothing to do with knowing. Atomism is an "either . . . or" position. Lonergan's structural approach to knowing, on the contrary, holds that sensing, inquiring, reasoning, understanding, reflecting, judging and the like are all parts of knowing. They are partial and complementary elements that constitute the cognitional structure. No one part is the whole. The structure is dynamic because its parts are activities which are dynamic in themselves and which when related in such a way to form a whole, that whole is itself dynamic.

Human knowing consists of many diverse and irreducible activities: sensing in all its forms, imagining, inquiring, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging. Yet any act of sensing or multiple acts of sensing cannot be the whole of knowing. Any act of seeing may be perfect as an instance of ocular vision but, without understanding, it is mere gaping. A person's hearing may be physically perfect but if he cannot comprehend what he hears he cannot be said to know. On the level of understanding the same truth prevails. Understanding is impossible without the experiences presented by sensation. How can understanding occur if there be nothing to understand? Similarly, for Lonergan, experience plus understanding do not equal knowing since it is only on the level of judgment that the distinction between meaning and meant, not only occurs, but is clearly established. Here the full term of what is meant is seen as either fact or fiction, history or legend, real or imaginary. Human knowing demands judging but it does not consist in judgment alone. To judge when one does not understand is arrogance. To judge when one has had no experience in the matter is to do away with fact.

The structural view of human knowing taken by Lonergan insists: 1) that no part is the whole: neither experience alone is knowing, nor understanding alone, nor judgment alone; 2) no combination of any two parts is knowing: not experience and understanding, nor understanding and judgment, nor experience and judgment; 3) that knowing is not something totally other than experiencing, understanding, and judging. Rather, human knowing is a structure whose parts--interrelated and interdependent--are dynamic operations; each of which makes quite different contributions.

More than this, it is a structure which is dynamic in itself; formally dynamic. Human knowing is self-constituting: it puts itself together as one part calls for the next until the whole is achieved. What is experienced demands understanding; what is understood calls for reflection on its validity. All this is done consciously, intelligently, rationally. Each part or operation is related to the others functionally. For, while experience differs from understanding and both differ from judgment, yet each is a function of the whole that is full, human knowing.

IMPLICATIONS OF LONERGAN'S THEORY OF COGNITION

A structural notion of knowing has many implications. First, as a dynamic structure consisting of dynamic operations, it gives us a view of knowing that is both on-going and open-ended. A person's drive for meaning, which takes the form of a desire to know on the level of cognition, is never ended. He wants to know everything about everything. His horizon limits his range of interests but faithfulness to his dirve for meaning constantly expands his horizon. Also, in this view, truth and objectivity lie within the person's intentionality and, while they are independent of the person who grasps them, they are never reached at all except through the cognitional operations of the subject. Both are achieved in the virtually unconditioned and neither exists apart from the person--the whole--who experiences, understands, and judges.

Secondly, the structure of human knowing parallels the nature of human consciousness. Wonder, puzzlement--Aristotle's starting point of all science and philosophy--marks the difference between the consciousness of a person lying on the beach under a strong sun and a person intellectually alert, whose attention is caught by some question that is troubling him, some problem he is trying to solve. The latter is in a state of wonder. The state of wonder he experiences leads to the formation of images that simplify the sensitive data, patterning it into schematic contellations digestible for limited human understanding. When the data merges into meaningful patterns, acts of insight occur. His sensitive consciousness has been sublated[28] into intelligent consciousness.

While he seeks an adequate formulation for his insight, he is thinking. The formulations he considers and possibly disgards are results of his intelligent thinking. None of this is full knowing. Because thinking is only a part of knowing, the person moves on, trying to determine if his thinking is, in fact, correct. This reflective attitude in which he searches for sufficient evidence to ground a judgment is the attitude of rational consciousness. Only when he reaches a point where, for him, the evidence necessary for a judgment is present will the *eros* of his mind give him momentary rest. Each enlargement of consciousness is matched by an increment in the person's autonomy. The intentional self-transcendence he achieves in judgment carries with it the possibility of his winning real self-transcendence through personal decision.

Thirdly, the structure of human knowing parallels the structure of meaning. As we saw, whatever is structured has parts. Therefore, meaning has parts which can be analyzed separately. These elements of meaning are distinguished, by Lonergan, as sources, acts, and terms.[29]

1) Sources

The sources of meaning include all of a person's conscious acts and their intended contents. Meaning can be found in any act which has at least the minimal consciousness of the dreamer. Just as the degree of personhood increases as one's level of consciousness rises from the dream to the waking state, from merely being awake to being intelligently, rationally, and morally conscious, so there is a hierarchy among the sources of meaning--ranging from acts of the dreamer to acts of deliberation. In a real sense, Lonergan says that the person is the source of all meaning.

From the side of the person the sources of meaning are called transcendental. They are rooted in the very dynamism of intentional consciousness with its capacity to attend, inquire, reflect, deliberate. The human person exercises the capacity which endlessly both heads for and recognizes data, meaning, truth, reality, and value. Concomitant with, and correlative to, the person as the transcendental source of meaning are the categorical determinations reached through experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Transcendental notions pose the questions; answers come in categorical determinations. In other words, the person as subject is the source of meaning; his "worlds" are the thematization of these meanings.

2) Acts

Continuing his structural analysis, Lonergan says that acts of meaning can be potential, formal, full, active, and instrumental. Elemental meanings are potential acts of meaning because there is no distinction as yet between meaning and meant. The smile and its meaning are not distinct. The work of art before interpretation or the symbol as internal communication prior to therapy--no distinction exists between meaning and meant. All acts of sensing and understanding of themselves have only potential meaning. For instance, sounding and hearing are an identity; without ears there can be longitudinal waves in the atmosphere but no sound. Data are potentially intelligible, but their intelligibility in act coincides with an intelligence in act. As Aristotle insists, the sensible in act and sense in act are one and the same; the intelligible in act and intelligence in act are one and the same. When the distinction between meaning and meant emerges, i.e., when the insight by which the meaning is grasped is formulated so that what is meant can be perceived, there is a formal act of meaning.

Formal acts of meaning, then, include all insights as formulated--acts of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing, in which the meant is what is conceived, thought, considered, defined, or supposed. There is as yet no knowledge of the exact nature of the distinction. Is the insight a true one or merely a bright idea? Is the object of thought a figment of the imagination only, or a mathematical entity, or a real thing found in the world of human experience, or a transcendental reality beyond this world? Lonergan claims that the status of the object of thought is settled by full acts of meaning. A full act of meaning is a judgment because it is only in judgment that the nature of the distinction between the meaning and the meant is determined.[30] The possibility that such a judgment cannot be made in a particular case is not relevant; the fact remains that the issue cannot be settled apart from judging.

Spheres of being. In a judgment, a full act of meaning, there is established the nature of the term, the meant. This necessitates some clarification of spheres of being. Spheres of being, for Lonergan, refer to the real, the restricted, and the transcendent.[31] Each sphere differs tremendously from the others but the contents of each are rationally affirmed and, therefore, each truly exists. Each is rationally affirmed since it is grasped by the reflective understanding as a virtually unconditioned. Each differs because the conditions for its being affirmed differ.

For instance, for an object to be judged real, its fulfilling conditions have to be appropriate data of sense or consciousness. A pencil which could not be seen or felt would scarcely be real. A person incapable of conscious activity could not judge himself to be real. When we move from the sphere of the real into the sphere of restricted being, we come to the example of a hypothesis. The fulfilling conditions for proposing a hypothesis is a possible relevance to a correct understanding of data. Beyond both the real and the more restricted spheres of being like the merely logical, or mathematical, of figurative, there is the transcendent sphere of being. Our affirmation of things in the world of our experience rests on our grasping the virtually unconditioned. In every case, our judgment deals with something that has conditions but de facto, those conditions are fulfilled. In other words, we make judgments about contingent things. But the fundamental criterion of judgment is simply the unconditioned. The virtually unconditioned is what we can arrive at in the world of contingent beings; but, the intention of judgment, Lonergan claims, is for the unconditioned simpliciter. The Transcendent Being is the being that, while known by us through grasping the virtually unconditioned, is itself without any conditions whatsoever. More will be said about the relation of the person to the Transcendent later.

Besides potential, formal, and full acts of meaning, there are also active and instrumental acts of meaning. Lonergan defines an active (or performative) act of meaning as one which results in decisions and courses of action. Thus, it is really a value judgment. For instance, my decision to take part in a Civil Right's demonstration is a performative act of meaning. The action I perform carries out the meaning I intend. Similarly, instrumental acts of meaning are the expressions used by the person to externalize and exhibit for interpretation his potential, formal, full, or active acts of meaning. Instrumental acts necessarily take diverse and varied forms--intersubjective, verbal, aesthetic, religious, etc. Their forms are determined by the nature of the act of meaning they seek to embody or display. In themselves, they can be adequate or faulty or any degree of either. For instance, a painting, a play, or a speech may or may not succeed in conveying the meaning intended. Thus, the quality of the instrumental acts obviously enhances or inhibits the expression and interpretation of the meaning.

3) Terms

Terms of meaning are simply what is meant. The terms in potential acts of meaning are not as yet clarified. In formal acts, Lonergan shows, the distinction is clear but the precise status of the term is still indeterminate. Full terms of meaning involve the probable or certain determination of the status of the term: a person knows through judgment if such-and-such is merely a product of his imagination or an existing reality. Active terms refer to the settlement of a person's attitude toward A, what he will do for B, whether he will try to bring about C. Active terms will be covered more fully in the chapter on decision.

SUMMARY

For Lonergan, human knowing is a dynamic structure with the person as its source and center. Through the interrelated operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging, the person finds or constitutes the meaning of his world. By viewing cognition as a structure, Lonergan can analyze its components more thoroughly and show how the operations of experiencing, understanding, and judging match the levels of experiential, intelligent, and rational consciousness. (In the next chapter we will see this parallelism between the levels of consciousness and the levels of one's operations carried to its natural conclusion when the morally conscious person lives his decisions.) Similarly, Lonergan can draw a parallel between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known. For, in both, the source is the person in his innate, dynamic desire to know and love without limit. As the person transcends himself in moving from experiential to intelligent to rational consciousness, he is able to express the meaning he grasps more precisely. (Again, as we will see in Chapter Three, the person gives his most authentic expression of meaning when, as morally conscious, he freely and responsibly acts upon his decisions.) For example, the potential meaning of my smile is actualized when I deliberately stop my work and go to the assistance of a student who has dropped an armful of books. Thus, for Lonergan, the level of meaning increases concomitantly with the level of consciousness. And, he insists, both consciousness and meaning reside in the person.

Lonergan's analysis of meaning also shows that meaning, as rooted in the person, shares in the person's unrestricted openness. As has been said, Lonergan's person is marked by a radical openness--the unrestricted, disinterested, detached desire to know and love. This is but another way of expressing the person's radical openness toward meaning, meaning which is equally open-ended, dynamic, unrestricted. This openness of the person for unrestricted meaning is, for Lonergan, a "proof" of the person's natural thrust toward the Transcendent. Lonergan claims that the question of God lies within the person's horizon.[32] His drive for (not achievement of) meaning--for the intelligible, for the unconditioned, for value--is unlimited. This, Lonergan contends, is indicative of the person's exigence for the divine. Since Lonergan's notion of full personhood is integrally related to the person's openness to God, the role of meaning is a vital one in the development of his notion of person. How this urge toward meaning, and hence, toward the Transcendent is accomplished will be discussed more fully in the second half of the thesis.

Focusing once again on the person as the source of cognitional activities and the meanings they uncover, we will next deal with the role of the emotions in the development of personhood. For, if one is to realize in himself a growth that is full and integrated, he must see and value his emotions as forces which, if correctly understood, can work for and not against his goal.

V. PERSON AND HIS EMOTIVE RESPONSES

In the preceding section we discussed the importance of meaning in the development of Lonergan's notion of person as self-transcendence. Now we will investigate the role of the emotions with respect both to meaning and person.

The catalyst which motivates a person to seek and express what meaning he can find or constitute in himself and in his world is what Lonergan calls the unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know. This desire to know is active within the person in whatever pattern of experience he is operating. Nor should the desire to know be interpreted solely as a desire for factual knowledge. Within the practical and intellectual patterns, it certainly takes that form. But, generically, it is a drive for meaning, the dynamic orientation within each of us which can be termed the inquiring and critical spirit of man. Metaphysically, the drive to know has as its object "being." Psychologically, this can be expressed as a drive for meaning. It is unrestricted insofar as the meaning it seeks is the true and not merely the specious. It is opposed to any obscurantism that hides truth or blocks access to it in whole or in part. It is detached insofar as it is opposed to any inhibitions that arise from other human desires and drives to prevent a person from pursuing his goal. It is disinterested insofar as it opposes whatever in human consciousness attempts to narrow and limit the range of the human spirit in its quest for meaning.

This drive for meaning is basic to one's rationality and arises spontaneously to spark in us the wonder that is the genesis of all human inquiry, and to sustain in us the impetus to seek and, often, to constitute the worlds of meaning in which we live. The feeling of wonder which generates the questions persons raise about themselves and their world is surely not the only emotion they experience in life. However, Lonergan gives it a strong emphasis because it is so necessary for the person if he is to experience insight as an activity. Wonder raises the "Why does this virus destroy only this type of cell?" in the mind of the medical research team. It causes the artist to muse, "How can I make this canvas reflect the pervading gloom of a storm-filled valley?". It furrows the brow of the adolescent trying to figure out the best way to ask for an advance on his allowance. Wonder seems to be the fundamental emotive expression of the drive for meaning. As such, it is easiest to detect when the knowing is purely intellectual--the curiosity which causes a person to search out an answer logically and try to verify his conclusion until he reaches "absolute" certitude.

However, knowing can be intersubjective: the way a child knows his mother, the way a friend knows his friend, the way a husband knows his wife; or, the way a man knows his enemy, the way a victim knows his torturer. Here wonder, as a desire to know, is often more spontaneous, pre-logical, and mixed with other feelings: love, hate, fear, joy, desire, repugnance, etc. These feelings once they arise can be reinforced or repressed. While spontaneous in origin, they can be cultivated, refined, and enriched deliberately.[33] In the pattern of artistic knowing, the story is quite similar. Wonder can be accompanied by a wide range of feelings which, if channelled, give the artist his momentum and power to find the best means of embodying the insight he has experienced. Obviously, feelings can work against a person, interfering with his drive for meaning. Feelings of antipathy can bias one's attitude toward another person as to make any meaningful relationship impossible. Anger, despondency, remorse can disrupt the creative impulses of an artist. Almost any highly emotional state can render efforts at intellectual work useless.

In general, Lonergan assigns feelings or emotions a vital part in one's achievement of his full potential as a person. He claims that feelings are what carry people on, get things done, give persons a sense of being alive. "Feelings are the mass and momentum and power of human living."[34] They relate the person to his world. Lonergan calls feelings "intentional responses" and because they are intentional, through them a person can respond, not merely to his world as it is, but also to his world as he intends, desires, decides to make it. Without feelings to attract and repel him, a person would have little zest for working at changing what needs to be changed in himself and in his world.

So, feelings assume the initial burden of a person's response to meaning as known and lived. Meaning attracts a person initially by its appeal as a value for him. Lonergan contends that a person responds affectively to value according to a sacle of preference.[35] As he moves toward full development, his emotional response makes him more ready to choose vital values such as health, strength, vigor over work, pain, the acquisition of goods, etc. These vital values he may set aside in favor of social ones--the good of his neighbor--since his feelings can lead him to value others above his own interests. Cultural values presuppose vital and social values but rank higher on a developed scale of preference. Thus, persons find value in cooperating. The value of cooperative meaning embodied in culture can sustain the demands of its making. For, culture finds meaning and value and improves them, reinforcing the notion that the person does not live by bread alone. Still more do personal values elicit an affective response as one transcends himself in loving and being loved. Through personal values, one goes out of himself, particularly in love, and finds that he is a source of valuing. This itself becomes a value--there is affective "profit" in realizing the good one can help occur through love. Finally, the highest value, for Lonergan, is religious. It is "the heart of the meaning and value of a person's life and his world."[36]

In showing how a person's feelings can cause him to respond to this ascending order of values, Lonergan is insisting that in his integrated subjectivity a person is a radical openness to development, which development is given its impetus by the person's feelings. These are what draw him toward his values. Without feelings, the person would have little incentive for making value-judgments at all.[37] Development of the person is not, of course, determined or necessary. He need not grow emotionally, just as he is not determined to intellectual growth. Feelings arise spontaneously, but having once arisen they can be encouraged or repressed. By deliberate control of his feelings, a person can also change his scale of values. One of the tasks of education, Lonergan claims, is to enrich and refine the feelings of a person. If one is sensitized to a proper scale of values, he will be able to discern true values and he will be motivated to transcend himself and to actualize these values in his own life.

Since the drive for meaning, which Lonergan says is basic to a person, entails not only an unrestricted desire to know but also an equally unrestricted desire to love, there is, finally, an emotional, affective component to our willing, as well as to our knowing. Here, too, emotions should lead us through the patterns of vital and social goods to their personal and religious fulfillment. Our ultimate love, for Lonergan, is a response to God--a response to the Source of all value, to the Person who in first loving us makes us loving and lovable. To the extent that one makes a response of love to God, love becomes a first principle, a dynamic state.[38] The person who is possessed by love for God finds it radiates through the whole of his living and acting. It opens his horizon to the full, affecting all his relations with others, and literally making him a new person. So the final term, the ultimate personal value to which the emotion of love can draw us is a "new creation."

Feelings, then, according to Lonergan, are essential to the development of the person. The wisest course to follow is to take full cognizance of one's feelings. If self-transcendence--intentional and real--is ever to occur, self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of the whole self, is needed. Feelings experienced strongly but never objectified can lead to a conflict between the subject as conscious and the subject as objectified, with the result often being the alienation, instead of the integration, of the person.[39]

On the other hand, a person in his daily living can exert greater circumspection over his judgments and decisions if he has a keen understanding of his emotive responses. An appreciation of the make-up of his temperament can cause him to postpone temporarily any decisive action because he knows his present mood is one of mild depression. Or, he may know that he should act promptly because he is "in the mood" to see the issue through to its conclusion. The more sophisticated one's self-knowledge in this area, the greater the degree of objectivity one will be able to bring to bear upon his judgments and decisions. For, his deeper penetration into his knowledge of his affective nature will make him increasingly cognizant of his motives and biases, and, hence, less a victim of their hidden force. Thus, throughout all a person's knowing and doing, the drive for meaning can be epitomized in the emotion of wonder that precipitates all inquiry and sustains it through understanding and judgment to decision. However, the quality, intensity, and depth of that wonder is determined by the feelings that accompany it.

This section on the emotive responses of the person has been placed at the end of the chapter on human knowing and before the chapter on decision. The significance of its position is intended to show that feelings are integrally connected with both our knowing and our living. A person's affective, emotional reactions color the operations of each level of human consciousness. They have the power to enrich his experience, vitalize his understanding, sharpen his judgment, and motivate his decisions. The need for the affective involvement of the person is evident on each level. Yet, because decision-making is so closely associated with value, the role of the emotions as the media for the apprehension of value is especially important.

CHAPTER THREE

DECISION: THE ACTUALIZATION OF MEANING

Lonergan first seeks to establish the fact that knowing is a conjunction of experiencing, understanding, and judging: he invites each person to realize in and for himself that he is a knower; i.e., one capable of experiencing, understanding, and judging. However, this does not mark the end of Lonergan's goal but the beginning. He would have each person begin from this realization of himself as a knower, as a person capable of intentional self-transcendence, and move on to the realization of himself as self-constituting, as a person capable of real as distinct from intentional, self-transcendence.

A self-constituting person is one who deliberately chooses the person he is and how he is going to live, aware that his choices affect his own being far more than the objects or options they involve. Decision-making flows naturally from the same exigence which urges one to question the meaning of his experience, to formulate his understanding of that meaning, and to seek sufficient evidence for affirming the meaning he holds. The anxiety one necessarily encounters in living stems in no small measure from the need every one experiences to make wise decisions. Lonergan's explanation of the process involved presents a cogent argument for the validity of grounding morality and obligation in integrated subjectivity. Later, in

Chapter Seven, "The World of Interiority", this aspect of the person as an originator of value will be more fully explored.

ELEMENTS IN DECISION-MAKING

Decision-making involves four main elements:[1] the underlying sensitive flow of consciousness, the practical insight, the reflection which terminates in a judgment of value, and the deliberation which terminates in a decision.

A. The Sensitive Flow and the Practical Insight

The sensitive flow of consciousness includes all the images, affective and aggressive feelings, and conscious bodily movements of an individual. It is the patterned context from which emerges the practical insight. The practical insight seizes the meaning which it finds in the data presented by the pattern of consciousness. Of itself, the practical insight does not imply that such a meaning truly exists. It differs from the direct insight in that the practical insight grasps what seems to be a value; i.e., a good which may be the possible object of choice. The meaning it grasps then is not something that is but a possible value to be realized through decision. Therefore, the process of reflection following the practical insight will consist of questions concerning whether or not such a meaning ought to be made to exist. Practical insights have as their objective not what is but what is to be done. They reveal possible courses of action.

B. Reflection and the Value Judgment

It is the work of reflection to determine if the practical insight has grasped a genuine value or not. Through reflection, a person raises and seeks to answer questions about the object: the purposed action and its foreseeable consequences. The intensity, scope, and duration of the reflection are variables inversely proportionate to the person's antecedent knowledge of the prospective plan. If he is unfamiliar with it, he will want answers to questions like: What exactly is being proposed? What are the steps involved? Does it admit alternatives? What does it positively exclude? What are the likely consequences? Is the whole plan feasible? How possible or probably are its parts? What is its general utility? If the person is dealing with a plan with which he is fully cognizant, this period of reflection may be accomplished by his merely adverting to what he already knows. For reflection is simply a means of reaching knowledge. The knowledge he seeks will take the form of a judgment of value.[2]

Lonergan divides judgments of value into simple and comparative. They are simple if reflection has been on one possible course of action: "x" is truly good or "x" is only apparently good. They are comparative when alternatives are presented: "x" is better than "y" or more urgent, more useful, more appropriate. Judgments of value differ from judgments of fact in content but not in structure.

The content of a judgment of fact is what exists or what is so, but the content of a judgment of value is what ought to be or what one approves or disapproves. The structure of both show a distinction between the meaning and the criterion. In judgments of fact the meaning of truth is its correspondence with reality. The criterion, however, which says when truth is reached is the fact of sufficient evidence for making the judgment, reaching a virtually unconditioned. The objectivity of a judgment of fact, therefore, is the achievement of intentional self-transcendence. The person passes over what he wishes, feels, or desires to what is, in fact, so. Similarly, in judgments of value the meaning is that this really is good or better. But, the criterion, Lonergan insists, is whether the person is truly transcending himself or not. In other words, it is the authenticity of the person that makes a judgment of value objective. Is he moving toward real self-transcendence? If so, then, his goal is to affirm what is objectively a value, rather than what satisfies him.

Judgments of value, for Lonergan, go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence without arriving at the fullness of real self-transcendence. The fullness lies not simply in knowing what is good but also in doing it. If one knows the good without doing it, he is either forced to acknowledge his failure or run the risk of destroying the basis of his moral being by rationalization. Judgments of value are beyond the sphere of fact; they point to reality in the moral order that awaits realization. In the judgment of value itself there is a moral element since it is the first step toward constituting the person as capable of real self-transcendence. If the person is authentically open to such transcendence, he will see in the judgment of value a summons to goodness, true collaboration, and love.

Intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value are apprehensions of value. These, Lonergan contends, are given in feelings.[3] Feelings here refer to intentional responses to the ontic value of persons and to the qualitative value of beauty, truth, noble deeds, virtue, achievements, and the like. We ask questions concerning a proposed value and we recognize correct answers. Still, if there were no more to it than that we would only be in the realm of knowing, of intentional self-transcendence. However, there is more, Along with the recognition of the correctness of our answers about the proposed judgment is an affective response: a stirring of our whole being as we glimpse the possibility or the actuality of real self-transcendence. There is a thrust of feeling that carries us toward real self-transcendence; toward the value as perceived, but not yet truly affirmed.

Lonergan stresses that a judgment of value should have three components. 1) A knowledge of human life and its possibilities. Without this general knowledge and the specific information about the practicality of the planned course of action and its probable consequences, there can be no genuine judgment made. Without knowledge, fine feelings result in a brand of moral idealism which may do more harm than good. In short, judgments of value must have a basis in concrete human reality. 2) The knowledge and the moral feelings one has about the proposed good must be critical. The person must submit them to a critique to insure that he is as well-informed as possible and that his feelings are as well-developed as possible. 3) Finally, this development of knowledge and feelings head toward existential discovery. The person discovers himself to be a moral being. He begins to see the need for personal responsibility. In each judgment of value there is the opportunity for the fulfillment of oneself or the loss of oneself. The person, through his judgments of value and ultimately through his decisions, achieves real self-transcendence. He often experiences his own weakness or perhaps wickedness, raising questions of salvation and mediating the possibility of a religious conversion.

While judgments of value are essential for deciding rationally, they are neither tantamount to choosing nor the final determinant of choice. Reflection may lead me to proper knowledge of the value and my feelings may apprehend the value as a value, but both merely indicate the path I should follow. My judgment may be that the proposed action is concretely feasible, quite necessary, and morally obligatory. But, Lonergan reminds us, while it is one thing to know what could or should be done, it is another thing to do it.

C. Deliberation and Decision

The persuasion necessary to motivate oneself to undertake what one has judged is a value calls forth the fourth element in decision-making: deliberation leading to decision. Deliberation regards not the object: the proposed plan, but the motives for adopting it. Here the questions can be raised on different levels. On the level of the particular good for me, I might ask: Would its adoption or execution be agreeable? Are there features which will compensate for its disagreeable aspects? Would I find it useful? How desirable to me are the goals for which it is useful? From the level of the satisfaction of personal desires solely, deliberation can move to the level of the good of order: Does the proposed plan fall under an already existing institutional framework? If not, is it merely egoistic or is it contributing to the initiation of needed reform of the framework? If it does come under the accepted order, is not that order in need of questioning? Would it not be better to try to change the established institution than to continue working within it? Perhaps all such questions are superfluous since I am not in need of motivation.

My willingness to accept the plan is evident and, from my past experience with similar plans, habitual. Then, questions could arise on the level of value itself: Is my willingness right or wrong, good or bad? Habits of willing are imperative if I am to live decisively, but are my habits in need of improvement? Are the values to which they commit me true or false? Is my basic orientation in need of conversion? Am I intelligent and reasonable enough in the short run, only to be blind to the larger implications of my way of living? Am I truly concerned about the effects of my actions on the community?

Deliberation, then, is concerned with a scrutiny of the motives for my decision to choose or reject what I have judged a value. Of itself deliberation, unlike reflection, has no internal term. It does not end in any judgment but rather in the decision to act or not to act. Therefore, deliberation is capable of infinite expansion. A person can even deliberate over the possible causes of his lack of decision. Transposition of deliberation into the realm of deliberation on deliberation is, in the long run, of course, an attempt to escape the obligation of acting in a manner consistent with knowledge. While technically no decision is made or carried out, not to decide is, effectively, to decide. Normally the length of time spent in deliberation can be gauged by the degree of willingness one must generate before he is moved to act.

A COMPARISON BETWEEN JUDGMENT AND DECISION

The decision which calls a halt to the period of deliberation is an act of willing. For Lonergan, it has the internal alternatives of either consenting or refusing. It may possess external alternatives also. For, if different courses of action are considered simultaneously, then consent to one and refusal of the others constitute a choice. In several ways decision is similar to judgment. Each select one of a pair of contradictories: judgment either affirms or denies; decision consents or refuses. Each is dealing with actuality: judgment aims to complete one's knowledge of an actuality that already exists; decison intends to realize an actuality which otherwise would not exist. Each is rational: both are concerned with objects apprehended by insight, and both occur because of a reflective grasp of reasons or motives.

While judgment and decision are both rational, there is a radical difference between the rationality of judgment and the rationality of decision. The difference hinges upon and is constituted by an enlarging transformation of consciousness. Judgment--and this, of course, holds both for the judgment of fact and the judgment of value--is an act of rational consciousness. Decision is an act of rational self-consciousness or moral consciousness. The rationality of judgment lies in the unfolding of the detached and disinterested desire to know in the search for meaning as affirmed. The rationality of decision lies in the demands of the morally conscious subject for a lived consistency between the meaning he affirms in knowing and the meaning he expresses in his deciding and doing.

Lonergan makes a further distinction between the effective rationality of the subject as rationally conscious and that of the subject as morally conscious. In judging, his rationality is radically negative: he is rational if he does not let any other desire interfere with the exercise of his desire to know. In deciding, his rationality is radically positive: he is rational only if his demand for consistency between knowing and doing is followed by his deciding and doing in a manner consistent with his knowing. Thus, the human person experiences a succession of transformations of his consciousness. Waking replaces dreaming. In waking, intelligent inquiry arises to sublate[4] empirical into intelligent consciousness. Critical reflection on the formulation of one's understanding transforms intelligent consciousness into rational. Each transformation sublates what has preceded it by enlarging the consciousness of the person to encompass it. The final and most encompassing transformation happens when the person as empirically, intelligently, and rationally conscious demands consistency between his knowing and doing and accedes to that demand by deciding responsibly.

OBLIGATION

Now it should be possible to understand the meaning and oftentimes inefficacy of obligation. Practical reflection can reach with certitude the conclusion that the proposed course of action is obligatory. It can assert that I must either decide in favor of the proposal or surrender consistency between what I know and what I do. Just as practical reflection can affirm a proposal as a value, so it can affirm a proposal as obligatory. Thus, the emergence of an obligation is the emergence of a rational necessity in rational consciousness. Still, the obligation exists on the level of judgment, on the level of knowing. On this level, I may know my obligation but I am not "determined" to its fulfillment. To carry over the obligation from the realm of knowing to the domain of doing entails an act of the will. Mere knowing is ineffectual in bringing about the necessary willingness to meet one's obligations. Deliberation and the need for willingness in order to decide in favor of consistency between my knowing and doing is why rational necessity becomes merely an exigence for moral consciousness. In other words, when an action is obligatory, I cannot be a rational knower and deny the obligation and I cannot be a moral doer and fail to fulfill the obligation. But I can be a rational knower simply through reflection with no act of willing; but I cannot be a moral doer without the act of willing which is the result of deliberation.

Practical reflection provides the insight needed to grasp the proposed plan as a value. Obviously, the plan seen as a value is contingent both in its being: it need not have been a value but, in fact, it is; and in my knowing it to be a value: I need not have judged it to be a value but, in fact, I do. Finally, the deliberation by which I seek to convince myself of the reasonableness of actually willing this value involves contingency. The reasonableness of human acts of will is not a natural gift but a precariously achieved and held personal quality. There is not causal necessity linking determinate knowing to determinate willing. There occurs consistency between my knowing and my doing only when I see the consistency as reasonable and will to realize the affirmed value in my own life.

THE PERSON AS MORALLY CONSCIOUS

The integrated subjectivity which is the hallmark of Lonergan's notion of person reaches new heights on the level of moral consciousness. From the moment the individual is illuminated through consciousness, the potentiality for full personhood is present. On each level of consciousness, he becomes more and more an ek/sistant, a subject. As empirically conscious, he experiences the data given through his senses and in consciousness. The exigence that is his intelligent consciousness causes him to raise questions about the meaning of his experience and push on through images to insight, to conceptualization and formulation of that meaning. Not content with understanding, he critically appraises the evidence and, on the level of rational consciousness, he judges his understanding of the meaning of his experience to be true, false, or inconclusive. With each higher level, the person comes closer to the goal: intentional self-transcendence by which he rationally appropriates his world by evaluating its meaningfulness. As a corollary of this, of course, is the greater achievement: through his intellectual conversion he appropriates himself as a person capable of experiencing, understanding, and judging meaning.

Still, the process is incomplete until he takes possession of his moral consciousness. Through his decisions the person becomes the ground of his own possibilities, the one responsible for the free realization of those possibilities. He reaches the "critical point" in his transcendence: finding out for himself that it is up to himself to decide what he is to make of himself. This making of self has been going on since birth. The crucial difference which integrated subjectivity involves is that this making of self becomes open-eyed and deliberate. The meaning of his life is largely under his control. While control of life's meaning is never absolute: the future remains hidden, hereditary and environmental and sub-conscious factors wield some influence; still, the person is not merely a drifter at the mercy of every whim or wind of change. His integrated subjectivity gives him the critical acumen to subject his intentional consciousness--which include both his cognitional and affective responses--to a constant questioning critique. What does this mean? Is this true? Is it worthwhile? What am I to do about it?

THE AUTHENTIC PERSON

The person increases in responsibility as he advances in autonomous self-transcendence. His sensitivity about adverse criticism mounts proportionately as it is directed against his seeing straight, recalling correctly, judging wisely, or living morally. While there is a high degree of responsibility involved in judgment, still, not all his judgments demand a "Yes" or a "No" nor are they HIM. In the matter of decision, however, the degree of responsibility reaches its apex. This area allows for no shading or qualification. HE must decide, and very often, before he is fully ready. If he allows himself to be other-directed, that too is his decision, though it be what Lonergan has called an "inauthentic equivalent."[5]

Authenticity is, for Lonergan, essentially an openness to one's drive for meaning, the exigence to know and love. It is a necessary quality of the person on every level of consciousness. As empirically conscious, a person's authenticity is his openness to experience; his refusal to close off any channels through which he may gain new insights into himself and his world. As intelligently conscious, a person's authenticity is shown in his faithfulness to his drive for understanding; his willingness to raise questions, without regard for "vested interests"--his own or others. On the level of rational consciousness, the authenticity of the person is evident in his critical appraisal of the available facts and his openness to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate his present judgment. Finally, the authenticity of the morally conscious person is his willingness to live the decisions he makes. On this level, authenticity assumes a moral dimension in that morality, as Lonergan defines it, is the consistency between what one knows and what one does.

The person's authenticity depends on his acting in consistency with his knowing, a knowing that must be constantly submitted to the most trenchant criticism. As a morally conscious person, he is not only capable of acting but he must be conscious of his motives, present to himself as a maker of motives and a doer of deeds. Lonergan insists that the dynamism constitutive of consciousness is found in three imperatives: be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. And these imperatives--like the possibilities for achieving fuller self-transcendence--are unrestricted. They pertain to every inquiry, every judgment, every decision.

Only on the level of decision is there reached performative meaning. Judgments of value, the actual positing of the decision and its realization through action results in the ultimate test of a person's valuing of meaning. Potential meaning is always ambiguous. Formal meaning is merely being considered. Full meaning demands personal responsibility but it ends with knowledge. Performative meaning requires that one be authentic and live the meaning he has experienced, understood, and judged to be a value.

Similarly, it is only on the level of performative meaning that a person achieves the real self-transcendence that can give him greater personal control of the meaning through which he constitutes himself and his world. The fact that the person is a decider is indisputable. He may seldom advert to himself as one who makes decisions but in his "performance" the reality and regularity of his decision-making is evident. His day is marked by countless choices: which suit to wear, which letter to answer first, which movie to attend in the evening. Small--and sometimes large--decisions are the stuff of human life.[6]

Some may claim that most persons abdicate their personal role in decision-making to routine or the pressure of the peer group. While much that we do is based on habit rather than deliberate choice and few, if any, of the decisions we make are totally free of outside influence, still we cannot claim to be entirely bound by habit or shackled to the wishes of the group. We know ultimately that we do decide. Even when we succumb to allowing others to decide for us, that also is our decision. We choose, as Lonergan says, an "inauthentic equivalent," i.e., we choose not to choose.

Lonergan's insistence that a person is a decider and that through his decisions he makes himself what he is is crucial to his notion of person. Unless a person is essentially free to act upon the knowledge he has, there would be no possibility of a dynamic development. Knowledge alone is not enough. A person must so live that the meaning he affirms through knowing is realized in his lived-decisions. Only in this manner can he grow and develop as an authentic person.

GENERAL SUMMARY

As we said in the Introduction, the purpose of this thesis is to expose Lonergan's notion of person as self-transcendence. In Part One, we have been chiefly concerned with understanding what Lonergan means by consciousness as experience and how his unique theory of consciousness underpins the self-transcending operations constitutive of personhood. Chapter One shows that consciousness, for Lonergan, is a multi-leveled experience which allows the person to be simultaneously present to himself as subject and present to objects (through different modalities). In Chapters Two and Three, we discuss in detail each of the constitutive operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, by which the person transcends himself in achieving personhood. These operations, because they are dynamically interdependent, form a dynamic structure, with each operation calling forth and being completed by the next. Thus, my experience forces me to seek to understand its meaning. After I judge what it is, I am morally obliged to decide in the light of my knowledge. Through each operation I transcend myself more fully.

This self-transcending process by which I grasp or constitute meaning and then choose to live according to it marks my growth as a person. Since each operation is matched by a specific level of consciousness, each transcendence raises me to a higher level of consciousness. For instance, when I am merely experiencing the sensations of rain and wind, I am experientially conscious. If I begin to puzzle over a problem, I become intelligently conscious. If I reach a judgment concerning the problem, I am rationally conscious. If I further decide to act according to my judgment, I am morally conscious. With each step, the level of my conscious activity becomes more autonomous, more responsible, more genuinely free.

The emphasis on the person as the subject of these conscious operations brings out Lonergan's contention that personhood is a goal which must be won through the efforts of the individual. Lonergan feels that if a person understands his operations, he will come to appropriate them, thereby achieving greater control over both his operations and the meaning he constitutes through them. Similarly, throughout Part One, we have shown that the personhood Lonergan describes is an integrated subjectivity. This means that Lonergan's person is one who is open to unrestricted development in all facets of his being--intellectually, spiritually, emotionally. Finally, in exposing Lonergan's views on person as the subject of these self-transcending activities, we have tried to lay the groundwork for a discussion of the worlds of meaning the person constitutes through his operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. In Part Two we will take up these several worlds and explore what it means for a person to differentiate and appropriate them.

PART TWO

THE PERSON AND HIS WORLDS

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT'S WORLD

If Lonergan's heuristic notion of person is correct, then, a person is one who is capable of, demands, discovers and constitutes meaning. It is through the operations of his integrated subjectivity that one seeks and achieves meaning. Integrated subjectivity and meaning epitomize the two poles of a person's horizon. We have already explored the subjective pole--the operations of a person's integrated subjectivity--in the first three chapters. Now we will examine the objective pole--the worlds of meaning constituted by the person and in which he lives.

The subject's world differs essentially from "the" world. "The" world, writes Lonergan, is what is there to be known and is unchanged by its being known.[1] The subject's world is the objectification or thematization of the meaning found or constituted by him. It is correlative to the subject. It may be a world of fantasy, a world of fact, or a mixture of both. But whatever its make-up, it is the world in which the person lives and develops.

Before considering the various worlds possible to the person according to the type of subject he is, it may be helpful to see how the world of the subject develops in terms of horizon. The horizon of one's world develops in close approximation to the development of the subject's operations. If the person is not able to differentiate his operations, his world, too, will be undifferentiated. If, through the use of a method, he learns to differentiate his operations (intellectual conversion), he will be able to differentiate his worlds. If he also appropriates his operations (moral conversion), he will be able to appropriate his differentiated worlds. The conversions which transform the person and his operations necessarily transform his worlds. For, any change in the person causes a change in the worlds he constitutes. Just as the person and his worlds are correlative and concomitant, so they are mutually dependent.

STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERSON'S WORLD

Child development and the modifications it causes in the child's world is treated extensively in the work of Piaget.[2] Lonergan borrows freely from the conclusions reached by Piaget in his studies. For instance, Lonergan uses many of Piaget's concepts when he describes the world of immediacy.

A. The World of Immediacy

The world of the infant is the world of immediacy--what is felt, grasped, sucked, seen, heard, smelled. It is dominated by immediate experience. Gradually the child develops, and such development means he learns new operations. He learns to adapt to some new situation or object. Adaption involves two parts: assimilation, by which the infant tries to use an "old" operation in new circumstances--sucking is now applied to objects other than the nipple;

and adjustment, by which he modified and supplements his "old" operation to fit the new circumstances--he shapes his mouth to fit the varying shapes of what he sucks. Through adaptation, he constantly edges forward in his development. Slowly he learns to differentiate operations; e.g., those of the hand from those of the foot. He gradually learns to integrate and group operations as in learning to walk. Finally, he learns to group groups of operations and is able to walk from a chair to his mother and back again.

B. The World as Mediated by Meaning

In all of the operations, he is learning to cope with an undifferentiated mass of reality. All these operations are immediate; all deal with objects that are present. He learns to operate on what he can see, hear, and touch. Mastery of such grouping and grouping of groups of operations gives the child access to his world, because, thus far, his world is limited to what can be immediately sensed. However, once the child learns to speak the horizon of his world expands immeasurably. Through the development of language, imagination, and the budding of symbolic consciousness, his world becomes not limited merely to the immediate but is now open to the mediation of meaning. The undifferentiated mass of reality can now be patterned, placed in a context, comprehended because it is mediated through word, image, symbol. By the same mediation, the past, the future, and what is absent can be conceived. In learning to speak, the child pushes out of the one-dimensional world of immedicay and moves into the larger, richer world mediated by meaning.

At first, this world beyond the nursery is but an extension of the world of immediacy. Picture books, nursery rhymes, and fairy tales give him glimpses of a world of vast and variagated beauty. Slowly he learns to distinguish between fact and fiction, history and legend. He develops through education the ability to mediate the reality of his world through a technical language. He moves more and more from the world of imagination and its immediacy to the world of thought and theory. This world mediated by meaning is not merely the sum of all worlds of immediacy. It cannot be known simply through experience. Knowledge now depends on the interrelated activities of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Still, the development continues. The introduction of meaning into a person's world is a limitless source of possible development. Lonergan points out that the subject's world can now be shaped by the memories of other men, the commonsense of the community, the pages of literature, the scientific endeavors of research teams, the experiences of saints, the writings of philosophers and theologians.

Just as the distinction between immediacy and meaning as mediated by intelligent operations has tremendous significance for the individual so, too, the further distinction between spontaneous meaning and reflexive meaning has broad relevance for, and beyond, the individual. This later distinction is the basis for the distinction between Western culture before and after Socrates. For, when meaning is mediated explicitly through the clearly differentiated operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, meaning is rationally controlled by the person. Before Socrates, meaning was controlled through magic and myth. But, since magic is a hidden and futile command of meaning and myth is a mistaken interpretation of meaning, neither offer a control that is explicit or rational. With the Greeks came the breakthrough, for Western culture, from mythos to logos. Socrates' questions: "What is courage?", "What is justice?", "What is knowledge?" were simple enough. But, try as they might, the Athenians could not give Socrates the definitions he wanted. The Athenians discovered that meaning has two levels--the spontaneous level, on which we use everyday language, and the reflexive level, on which we not only use everyday language but also define what we mean by the everyday language. The Athenians were familiar with meaning on the first level, since they knew quite well the difference between courage and cowardice, justice and injustice, knowledge and ignorance. They neither confused one with the other nor became mixed-up in their use of words. However, on the second level, they were at a loss. They were unable to say what they meant by what they said. They could give descriptive examples but no explanatory definitions. Definitions are omni et soli and, as such, require that the person not only know what he means but also have control of the meaning so he can apply it to every instance of the defined and no instance of anything else.

Is control of meaning so important? Isn't it sufficient to know what we mean? Lonergan insists that only when meaning is mediated explicitly through the clearly differentiated, intelligent operations (in other words, when one moves from the spontaneous level to the reflexive level of meaning), can the control of meaning pass from the realm of magic and myth to the realm of reason.[3] Thus it is that the placement of the control of meaning marks the difference between a culture that is pre-theoretic and one that can utilize theory in an explanatory manner. Pre-theoretic or primitive men were as intelligent and reasonable as we in practical matters, from hunting and fishing to working out the intricacies of geometry of astronomy. Yet, they did not possess the theory for explaining, for mediating, the meaning they knew. Therefore, their lack of a method for mediating meaning left it open to the false control of magic and myth. Lonergan sums up the need for mediation of meaning by saying that far from being idle talk, mediation of meaning is "a technique for putting an end to idle talk.[4]

There is a further consequence of the Greek movement from mythos to logos. The mediation of meaning introduced by the Greeks gave us classical culture with its static norms for viewing reality which it perceived to be hierarchical and changless. Classicist culture dominated man's horizon into the 20th Century. According to the classicist horizon, the subjective pole--the person and his operations--were subsumed under the definition of "an individual substance of a rational nature." This view of the person took into account only what was essential, universal, and necessary. As such, it applied *omni et soli* but it resulted in an arbitrary standardization of "man," ignoring the uniqueness of each individual person. Similarly, the classicist horizon's objective pole--the world of the person--was under the thumb of the Aristotelian definition of science. Reality, the "really real," was known through science which gave "true, certain knowledge of causal necessity."[5] Whatever fell outside this limited domain was known only through opinion.

The breakdown of the classicist horizon came about primarily through a change in the concept of science. Modern science has replaced the Aristotelian ideal of science on all five counts. Modern science does not claim to be *true* but only on the way towards truth. It is not *certain* but merely probable. It is not *knowledge* but rather hypothesis, theory, system. It aims not at *necessity* but tries to achieve verified possibility. In place of Aristotle's four causes, modern science seeks an explanatory correlation of all phenomena. Similarly, the new notion of science has produced a new science of the person. Modern, human sciences are not interested in an arbitrary standardization of man but in the fullest possible development of each person. Their interest in the complete explanation of all phenomena makes them interested in all facets of the person. Because the aims are so diverse, the modern sciences never think of themselves as finished, but rather as dynamic, on-going process, open to all possibilities.

In these two briefly sketched examples, one can see that Lonergan is implying that the mediation of meaning through the controls offered by classicist culture is no longer viable. What he is also saying is that modern culture has not fully explicated how it will mediate, and hence, control meaning. This is why Lonergan claims that our present age is undergoing a "crisis in culture." The thrust of Lonergan's work is based on the conviction that the best mediation of meaning is one rooted in the structural invariants of the concrete human person.[6] In these days when one culture is no longer considered normative, when the natural and human sciences are making rapid advances, when meaning is seen to be constitutive of all human living--what is needed "is not a dam to block the flow but control of the river-bed through which the stream must flow."[7] Lonergan's insistence on method as the means of controlling meaning reflects his belief that if a person methodically comes to know and appropriate his operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, he will be able to differentiate and control the worlds of meaning. The horizon Lonergan would wish to project for modern culture would be one in which the person would be the self-appropriated subject of the multiple worlds of meanings which he constitutes and in which he lives.

C. The World as Constituted by Meaning

It is when the person realizes that meaning is constitutive of his worlds and he is the source of that meaning, then, the person's worlds become the fully human worlds of Existenz.[8] Constitutive meaning does not necessarily imply that a person creates his values _ex nihilo_. Constitution as used by Lonergan refers originally to the distinction between mediated meanings and constitutive meanings. This distinction is based on the distinction made in Lonergan's notion of consciousness between cognitive and constitutive. Mediated meanings are meanings mediated by intellect, concept, or imagination. They are the meanings _known_ by a person. Constitutive meanings are those which make up, form, constitute reality precisely as _human_. Just as human consciousness is cognitive not merely of what _is_ but also of what it constitutes, so the human person is capable not only of knowing meaning but also of knowing meaning as constituted by himself.

A further corollary of Lonergan's use of constitution is that the particular meaning or value which expresses a person's life is constitutive insofar as it both reveals the reality of the person, consciously or unconsciously, and brings him into contact with a reality that is possibly beyond his own possibilities. This "beyond" refers both to finite transcendent possibilities where he can know himself as capable of intentional and real self-transcendence and even beyond those finite possibilities to God and the full self-transcendence of love.

A transcendental analysis of the constitutive dimension of the subject's world is an attempt to show that the ultimate grounding of self-constitution is not the person himself. The grounding is the very possibility of value. Therefore, it is erroneous to equate self-constitution with complete autonomy. This would be to interprete historical consciousness exclusively in terms of an ideology like secularism. Such a positing of complete autonomy involves an arbitrary shutting off of the question; and obscurantist tendency to refuse even to raise the question of transcendence.[9]

Nevertheless, the person is the human "cause" of constitutive meaning. (Some further implications of Lonergan's notion of constitutive meaning will be seen in the discussion on the existential subject. Through his judgments and decisions, a person "causes" or constitutes both himself and his world. Naturally, this aspect of constitution argues for the imperative need for a person to be intelligent, reasonable, responsible, free, and open to development. All of his human acts are constitutive of himself and his world. Likewise, these human acts take place in a communal context. Therefore, Lonergan insists that only the world constituted by meaning is a properly human world, a world of community consisting of free, self-constituting subjects.

It is from this perspective that we will explore the various worlds of meaning open to a person. Our stance will be that of a person who has a differentiated consciousness; a person who has methodically distinguished and appropriated his operations and therefore has distinguished and appropriated his worlds. For such a person the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning have been sublated into the world constituted by meaning. This differentiated world is necessarily plural since no one world is adequate to express the multiple meanings a person constitutes.

Each world will be described, showing how the horizon which delimits each affects the person whose world it is. By his authenticity in living in one world, the person finds another opens to him. This is because one's horizon, while it limits him to a determinate "view" or world, it is capable of limitless development and conversion. Because it is simultaneously "fixed" and "open," the horizon of each person is unique and ever-changing. The person, as he moves through many and varied experiences, gaining new insights, sometimes shifting the criteria of relevance and evidence that guide his judgment, constantly develops in time.

In discussing the relationship between a person's horizon and his world, Michael Novak stresses the fact that the concept of horizon is not Husserlian. It does not project two objective spheres "out there" with one subsumed within the other. Just as Husserl's epistemology is Platonist, so, too, is his metaphysics with the result that it includes this world and another world. This notion of horizon, Novak points out, comes from Bernard Lonergan and its intellectual lineage is anti-Platonic. It denies that there is any metaphysical world out there beyond the world in which we live. Its purpose "is to articulate the fact that human deeds in this present, concrete, historical world are symbolic of human intentions and not exhaustively translatable into the categories of instrumentalism."[10] The concept of horizon is an effort to "say something about the character of life: it expresses vision or the lack of it."[11] As a person is, so he acts. If he acts as to contract his horizon, he limits reality and cuts down the number of objective worlds of meaning that can be his. On the other hand, if a person remains dynamically and authentically open to all opportunities, he will find his horizon capable of conversion: the actual transformation of himself, his operations, his orientation and, hence, the transformation of his world.

The first half of the thesis explored the basic operations constitutive of person in their dependence on consciousness as experience. In other words, it dealt with the person as one who experiences, understands, judges, and decides. Having thus investigated the activities of the conscious person, we will now in the second half of the thesis focus on the worlds of meaning which the person constitutes through his conscious acts. In Chapters Five through Eight, then, the emphasis will be the person in his relationship to the objects of his human acts, his worlds.

It is the bipolarity of Lonergan's notion of horizon which correlates acts and objects, operations and worlds, subjective and objective poles. Furthermore, one's horizon, while it marks the limits of his present stage of personal development, is open to conversion. (Incidentally, this permits us to use a moving viewpoint in describing each of the worlds). For, the person as self-transcendence is capable of raising the questions which cannot be answered within the context of his present horizon. This forces him to transcend it, by a conversion of his operations and, through them, a conversion of his world.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE WORLD OF COMMONSENSE

The world of commonsense[1] is the everyday world of practical living. Its horizon is set by the concrete concerns of what is useful, necessary, and worthwhile. In this world, the spontaneous subject is totally absorped in the business of living. He meets his particular obligations with an integrated response. The need for theory or a purely intellectual approach to any problem is beyond his horizon. Intelligence is neither lacking nor necessarily less but it is an intelligence which specializes in the concrete here and now.

APPREHENSION OF REALITY

His view of the world is predominately person-centered. Not that he studies person as such but rather that he knows individuals and how to deal with them explicitly. All his knowing regards what is to be said and done or not to be said and done in each of the many situations in which he normally finds himself. If he finds himself in a strange situation, one which he has never before encountered, he will be ill-at-ease until he learns how to cope with the concrete reality involved. Everything and everyone in the world of commonsense centers around and is related to the spontaneous subject. Lonergan explains that this does not imply crude egotism but merely a fact about the nature of the commonsense world. Without theory, all relationships must have the subject as one partner. The man of commonsense sees a table as a piece of furniture that is of possible use to him, an object which pleases him aesthetically, or something which costs too much for him to afford.

Because the structure of his consciousness is aimed at practical living rather than speculative thinking, his feelings are integrally meshed with his approach to life. In fact, it is erroneous to speak of his "approach to life" as if he thought about life abstractly. The spontaneous subject is just that: spontaneous. He approaches life by living it. All his thinking is geared toward, and specializes in, doing. That is why feelings play such a dominant role. His feelings of affectivity and aggressiveness are what motivates his thinking and doing.

APPROACH TO LEARNING

Because the orientation of his consciousness is egocentric, his approach to learning is also centered on how concrete and particular things are related to him. All men share the wonder that spontaneously generates questioning. From childhood, we incessantly ask, Why? What? How?. If an insight follows the questioning, one only has to act or think on the basis of it for its incompleteness to raise further questions. These further questions lead to further insights and one's store of commonsense knowledge grows. Such learning can be supplemented and enriched by formal education but the point we want to make here is that learning is not confined to a classroom. We learn from our own successes and failures. We learn, too, from the words, and, more frequently, from the actions of family and friends. But, because our learning is so closely tied to our relations with others, we learn from, and contribute to, the fund of knowledge Lonergan calls the commonsense of the community.

It is from this fund of commonsense that the spontaneous subject draws. Commonsense, the specialization of intelligence in the concrete and particular, is common without being general. For, Lonergan defines it as an incomplete set of insights which await completion by the person's getting the needed insight in the relevant situation. When the situation passes, his store of commonsense falls back again into its incomplete state. This is why commonsense learning is expressed in proverbs rather than scientific laws. Proverbs contain instances of practical wisdom but they express, not the scientist's rounded set of insights that either holds in every case or in none, but the incomplete set of insights which is called upon in every concrete case, becoming proximately relevant only after a good look around has resulted in the needed additional insight.[2]

Similarly, commonsense does not express itself in a technical language. It knows that one must say what one means and mean what one says but its correlation between saying and meaning is subtle and fluid. For, commonesnse says what it means--but it says it to *someone.* The spontaneous subject is sensitive to the other person and "where he is at." Communication here is not a matter of formal logic; rather, it is a work of art. He communicates not merely through words but also through nuanced changes in tone and volume, facial expressions, gestures, pauses, and omissions. Therefore, commonsense is the only interpreter of commonsense utterances. For, Lonergan reminds us, the relation between saying and meaning is the relation between sensible presentations and intellectual grasp. This relation can be as direct as, "This is a pen." But, it can also be as subtle and fluid, as delicate and rapid, as is necessary for one incarnate intelligence to communicate its meaning to another by realizing what the other has yet to understand and what act or word would make him understand. Commonsense, then, is logical, if "logical" means "intelligent and reasonable." It is not logical, if "logical" means conformity to the rules of logic; for logic in this latter sense cannot match the resourcefulness of the human person in adapting to the exigencies of the concrete tasks of self-communication.[3]

Knowledge, then, is important to the spontaneous subject but it must be knowledge that will help him to understand the persons and things with which he must deal. Through his knowledge, he builds up practical experience so he will be more and more competent in similar, future situations. Lonergan stresses that the spontaneous subject learns as all men do--by the self-correcting process in which insights accumulate, coalesce, qualify, and correct one another. Words, for him, have the function not of naming the intrinsic properties of things, but of completing the focusing of his conscious intentionality on things, of crystallizing his attitudes, expectations, intentions, and of guiding all his actions.

QUALITIES PECULIAR TO COMMONSENSE

Thus far we have been saying that the spontaneous subject's consciousness is structured so that he responds to his world in a practical, personalistic manner. Further, the difference in his structure of consciousness effects a difference in his process of learning. Similarly, his apprehension of his world is unique. Lonergan gives an example of this by contrasting scientific with commonsense description. While both deal with things as related to us, they do so from different viewpoints and with different aims. Scientific description, the work of a trained observer, aims for complete articulateness and exhaustive statement. It surely begins from data as sensed, as related to us, but it does so with the ultimate goal of methodically relating things to one another. Commonsense, on the contrary, has no such goal. It never leaves the realm of things-for-me. Any further questions which arise for the spontaneous subject are held within the interests and needs of human living, of what makes for success in daily work, and the search for pragmatic solutions to immediate problems. In fact, commonsense is marked by this restriction of further questions to the domain of the concrete and practical. It is similarly marked by its distain of any answer that would not make an immediately palpable difference. The person of commonsense has no time and sees no need for what has only "theoretical" application to the here and now.

Lonergan points out another singular quality about the commonsense world: its differentiation into specialized departments. Commonsense varies from country to country, from job to job, from social strata to social strata. An American blue-collar worker can be intelligently at ease in all the situations he faces on the job, at home, or with his friends. He has a "feel" for the correct thing to do or say in all the eventualities that occur in his milieu. While not infallible, he makes fewer mistakes now than when he was young and inexperienced. He personifies the ideals of commonsense. But, his commonsense acumen is strictly limited to the time, place, and conditions under which he does his "thing." Transfer him to France, give him a different job and, until he develops a new store of commonsense, he will be disoriented and ill-at-ease. Lonergan says that this specialization of commonsense is what adapts a person to his individual vocation, but it is likewise the source of all the miniscular differences of outlook and mentality that separate men and women, old and young, city and country until, in the limit, one reaches the collected differences and mutual incomprehensions of different nations, different civilizations, and different epochs of human history.[4]

The picture Lonergan gives of the person of commonsense is one of the ordinary person living his normal life. In the first half of the thesis, we set out Lonergan's analysis of the operations inherent in human consciousness. Now we see that while these operations are invariant, they can be structured differently in different subjects. In the spontaneous subject the operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding are mixed in and form merely a part of the structure of his consciousness, where practical activities play a very conspicuous and predominant role. In him, his purely cognitive activities meld with his affective responses--living and hating, desiring and fearing, enjoying and enduring--to form a single, integrated, interdependent whole. He does not merely know. His sensing is linked to his affectivity. Similarly, his understanding and judging lead immediately to deciding, just as he only thinks about, tries to understand and judge, things he intends to *do*.[5] Because he is this way, his interest in learning, his communication with others, his apprehension of his world are laced with a concern for how the meaning involved in all these activities will affect him.

SUMMARY

What Lonergan is saying is that a spontaneous subject is the whole person in which knowledge is not a specialized part. For instance, the spontaneous subject knows the meaning of value or truth insofar as he lives them. He is not interested--or able--to define them. He, like the Athenians confronted by Socrates, can mean what he says when he uses these words but he cannot say precisely what he means by what he says. He lacks the theory to explain his meaning. As a spontaneous subject, this lack of theory does not bother him. But, he is a person before he is a spontaneous subject. As a person, he can raise questions about his lack of theory. Lonergan speaks of this questioning as the systematic exigence, that is, a desire on the part of the person for system, for an ordering of his knowledge. Because of this push for system or theory, a person not only raises questions that commonsense cannot answer but he also demands a context for the answers which commonsense cannot supply. If a person is authentic in allowing these questions to arise and in trying to supply both their answers and the context for the answers, he will undergo a conversion to theory. Through this conversion, his horizon will be transformed as he becomes a theoretical subject and as his world becomes the world of theory.

CHAPTER SIX

THE WORLD OF THEORY

The individual person, then, can come to realize his need for theory[1]--to explain what commonsense can only describe and to order his knowledge so that it forms a more unified whole. This is especially true for a person living in our present culture which places a high value on theory. Our advanced level of technology demands experts: persons whose mastery of theory makes them competent in their fields. The Renaissance Man who possessed universal knowledge of medicine, politics, science, and theology is extinct. The vastness of knowledge to be mastered in a minor specialization within one small area of one field of medical science is too great to be fully achieved by any one person. So, the knowledge explosion has resulted in the urgent need for both specialization and collaboration. If one wishes to be part of this world, he must become a theoretical subject. For the theoretical subject is the person who is engaged simply in knowing. His emotions are not actively involved, except as a motivating undercurrent which may, on rare occasions, rise to the surface prompting him to exclaim, "This study is good. How satisfying to see how ideas mesh!" However, one of the basic differences between the spontaneous and the theoretical subject is this difference in the structuring of their consciousness. The theoretician is operating in the intellectual pattern in which his whole consciousness is absorped in the effort to understand. As the intellectual pattern becomes more habitual, the theoretician finds his powers of concentration sharpened--insights come more readily, formulation follows swiftly, the senses pounce on significant detail, memory tosses out the contrary instances quickly, imagination devises an alternative plan immediately. This type of development takes place within the theoretical subject only over long years of work; for, as Lonergan remarks, even with talent, knowledge makes a slow if not bloody entrance.[2]

APPREHENSION OF REALITY

The world of theory is essentially an outgrowth of the world of commonsense. Commonsense is unable to explain itself or establish any norms by which it can be criticized or judged. Once it moves beyond the realm of the particular and concrete, it must either resort to symbolic utterance or silence. Theory, however allows the subject to relate things not to himself but to one another. It gives a completely different apprehension of reality than that of commonsense. The theoretician like the man of commonsense begins from description but his description is that of the trained expert focussing on elements which will allow him to move on from description to explanation. The biologist sees an animal and can give a detailed description of it. His description, however, will be far different from the layman. He is trained to see what the ordinary person would overlook. Both he and the layman understand the animal in terms of an organic unity of parts. These parts, to the layman, include the head, body, and legs. To the biologist, the parts are systems: respiratory, digestive, vascular, locomotive, etc. Each of these systems consists of a set of organs. Each organ is made up of myriads of cells. Each cell has its structure and, hence, its sub-divisions. These chains of chemical compounds can be broken down into sub-atomic protons, neutrons, and the like. Such a view of reality is surely quite different from that of the spontaneous subject's view. The reality does not differ but the apprehension of it does. Commonsense understanding contents itself with what is available immediately through perception or imagination. The other view, mediated by theory, is concerned with understanding in terms of ultimates reached through analysis. The theoretic subject can reach this understanding of reality because he is capable of speculative thinking. Speculative or theoretical thinking entails putting aside one's feelings, one's practical concerns, one's existential commitments and getting on with the work of knowing. In its strictest sense, theoretical knowing is knowing for the sake of knowing rather than knowing for the sake of doing.

THEORETICAL APPROACH TO LEARNING

The theoretician in his methodical approach to learning tries to systematize his knowledge, to organize it into a unified whole which will constitute a complete, self-sustaining system. Rather than proverbs, he seeks principles and laws which will be universally true. His first concern is with knowledge itself: pure research. Yet, the results of his pure research often have tremendous repercussions when they are applied to the problems of practical living. Still, by definition, the theoretician is primarily, if not exclusively, involved in the world of theory.

The difference in the theoretical subject's apprehension of the world causes him to develop a technical language. While he realizes that the principles and laws he is expressing are approximations of truth, not absolute truth itself, still he knows that even approximate determinations must have the logical properties of abstract truth.[3] Therefore, he defines his terms carefully and applies them rigorously. He states his postulates clearly; examining their presuppositions and exploring their implications as far as possible. Here the link between saying and meaning must be as lucid as he can make it. Hence, a technical mode of speech is essential for the theoretical subject. This technical language, incomprehensible to the layman, can be either a coining of new words or a redefining of old ones. When the theoretician does either, he transforms ordinary language. In coining new words, he adds new meanings to reality. For instance, the use of computers has created an entirely new vocabulary. In redefining old words, he gives familiar words new meanings. Greek philosophers took words like truth (aletheia) and wisdom (sophia) which were in current use and gave them meanings that never before existed. From where did these meanings come? They came from the gradual realization of theoretical subjects that their apprehension of the world demanded an expression more precise and explanatory than ordinary usage permitted. Then as today, the theoretical subject will have to create and utilize a technical language to embody the meanings he discovers.

The theoretician with his intellectualist mentality, his peculiar apprehension of reality, and his technical language forms a society quite different from that of the layman. His society consists of fellow-specialists who share his world-view and speak his language. Such a society cuts across social classes, nationalities, political ties, and religious creeds. Physicists the world over form a community based on the common meaning inherent in their world.

The theoretician is logical in the natural fashion of the person of commonsense but he is also cognizant of the principles and rules of logic; he objectifies his natural knowledge. Lonergan recalls that Parmenides referred to this as the distinction between the way of seeming and the way of truth. In Plato, it is the distinction between διαλεκτκή and ἀριστική; ἀριστική being the person who argues to win and διαλεκτκή the person who argues to let truth appear. In Aristotle, it takes the form of his Logic. The Stoics express their criteria in a moral code. For modern scientists, it is shown in their scientific method. In each case, the theoretical subject is objectifying his knowledge of first principles which the spontaneous subject simply lives.

SUMMARY

We saw that Lonergan says it is the systematic exigence which distinguishes the world of commonsense from the world of theory. The systematic exigence is the integrated subjectivity of the person not only raising questions that commonsense cannot answer but also demanding a context for its answers that commonsense can neither supply nor comprehend. That context is supplied by theory, and the objects to which it refers are in the world of theory. Another way of expressing this is to say that the worlds of commonsense and theory are grounded in the possibility of the specialization and structuring of human consciousness. Commonsense is the specialization of intelligence for dealing with the concrete and particular. Theory can be described as "the intellect on its own."[4] Human consciousness has the potential necessary for living in the world of theory. The person as a conscious subject need not be content with the limitations imposed by the world of commonsense. He can push back the horizons of this world and seek the wider vistas of explanation and theory. When he does, his grasp of reality is radically altered. Similarly, the person can raise the question "Which of these worlds--commonsense or theory--is the really real?". To answer this, he must transcend the external worlds of both commonsense and theory and be "converted" to the world of interiority, which is the subject matter of Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE WORLD OF INTERIORITY

When a person has met the systematic exigence and moved beyond the world of commonsense to a world of theory, he may, if he remains open to all that is real, be brought up short by the critical exigence. This critical exigence can drive him from the worlds of commonsense and theory to the inner world of subjectivity. The world of interiority is not the presence of objects to the subject but the far more basic and intimate presence of the subject to himself as subject. The difference between the worlds of interiority and the worlds of commonsense and theory is grounded in the differentiation between consciousness itself and knowledge.[1] Consciousness, according to Lonergan, is the person's immediate awareness of himself and his operations. Knowledge is the mediation by means of concept or image of this awareness (introspection) and the awareness of other objects (direct knowing).

THE CONVERSIONS TO INTERIORITY

The questions which arise and precipitate the individual's conversion to interiority are of two kinds. The first set involves the thematization of the cognitional process:

> What am I doing when I am knowing?
>
> Why is doing this knowing?

With these questions, Lonergan says, the person turns from the worlds of commonsense and theory to the appropriation of his own interiority, his subjectivity, his operations with their structures, norms, and potentialities. In seeking to discover what knowing is, he seeks an insight into insight. He moves from merely experiencing experiencing, understanding, and judging, to understanding this experiencing, to making an affirmative judgment about his understanding of himself as an experiencer, understander, and judger. When he does this, he undergoes what Lonergan terms an intellectual conversion. Such an intellectual conversion is but a starting-point for further appropriation and for other conversions.

In its technical expression such appropriation resembles theory but in itself it is a heightening of intentional consciousness: an attending not merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts. This heightened consciousness constitutes the evidence for an account of knowledge. Since such evidence is so personal, Lonergan reminds us that the crucial issue is an experimental one, and the experiment must be performed not publicly but privately.[2] Finally, the uniqueness of this theory of knowledge demands an intellectual conversion: to accept it at all one must realize in himself the truth of its claims.

Intellectual conversion can in turn mediate moral conversion. A second key set of questions may arise which ultimately can only be answered in the concreteness of the decision called a moral conversion.

Is it worthwhile for me?
Is it a value for me?
What must I do about it?

A moral conversion occurs on the level of decision, of moral consciousness. Decision, as was seen in Chapter Three, is the natural demand of the value judgment. If a person has affirmed himself as a self-constituting subject who realizes personal authenticity by conforming his decisions to his most critical judgments, then it seems that he must face the implications of this judgment for his own moral consciousness. If he is truly open to a moral conversion, then the demand for concrete actiontto insure consistency between what he knows and what he does becomes an exigence. If he fails to do what he judges to he should do, he is guilty of deliberate inauthenticity or personal sin. (The inability to sustain this moral consistency over a life-time is a philosophical explanation of original sin.) Moral conversion is also the appropriation of one's interiority, one's subjectivity. But this appropriation goes beyond the sphere of the intentional transcendence (knowing) into that of real transcendence (doing or living). Moral conversion is self-appropriation in which one chooses oneself as an originating value, as the source of all value judgments.

An understanding of moral conversion is integrally connected to the notion of the human good or value. The human good is Lonergan's way of speaking about the concrete meaning a person discovers or puts into his life. By a moral conversion a person comes to know that he and he alone is responsible for the meaning that is his life. This meaning--the human good--consists of several levels of interrelated elements, forming a basic pattern of the development open to an individual or to mankind. It is always concrete; i.e., immediately applicable to the needs and desires of the person which come under the title of the "human good." The schema Lonergan has drawn up is an attempt to show the vastness of the range of possible questions concerned with the human good. A brief explanation of the schema will be given later and will highlight the relationship existing between the human good and the moral conversion that results in a person's achievement of real self-transcendence.

HORIZON AND CONVERSION

Both the intellectual and the moral conversions involve a revolution in one's horizon. Conversion has been defined as the actual transformation of the subject, of his operations and orientation, and therefore, of his world. Any appreciation of what this means must start again from a consideration of horizon. Horizon has been defined as the maximum field of vision from a determinate standpoint. How exactly is one converted to a new horizon? And what does such a conversion imply for the person?

Human knowledge, for Lonergan, is in process.[3] It is the result of a conjunction of experiencing, understanding, judging. A dynamic, on-going activity, knowledge at any point in development involves a three-fold division: the known, the range of questions I can raise and answer; the known unknown, the range of questions I can raise, which I find significant and worthwhile but which I cannot at present answer; and the unknown unknown, the range of questions I do not raise and, if someone raised them, I would find them meaningless, incomprehensible, and worthless. My horizon, defined in terms of questions, marks the boundary between what is, for me, the known unknown and the unknown unknown.[4]

The latter includes everything that is beyond my ken. What is known falls easily within my horizon, while the known unknown forms a hazy limit. Obviously, the term horizon is a relative term: what is meaningless to me may or may not be meaningless absolutely. The very existence of horizon can be "proven" only indirectly. Horizon can only be sharply defined by passing beyond it to a wider horizon in which the old is seen as a part. From within any given horizon, its limits are not clearly in focus. Rather, the boundaries are obscure since they are constituted by what is known to one in a vague and unclear manner. Horizon can be known indirectly, however, since one can study instances of the broadening or contraction of horizon.

Lonergan gives as an example of horizon expansion the occurrence of a crisis and subsequent, fundamental revision within the scientific world.[5] A crisis develops when the existing theories or methods can no longer handle the facts in a satisfactory way. Such a crisis precipitates a revision in the theories or methods. The expansion of the scientific horizon meets resistance, which Max Planck said is often overcome not on the basis of the intrinsic merit of the new theory but upon the retirement of the current generation of professors. However, the resistance is eventually set aside and the new theories or methods are accepted universally and permanently. They gain universal acceptance because scientific results are equally accessible to all scientists everywhere, since theoretical understanding cuts across national, ethnic, and social barriers. The new ideas also gain permanent acceptance because they cover all the old facts plus the new ones so thoroughly so as to make reverting to the earlier position untenable.

In philosophy or any of the human sciences the broadening of a horizon comes about in the same way as in the natural sciences or mathematics. There is a crisis, which is met by a radically new point of view. Examples of this are numerous: Augustine's shift from equating the real with body to the real with what is true; Aquinas' transformation of existing theology; Descartes' treatment of philosophy as independent of theology; Hegel's turn to the subjective. Nevertheless, expansions in philosophy's horizon are neither universal nor permanent. As Lonergan explains, an original philosopher introduces new approaches when he founds his school, but the new techniques do not fundamentally change the basic differences among the various schools. The family resemblances between the materialism, the idealism, or the realism of ancient times and those of today remain basically the same. His school falls into one of these classes. Nor is horizon expansion permanent since schools flourish, fade, and often splinter. The doctrines lose their vigor and become dogmas whose words demand adherence but whose vital meaning is lost.

Lonergan explains why horizons can expand permanently and universally in the natural sciences but not in the human sciences in this manner. In philosophy or any of the human sciences a change in the content necessitates a change in the subject because the subject is part of the content of any philosophy. A new horizon on the subject means far more than new theories or methods. It demands a conversion, a reorientation of the subject.[6] A conversion of one's horizon means adopting a new concept of oneself, new principles to guide one's thinking, judging, deliberating and deciding. Horizon, then, both invites and calls for the transformation or conversion of the subject. Without conversion, the new ideas propounded by the philosophy are not only inoperative in the person's life but they are without genuine meaning in expanding the content of the philosophy itself. Rote recitation of philosophical propositions makes of the philosophy an empty shell and of the person a sterile follower.

The need for a conversion becomes evident when we realize that the reality of the person can be beyond the horizon of the person. A person is, in fact, more or less intelligent, reasonable, responsible, free. These qualities manifest themselves in numerous ways. No one desires to be told that he is stupid, irrational, irresponsible, or determined. But, while he may live as an intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and free person, his own intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility, and freedom may be outside his horizon. Lonergan refers to this condition as the "existential gap":[7] the difference between one's horizon on oneself and what one really is.

For instance, one can experience, understand, judge, and decide but yet not know the profound implications of what he is doing. The existential gap is not closed by affirming a list of true propositions. It is eliminated only by a conversion. It is not a matter of agreeing with Augustine that the real is the true, or with Lonergan that full human knowing is a conjunction of experiencing, understanding, and judging. It is a matter of meaning as much as Augustine meant by veritas or meaning as much as Lonergan means when he speaks of the virtually unconditioned. And, this entails conversion: the personal transformation of oneself and one's horizon. A person should not be beyond his own horizon but the "should not" here calls for one's free and responsible decision to move beyond one's present horizon to a more encompassing one.

Lonergan's notion of horizon is grounded in the person as subject. Objectively, it is delimited in terms of what the subject not only does not know but what is utterly meaningless to him: the unknown unknown. Subjectively, horizon and world correspond to the concrete synthesis that is the subject's conscious living. To challenge that concrete lived-synthesis is to evoke a sense of dread. The person spontaneously reacts whenever his horizon is threatened. Since the dread arises not out of objective evidence but rather as a function of his mode of life, his solution to the problem of an integrated life--conversion cannot be exclusively the outcome of proofs or arguments. Moving to a new world, widening one's horizon is to tamper with an established and until now successful solution to the problem of conscious living. The potential convert falls back upon what to him, at his present stage of development, is self-evident. He argues for the maintenance of his position from within his present horizon. From such a stand-point, his logic is irrefutable . . . to him, at least. Therefore, if he is to be converted, he must risk a leap into the unknown.

Because he is a self-constituting subject, the human person must make this conversion freely and responsibly. One obvious difficulty is, as Lonergan explains, that the person is already caught up in living life prior to any realization of the meaning of his life and his role in constituting that meaning. One already has a horizon, is living in a world, forming himself through his reactions--cognitive and affective--to other persons and objects before he has the opportunity to evaluate his basic orientation and courses of action and choose among them. In a very real way, he makes all his choices from within a given horizon. However, since his horizon is grounded in his own integrated subjectivity, he is capable of questioning it and of transforming it. While he has made himself without any critical or methodical awareness of what he was doing, so he can now remake himself in the light of greater knowledge and better will. The refusal to do so is tantamount to accepting responsibility for what he has unwittingly made himself to be in the past.

This is what the world of interiority is all about. When one truly lives in the world of interiority he has taken possession of his intelligence, reasonableness, freedom, and responsibility. Philosophy, for Lonergan, is the attempt to illuminate the effort of intelligent, reasonable, free, fully responsible self-constitution.[8] Lonergan's philosophy tries to lead one to a knowledge of oneself as a subject. Converted into a different kind of person by such knowledge, one can now begin both to relate persons and objects within his world to himself and to one another. He can operate in the world of commonsense or in the world of theory because he knows what knowing and choosing are in either world and how they stem from and constitute him as a person.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTERIORITY

It is only through integrated subjectivity that a person can come to a knowledge of self that will terminate in real self-transcendence. Through integrated subjectivity he knows himself to be a subject, alive and aware, forging his own destiny in history through his interaction within the community. The bedrock of integrated subjectivity is consciousness: presence of the subject to himself as subject. It is subjective because it is neither extroverted nor introverted. Consciousness is concerned with the subject, his alertness, and his identity. The subject in this sense is not an object, nor can he be adequately known as an object.

In Lonergan's theory, consciousness, which permeates and constitutes all other cognitive activities, is itself cognitive. It can be experienced by everyone and it must be employed even in order to deny its existence. It is essential for all reasonable self-criticism since it is a person's most intimate cognitive act, unifying all his activities and guaranteeing his identity throughout all his activities. Consciousness, then, is subjective while intelligent; private but shared by all persons; verifiable according to data which is accessible to each person; and, totally necessary for all human acts.

This extraordinarily vital underpinning of human life is frequently ignored by philosophy, in large measure, because it is so difficult to discuss. Yet, if, in Lonergan's terms, philosophy's prime function is to elucidate what it means to be a subject in order to promote the conversions needed to produce a critical subject, then his philosophy must articulate the meaning and value of consciousness. The worlds of commonsense and theory in which dwell the spontaneous and theoretic subjects provide for social and technical communication. But, it is only through reflection that one becomes aware of the source of his human powers. Such reflection is both dependent upon consciousness and can, through one's heightened awareness, give one some awareness of this abiding awareness. If one chooses explicitly to enter the world of interiority, Lonergan maintains, he will choose to advert to his consciousness frequently and make it the guiding experience of his life.

COMPARISON OF SUBJECTS

To the extent that one becomes converted to the world of interiority as a critical subject he moves from the lived-experience of presence to self (consciousness) to knowledge of self. As a spontaneous subject consciousness is focussed on feeling-knowing-deciding-doing as a single lived-unity (world of commonsense). As a theoretical subject, consciousness is engrossed in knowing objects through the mediation of theory. The critical subject through intelligent subjectivity is the person whose consciousness centers on reflection. Through reflection the critical subject knows himself now as the spontaneous subject reacting to another with the empathy born of commonsense, and now as the theorist seeking a clear explanation of physical reality through the mediation of chemistry, and now as the critical subject understanding what it is to know and why there must be a consistency between what he knows and how he lives.

It is Lonergan's critical subject who by means of philosophy combines commonsense, theory, and reflection without confusing their roles or sacrificing one for another. The spontaneous subject knows particular, concrete reality and the theoretical subject knows reality through the mediation of theory: the natural and the human sciences. The critical subject knows himself and knows his knowing. And, since all knowing is knowing of objects, insofar as the critical subject knows commonsense knowing he knows the spontaneous subjects and the objects of their knowing, insofar as he knows theoretical knowing he also knows the theoretical subjects and the objects of their knowing and insofar as he knows himself he can integrate these three types of knowing and their respective differentiated worlds. Consequently, the critical subject has at his command the ability to discern and differentiate the quite distinct modes of learning, the types of language, and the kinds of societies common to the commonsense world and the theoretical world.

The critical subject is unique in his concern with the transcultural: the relations between commonsense language and theoretical language, the characteristics of pre-theoretic cultures and the effect upon them of the development of theory. He is intrigued by the problems involved in the total changes of the meanings of words that occur when there is a development from spontaneous to theoretical subjects to critical subjects.

Further, Lonergan says, the critical subject is the historical subject.[9] The spontaneous subject lives in his country and calls all others foreigners. The theoretical subject would establish a cosmopolis, a universal norm, a society of what ought to be done. The critical subject as an historical subject knows and understands the variations in commonsense. He sees commonsense as a function of the social milieu, possessing general invariants while differing widely from country to country. He knows and understands the value of a theoretical approach to the problem of conscious living but, as a historical subject, he sees that any theory is like himself both constituted by and constitutive of the historical process. He is ever engaged in understanding the historical process so that through his historically-conscious judgments and decisions, he can better fashion the future.

Finally, the critical subject can handle the question of ultimate criteria explicitly. The spontaneous subject is intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. He makes good judgments and wise decisions but the criteria he uses are known only implicitly. Unable to formulate or articulate them he nonetheless observes them. If he expresses them at all, he does it symbolically. The theoretical subject expresses his criteria objectively in a formal or a transcendental logic, in a moral code, in the canons of a method. However, the critical subject wants to ground all criteria in the subject himself as intelligent, reasonable, and responsible.

THE SUBJECTS AND HORIZONS

The role of horizon in each of the three worlds is fundamental. Horizon is grounded in the subject and the basic difference among the three horizons is the structure of consciousness. Historically, in Western thought, it was the Greeks who brought about a conversion of the horizon of the spontaneous subject by becoming themselves theoretical subjects. Lonergan tells us that there were no doubt theoretical subjects prior to the Greeks but they had no means of expressing themselves.[10] They could raise theoretical questions but they could not answer them. Similarly, the contemporary shift to historical consciousness and the subjective has given us the tools for articulating the conversion to a critical horizon. Again, critical subjects have existed in the past. Lonergan shows that Aquinas wrote about experiencing abstraction from phantasms, the reception of intelligibles in act in our intellects, and what anyone can experience whenever he tries to understand anything. Aquinas knew his own intellect experientially but he lacked the techniques of introspective psychology which would have allowed him to give a clear analysis of what he experienced. The difference between a spontaneous subject and a theoretical one or between a theoretical subject and a critical one is the structure of consciousness. The spontaneous structure is the whole person responding in an integrated fashion to the persons and objects of his commonsense world. The theoretical structure is cognitional and closed, focusing on objects in an effort to understand them through the medium of a theory. The critical structure is cognitional and closed, reflecting on itself to effect the transition from self-presence to self-knowledge.

Each of these structures of consciousness is bounded by a horizon. The person is circumscribed in his experience, judgments, and actions by the horizon of his world. Yet, the limitations imposed by one's horizon though they are formidable are not absolute. The boundaries set by one's present horizon can be overcome, but only with difficulty. For example, the spontaneous subject has no capacity for theoretic explanation. He will ask a mathematician to explain to him some intricate aspect of mathematical theory. As soon as the theorist begins, the spontaneous subject will cut him off saying, "Don't use a lot of technical jargon. Put the explanation in plain, ordinary language that I can understand. I'm not interested in the theory; I simply want to understand what it's all about." What the spontaneous subject wants, Lonergan claims, is to be able to fit the results of a theoretical framework into his commonsense horizon. This simply cannot be done without transforming the theory. There is no possibility of dialogue since theory is precisely what is beyond his horizon--and therefore, meaningless to the spontaneous subject.

Similarly, the critical question lies beyond the theoretical horizon. The theorist cannot comprehend or account for knowledge that can be verified only in one's personal, internal experience. He accepts as true only what can be empirically verified by proofs or demonstrations. The reason for this is simple enough. The theorist always works with objects and what the critical subject is talking about is the subject. The theorist will want to transpose the critical question within a theoretical horizon. He will say it must be a question of a new metaphysics or a new science or a new commonsense. They are the only possibilities since all else lies beyond his theoretical horizon. It is useless for the critical subject to try to insist that the critical question, as Lonergan tells us, is whether knowledge exists, not the existence of some particular fact or aspect of knowledge. Lonergan holds that the theorist cannot conceive that it is possible to know human knowledge not by analogy but properly, not in terms of a metaphysics but in terms of cognitional activity. Nor can the theorist reach the point of understanding the critical subject's stance as transcultural and historical. His vision is blocked to all that cannot fit within the field of theory.

The problem of the widening or transforming of one's horizon, then, is not an easy one. However, since a horizon is rooted in the subject as subject, he has within himself the capacity for conversion, for transforming his horizon. What lies beyond the horizon of the spontaneous or theoretical subject is beyond him precisely as spontaneous or theoretical or both. But, as a subject, a person, he has the potential to understand all reality: his possible horizon is virtually limitless. His present horizon merely marks the limit of his present development. The spontaneous subject has the horizon he does because his development has not gotten beyond the sphere of commonsense. However, because he is a subject (in Lonergan's use of the term), he can go beyond commonsense and he can from his uneasy conscience raise the question of why he has never taken the trouble to master any theory.

In the same way, the theoretical subject has the horizon he does because he has reneged on pursuing the existential questions: What is it to be a person? What must I do to be an authentic person? Such questions are not answered by an answer but by a development. A person does not change the structure of his consciousness, his apprehension of the workd, his language, mode of learning, society, and apprehension and manifestation of ultimate criteria by saying "Yes" or "No" to a question. The spontaneous subject could repeat all the true propositions and agree with each of them while remaining a spontaneous subject. What is needed is a conversion--and inner transformation--of the structure of consciousness and of its consequences to effect the difference between a spontaneous and theoretical subject. The spontaneous subject can become a mathematician, physicist, chemist, or metaphysician without leaving the horizon of the commonsense world. All he does is reduce theory to commonsense, thereby destroying the theory.[11] His stock approach, Lonergan remarks, is ever: "Now the book says this but what it REALLY means is . . ." The theoretical subject likewise can distort the critical problem by forcing it into a theoretical viewpoint. In so doing, he avoids the necessity of facing up to the genuine intellectual and moral conversions that would make him a critical subject.

THE CRITICAL SUBJECT

For the critical subject, by definition, is one who raises the questions of interiority: questions concerning knowledge and moral performance on the basis of one's knowledge. One way in which the intellectual and moral conversions can occur is through the mediation of a transcendental philosophy. Under its reflective guidance, a person can be led to an understanding of what it is to know. If he succeeds in achieving for himself the intentional self-transcendence of an intellectual conversion, this can mediate his moral conversion. He can come to realize that he is not only a self-constituting knower but also a self-constituting doer. He is one who is capable of deliberating, evaluating, choosing, and carrying out his decisions freely and responsibly. His philosophical reflections have made him aware that meaningful human living is constituted by what he makes of himself and his world through his good judgments and wise decisions. Because these acts are free and responsible, he knows that in them lie the reality of morality and the creation or destruction of character, the achievement of full personhood or the failure to achieve it. On the basis of such an awareness the subject can freely and responsibly choose himself as, what Lonergan calls, an originating as well as an originated value. This choice is what is meant by a moral conversion--a person deliberately decides to live his life according to the values which he knows to be authentic. Such a life demands a total dedication to openness. His judgments must be reached through as total a fidelity to the drive for meaning as he can muster. His decisions must rest solely on what he truly judges to be the most reasonable and authentic course of action.

There is, however, a second way in which a moral conversion is possible. It can occur with no prior intellectual conversion and without the prompting of a philosophical theory. The spontaneous or theoretical subject is first and foremost a subject, a human person. As such, he experiences, understands, judges, and decides everyday of his life. He may never reflect upon these activities nor critically examine their meaning or origins. But, he does perform such activities and in their performance he makes himself what he is. Unreflectively, he shapes his life and his horizon by his judgments and decisions. The decisions by which he effectively fashions his future are the products of a whole context of past judgments (just as they are for the philosophical, reflective or critical subject).

He can not articulate the reasons for the judgments or decisions beyond saying that they "seem" correct or he "feels" that this is the thing to do. Pressed for a clearer explanation, the spontaneous or theoretical subject might say he acts according to his beliefs.

Belief[12] often means what one accepts as true on the word of the civil community, religious tradition, or scientific opinion. All of these are valid sources of truth. The critical subject, too, utilizes them in his efforts to reach true judgments and sound decisions. The difference is the non-critical subject grounds all of his judgments and decisions in such sources. The critical subject, on the other hand, knows that while these supply him with a great deal of vicarious experience and understanding, ultimately the judgment or decision must rest with him, if he is to be fully free and responsible. He values the channels of tradition as sources of personal enrichment since he knows full well he is unable to attain their scope and depth in his one brief lifetime. Yet, he elects to maintain a critical approach to all experience--vicarious and personal. He chooses to weigh as carefully as possible all understanding, his own as well as that of the community. He determines to be as open as he can in his efforts to make or accept objectively valid judgments. And to remain open to their possible revision if new evidence vitiates what he now holds to be true.

Finally, he elects to establish his decisions on the factual judgments he has reached and to allow his lived-experience of these decisions to prove them good or bad. As a critical subject, he does not scorn the role of community or tradition. Rather, he accords them a place of genuine value. However, their roles are supportive and not central. The central role which nothing can usurp is held by the critical, existential subject, the subject as deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting, bringing about results which he knows will constantly transform himself and his world. Such a subject is neither an isolated intellect nor a caluculating will. He is the wholely integrated person who not only lives affectively and effectively as a human being but adds to his living a reflective dimension.

THE SUBJECT AND VALUE

For the critical subject, the "critical point" of the critical problem is the question of value.[13] (This is likewise true for the non-critical subject but since it is unreflective it remains unarticulated). Because of the dynamic structure of consciousness, the levels of consciousness are functionally interdependent, with the lower being both presupposed by and brought up into the higher. The unity of the levels is maintained by the unfolding of a single, transcendental intending of plural, interchangeable objectives. This "intending" is my natural, disinterested, detached drive for meaning. The catalyst which moves me from experiential to intelligent consciousness is my drive for meaning. Once I discover meaning I want to know whether my meaning is the correct meaning. So, the movement from intelligent to rational consciousness is promoted by a fuller unfolding of this same drive for meaning, as intending the true and the real. Lastly, Lonergan says, the intention of meaning as intelligible, true, and real becomes the intention of the good when I, as the critical subject, meet the existential question: What am I to do? How am I to act in the light of this good or value? The good as a transcendental notion is a question of value, of what is truly worthwhile. This is the "critical point" in which the already acting critical subject reflects on his world and the effects on it of his actions. When this occurs, Lonergan refers to the critical subject as "existential" to connote the sense of lived-experience.

To understand Lonergan's position on value it is necessary to view it as part of the transcendental notion of the good. The human good or value, for Lonergan, is the concrete meaning which a person discovers or constitutes for himself. Since a person is defined as one who demands and constitutes meaning, it is equally true to define a person as one who demands and constitutes the human good or value.

Lonergan's notion of the good involves a tripartite structure, each level of which can be analogously related to the horizons of worlds of the spontaneous, theoretical, and critical subjects. All subjects are concerned with the good, with value; each from his particular horizon. This linking of the various types of subjects to the differing levels of the human good is not to confine them

LONERGAN'S SCHEMA ON THE HUMAN GOOD

INDIVIDUAL		SOCIAL	ENDS	LEVEL
Potentiality	Actuation			
Basic needs & capacities	Differentiated operations	Cooperation	Particular goods	Immediacy
Capacity for development of basic potential (esp. thinking & willing plasticity & perfectibility of the person	Development of skills needed Habits: group of differentiated operations Intell. habits= science Will habits= vices or virtues	Institutions Roles & Tasks All meaning for society becomes institutional. Results from man's ability to organize	Good of order This good collapses when the society collapses.	Mediation of meaning
Freedom, liberty. A person's highest capacity. A dissatisfaction with living on the level of the good of order leads to an exigence for personal freedom.	Orientation: as opposed to habit. Habit is developed and then used. Orientation flows basically but freely from oneself as one is. E.g. love as an orientation, a personal response of oneself at one's highest level. To make love a habit, is to destroy it. Conversion: a shift in one's orientation.	Interpersonal relations. One's personal freedom awakens one to the respect demanded by other persons, other free beings. It is also a critical recognition of this relationship.	Values, esp love. Order is still a value but it is no longer the ONLY value for now values have a personal meaning.	Constitutive meaning. One recognizes he makes his own world as a free person by personal decision.

exclusively to that level. Rather, it is to show where their emphasis lies when they deal with the human good or meaning in their lives.

The spontaneous subject is engaged in acquiring instances of the particular good. He uses his diverse talents to obtain whatever goods he needs to fulfill his desires, be they intellectual, emotional, sensitive, or physical. His pursuit of the good is always concrete and particular. The good or meaning in his life is seen as related to him as the center of his world. Since the spontaneous subject is also a social being his efforts to obtain instances of the particular good often involve cooperating with others. But, basically, the spontaneous subject is intent on securing for himself and his family the standard of living that will permit them to enjoy as much of the benefits of the good life as possible.

The theoretical subject from his horizon has a different apprehension of the good. Meaning, the human good, is his goal also but it is mediated through human institutions within whose frameworks instances of the particular good can be ordered. His bent for relating things to one another rather than only to himself causes him to see that by cooperative industry more persons can acquire more goods more efficiently. Therefore, the theoretical subject tends to emphasize the role of institutions and institutional frameworks in his search for value. As an individual, he is born into a ready-made, highly institutionalized world. Institutional frameworks like the family with its customs, the state with its laws, the church with its prescriptions as well as the established educational, economic, and technological systems form the milieu in which the individual develops the skills he needs for his own fulfillment. He sees the institutions as worthwhile means to his end and he values working within their framework. The institutions provide the basis for cooperative effort and their stability in the face of change make them bulwarks of security. The concrete manner in which these institutions function or fail to function is called, by Lonergan, the good of order.

The good of order while distinct from instances of the particular good is not separate from them. Rather, the good of order looks not merely to the individual and his isolated need but to the needs of all the persons in the community and to these needs as recurrent. My education, Lonergan comments, is an instance of the particular good but education for all who effectively desire it is a good of order. Naturally, such an emphasis on the group does not work against but rather for the good of the individual. Further, the good of order looks to the order that sustains the succession of recurrent goods. Thus, it requires the interdependence of effective desires and decisions carried out by cooperating individuals. It is not some super institution which spews out goods automatically. Nor is it an ethical or legal system which insures the equitable distribution of goods and services.

Like all meaning in life, it is quite concrete. Lonergan names it the actually performing or non-performing set of "If . . . then" relationships guiding individuals and coordinating groups who strive to product it. While it is grounded in institutions, it entails much more: the knowledge, resourcefulness, fellow-feeling of the whole community and their willingness to adapt to necessary changes in order to keep the good of order functioning at its optimum level.

Historically, a comparison can be drawn between the theoretical subject's penchant for the good of order and the influence of the classical horizon which presented a static, hierarchically ordered universe. By the same analogy, the pre-theoretical or primitive subjects can be compared to the spontaneous subject with his emphasis on securing instances of the particular good. The contemporary shift which historical consciousness has introduced brings us to the third and most important level of the human good or meaning: value. Dissatisfaction with living solely on the level of the good of order develops as the theoretical subject becomes the critical subject.

As a critical subject, he begins to question the value of the institutinns under which he lives. He realizes that as a free person he is responsible for his world which is the product of his decisions. The exigence for personal freedom brings him to the level of value, of constitutive meaning, of personal decision. The good of order mediated through institutions is still a value for him but it is one of many values and cannot be allowed to assume a higher status than such values as honesty, truth, or love.

With the intellectual and moral conversions, the critical subject has discovered that the source of value lies within himself. He, as an originating value, is the cause of the originated values by his exercise of responsible freedom. Value is intrinsically tied to decision because it is by appealing to value or values that the person chooses to satisfy this desire and to refuse this other. Similarly, his value scale causes him to approve one system for bringing about the good and reject another, or value this individual as good and condemn this other as evil.

Lonergan compares the transcendental notion of value to his notion of being. The notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being. Likewise the notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value. The notion of being as a dynamic principle drives one toward an ever fuller knowledge of being. Similarly, value is the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that drives one toward an ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worthwhile, of what has meaning in his life. Value is a heuristic notion which functions in one's acting as the intention of the good. By reflection on its functioning a person comes to know existentially what the notion of the good or meaning is.

A person is good who does good as good men do, to paraphrase Aristotle. A person constitutes his values by living his values. The intention of the good is prior to his choices or actions but only as a heuristic principle of all appraisal or criticism. When the person brings about concrete instances of the good through his free decisions, he is constituting value or meaning. Values cannot be definitely defined in the abstract. The golden rule urges everyone to do good but it cannot say explicitly what is good. One comes to know the good from the example of others, from the tales of good and evil deeds, from the constant experience of praise and blame one meets in daily life, and from one's personal feelings of joy or shame that rise up in him when his decisions and actions make him deserving of praise or scorn.

While the person constitutes the values or meaning of his life, his choosing of values also constitute him. He experiences his freedom as the active thrust of himself as a subject assuming the responsibility for his deliberations, decisions, and deeds. However, insofar as this person regularly chooses the true good or value rather than an apparent good, he achieves real self-transcendence. He lives authentically, constituting himself as an originating value by concretely bringing about originated values: goods of order that are truly good and instances of the particular good that are genuinely good. Value, as Lonergan defines it, is the human good as a possible object of choice. Only on the level of value does the person emerge as an existential subject, one concerned with constituting himself as good or evil. This he does through his choices and actions which reflect the present stage of his sensitivity to value and continue to excelerate or impede his future responsiveness to value.

Further, it is only on the level of value, of free and responsible decision-making that the drive for meaning is at its peak. As long as a person is only moving toward self-transcendence, the drive to know is in control. But, once he becomes morally conscious, his decisions assume control. They set the objective of his total activity and will actions that will lead to the goal. Such a state is constituted by more than a drive to know. It is, for Lonergan, a manifestation of a drive for constitutive meaning or value.

THE SUBJECT AND COMMUNITY

No matter what type of subject a person may be, his nature as a social being demands the milieu of a community in which to live and pursue the human good or meaning. Community itself, says Lonergan, is nothing but the achievement of common meaning.[14] The extent to which it succeeds or fails to achieve common meaning marks the degree to which it can be considered a community. Common meaning (and therefore community) is potential when its members share a common field of experience and to withdraw from that common field is to lose touch with one's community. Common meaning is formal when there is common understanding and the person who misunderstands or is misunderstood is outside the community. Common meaning is actual if all have common judgments and the non-conformist fails to concur in the community's judgments. Finally, common meaning or community is realized when by common decisions, each person in the community freely and responsibly holds parallel orientations about how life should be lived. Especially if this is done through permanent dedication, they realize genuine community and their common meaning finds its lived expression. Here one discovers the values that bind: the love that unites families, the loyalty that creates states, the faith that is religion.

The common meanings that constitute the various communities of which a person is a member during his lifetime are passed on from one generation to the next as their cultural heritage. These meanings as historical evolve slowly and are open to the possibility of being enriched or impoverished by the interpretations of successive generations. For, the individual is born and lives within communities. Both he and the community develop through mutual, dialectical interaction. His growth is circumscribed by the meanings which the community values. His potential for full personhood is either aided or curtailed by the capacity of the community for renewal and reform. Yet, the individual who truly strives to live authentically can raise the critical questions about the values or meanings perpetuated by his community. If he finds them to be inauthentic, he must challenge their legitimacy. Gradually, the opposition may swell and result in a change in the values held by the community. However, the integrity of the individual person demands that he be authentic despite the inauthenticity of the community.

According to Lonergan, the community is a matrix of personal relations, the prime constituents of the subject's world.[15] The personal relations within a community determine the cohesive or chaotic nature of the community. Like the persons who form them, these relations are alive with feelings. Community members either share common feelings or harbor opposed feelings about qualitative values and scales of preference. Through mutual feelings they can root their relations in respect for one another as persons or merely in a toleration of one another as necessary sources of satisfaction. The range of personal relations is equal to the full range of human emotions: from intimacy to ignorance, from love to exploitation, from respect to contempt, from friendliness to emnity.

THE SUBJECT AND HIS ORIENTATION

Another aspect which affects the development of the person explored by Lonergan is the motivational well-springs which cause him to develop his talents and operations as he does. The difference among the various subjects again is one of emphasis. The spontaneous subject meets his needs through the development of his talents or differentiated operations in a more or less "spontaneous" manner; i.e., as the need arises. The theoretical subject is more likely to find merit in exercising these operations so that they become habitual to him. Habits, intellectual and moral, allow him to work efficiently within the institutional framework. For the critical subject, however, there is the need to question his habits continually to be sure that they are based on conscious intentionality rather than rote.

As an existential subject, he wants to be certain that he is acting out of freedom, not out of routine. The critical subject is more concerned, therefore, with orientation than with habit. Habits are developed and then used. Orientation, on the other hand, flows basically but freely from oneself as one is. The example of this given by David Tracy in discussing Lonergan's views on the person is love. Love as an orientation is a total giving, a personal response of oneself to another at one's highest level. Love can never be merely a habit. To reduce it to the level of a repetitive operation would be to deny its conscious deliberateness and free "response-ability." This would effectively kill love.

Lonergan speaks of love or the dynamic state of being-in-love as an orientation reached on the level of a person's highest capacity: freedom. Once the state of being-in-love is reached, it becomes the principle from which flows all subsequent judgments of value and acts of living. It is only through love that the person can achieve full self-transcendence and the deep joy and profound peace that accompany it. Such total love if it be without any conditions or reserves must be directed toward God since only idolatry could credit it to any finite value. However, genuine love as a first principle or orientation will radiate through the whole of one's living and acting. This is the key difference between love as a transient emotion experienced from time to time by most persons no matter what type of subject they are and love as the orientation of the existential subject's life.

As an orientation it can open a person's horizon to the full. The person who truly lives a life grounded in love will find love purifies his intentional responses (feelings) to values, rectifies his scale of preference, and underpins his value-judgments. Love has a way of simplifying issues by moving them to a deeper level where they can be seen more clearly without the clutter of egoism and group bias.

When the existential subject freely acts from love as his life's orientation he can root his interpersonal relations in a profound respect for the freedom of others and the values by which he lives and acts within the community will have a personal meaning. More and more, he will constitute the meaning of himself and his world; a meaning which, since it flows from love, will constantly strengthen him to strive for good in the face of evil.

THE SUBJECT AND AUTHENTICITY

It can be concluded, then, that the human person has before him the possibility of living in different worlds. Through horizon-analysis these worlds can be differentiated and, hopefully, integrated by the critical subject. Because of the nature of intentional consciousness, a person can perform different operations. These varied operations of consciousness ground the different worlds. The existence of different worlds raises the existential question: What is _my_ horizon? In what world do _I_ live? Do I understand what I claim to be? In other words, the question is one of authenticity.

Authenticity, for Lonergan, is the lived consistency between what a person intelligently knows he ought to do or ought not to do and the actual doing or not doing of it. Authenticity can be spoken of in several ways. A person can be authentic relative to a specific role or tradition he claims as his own. He can, like Kierkegaard, seek to become an authentic Christian. An authentic Thomist is one who is faithful to the genuine teachings of Thomas Aquinas. Beyond relative authenticity, there is a more basic notion of authenticity in which a person aims at freely assuming full responsibility for his development. The authentic person, in this sense, is independent of the fads and foibles of current opinion. He refuses to be bogged down in the morass of the mass-media's criteria of success. This attitude toward authenticity is summed up in the words of Sir Thomas More as found in Bolt's play A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: "It's not that I believe it but that _I_ believe it."

A still more fundamental view of authenticity is Lonergan's insistence that a person be radically open to what he _is_: a person is one who demands and constitutes meaning. To be authentically a person is to be faithful to one's drive for meaning: to one's unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know and love. The authentic person, in this case, is ceaseless in his efforts to be true to his deepest and fullest potentialities as a person. Such an authenticity demands an openness to an ever-expanding horizon and the ever-increasing possibility for constituting the meaning that he is. The crucial point here is that, for Lonergan, progress is open to the human person if he is willing to pay the price of authenticity. The key word here is "willing."

Authenticity is the mark of the person who lives a consistency between his knowing and his doing. The conversions (intellectual and moral) by which he achieves this authenticity are dependent, in the final analysis, upon his willingness to be converted. As a person, he is essentially free; i.e., he can grasp possible courses of action as values and choose to realize these values. But, the range of his possible choices is dependent upon his openness and this measures his effective freedom. Effective freedom or willingness must be won. It must be won in the teeth of all the opposition put up by a person's incomplete affective, intellectual, and volitional development.[16] For, the person is an-going, dynamic source of development. Because his drive for meaning is unrestricted, the level of his achievement at any given time leaves room for further progress.

Affective development can be impeded through traumatic experiences of rejection or repression, especially when they occur in childhood. A person's sensitivity and intersubjectivity are systems on the move. They need to be cultivated in an atmosphere of love and acceptance if the person is not to be stifled in his affective growth. Lonergan speaks of the dramatic bias which causes a person to withdraw from the outer drama of human living into the inner drama of phantasy. The scotoses which result impair not only his affective development but his intellectual and volitional as well. In speaking of the person it is possible to distinguish between his affective, intellectual, and volitional developments, but, in life as he lives it, such developments (or their lack) meld together and reinforce one another.

Lonergan describes various biases--all of which hinder intellectual growth by militating against a person's ability to make rational judgments and, thus achieve intentional self-transcendence. General bias is the most deeply entrenched of the biases since one falls victim to it merely by being human. General bias causes a person to stop short in his openness to intellectual development. It recognizes the need for intelligence in the pursuit of practical matters but refuses to make critical reflection central in life. The necessary higher viewpoint which would give such a person an understanding of what it is to know and a grasp of the fact that intelligence has its own immanent norms by which the person can critically judge between a real and an apparent good is lacking.

Intellectual conversion is neither automatic nor inevitable. General bias prevents persons from realizing the value of long-range plans. Should general bias contaminate the whole society the outlook would become grim. Instead of seeking to restrict the play of chance in their world and to enlarge the role of intelligence, they would surrender to the practicality of contending with what must be done now. In the extreme, general bias renders the person and the community so radically uncritical in their judgments that reliance on expediency replaces reason and the social surd replaces social sanity.

Volitional development must keep pace with intellectual development. A will is good by its conformity to intelligence. A person increases his willingness to act through persuasion and persuasion rests on his intelligent grasp, reasonable judgment, and affective appreciation that what is purposed is a genuine value. Again, in life all three must work together if authenticity is to be realized. However, volitional development is hampered by a person's inability to sustain his development in the face of his freedom to do or not to do what he judges to be the rational course of action. Because he is free, he can choose the irrational, the inauthentic. Because he is free, he is personally responsible for his choices. Lonergan calls such conscious, irrational choices personal sin and the inability to sustain his development the "reign of sin" (original sin).

The inherent difficulty involved in trying to live an authentic life is that one is given no trial runs before embarking on life. He must learn to live while living, developing along the way the affective, intellectual, and volitional integrity that will make authenticity not merely an ideal but a reality. Coupled with the difficulty of learning to live well while living is the person's awareness of the difficulty and his tendency to succumb to it. Reflection and the power to avoid inauthenticity or sin is always available to him but he shrinks from the burden of perpetual reflection and, well before giving it a respectable chance, he takes the easy road.

What is true of his lack of authenticity in personal matters carries over into his social relations. Since a community consists of persons, the deficiencies found in individuals multiply when they are transferred into the social milieu. Again, the communal situation becomes infected by the social surd and as conditions worsen, the deteriorization is taken as proof that intelligence and reasonableness and good will have but little effect in the conduct of human affairs.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE WORLD OF TRANSCENDENCE

It is, then, within the milieu of inauthenticity and sin that the person struggles to acquire and maintain his authenticity. According to Lonergan, for a person to live authentically demands from him the full self-transcendence of a religious conversion.[1] If a person is honest in living his moral conversion and is faithful to the dynamism of the intellectual conversion, he will be led to openness, especially to openness regarding the possibility of the existence of a Transcendent who is the Intelligence grounding all intelligibility, the Meaning behind the possibility of all meaning, the Goodness who is the ultimate criterion of all value.

Lonergan's notion of person, based as it is on the possibility of self-transcendence, includes the reality of God, the very ground of transcendence. Intellectual conversion is rooted in the person's ability to make true judgments. Moral conversion is rooted in the person's capacity to decide to live according to the truth he reaches in judgment. But, religious conversion arises out of the very structure of conscious intentionality, of integrated subjectivity; it is rooted in the person's drive for meaning. The transcendental exigence, writes Lonergan, means that there is to human inquiry an unrestricted desire for intelligibility; there is to human reasonableness a demand for the unconditioned; there is to human deliberation a criterion that criticizes every human good.[2] This exigence insists that a person can reach fulfillment, peace, joy only by moving beyond the world of possible experience into the world of transcendence where God is known and loved.

Earlier it was brought out that a person is one who demands and constitutes meaning. Meaning was eventually seen to be the same as the human good on its highest level: value. The approach Lonergan takes to the question of God is closely connected with the transcendental notion of value. He makes a vital distinction between originating value and originated value. The classical view of value was mostly limited to a treatment of originated values, values as constituted and found in human experience. Lonergan repeatedly insists on pushing past originated values to their grounding in originating value, which is the person as open to value. In Lonergan, value becomes the basic horizon of the person who lives authentically and tries to constitute his life so that it will express the values he holds and the value he is. This is the thrust of the person into the realm of value, self-transcendence, self-constitution.

As we said before, self-constitution or constitutive meaning does not imply that the person creates his values or meaning _ex nihilo_. To do so would be to claim total self-autonomy, shutting out the possibility of God or transcendence. Because such is not the case is the reason why there must be a _transcendental_ notion of value.

Constitution in the phenomenological sense used by Lonergan refers originally to a distinction between mediated meanings (meanings mediated by intelligence through images and concepts) and constitutive meanings (meanings which actually constitute the reality which is the human reality). The particular value which expresses a person's life is constituted insofar as it both expresses the reality of the person, either consciously or unconsciously, and can bring him into contact with a reality that transcends his own human possibilities, God. It is, for Lonergan, this latter point that argues for the existence of God.

The constitutive value that a person manifests by his authentic living places the question of God within his horizon. The unrestricted drive of the person which causes him to raise questions about value causes him also to raise questions about the value of value, the meaning of meaning. Such reflection can result in religious conversion. However, religious conversion, like intellectual and moral, is not a matter of proofs but of persuasion. It involves a commitment based on free decision. Nor is religious conversion--in this reflective, technical sense--a pre-requisite for religious faith. Religious faith and religion as practised are most often part of one's life from earliest childhood. The value of reflection like the kind that can bring about religious conversion is that a person by means of reflection can ground his spontaneous religious beliefs in his drive for meaning and integrated subjectivity, rather than merely on the teachings of childhood.

CHARGES LEVELED AGAINST RELIGION

Religion which is identified with inherited, and therefore unreflected, "truths" is frequently accused of being divisive.[3] A person, it is said, cannot be whole if he claims to be religious. Religion seems often to demand fidelity to God at the cost of fidelity to oneself, causing a person to abdicate his autonomy and abandon his critical intelligence. When this occurs, the person has no protection against myth or superstition and his religion cannot face the test of either common sense or science. Again, religion as practiced, often reflects either a universal, naive optimism where no shadow of harshness is permitted or a morbid pre-occupation with guilt. Lastly, religion is accused of engendering a resignation in the face of social evils that precludes efforts at reform.

Charges like these are leveled as theoretically true: religion *per se* leads to such results; or historically true: religion has up to now brought about such conditions. However, such charges show not the intrinsic irrationality of religion but, rather, the aberrations that can occur when religion is not based on the drive for meaning and value which is the exigence of the person as capable of transcendence.

Religion if it is based on the drive for meaning and value is far different from the religion described above. Religion here means the expression of one's horizon which is shaped, formed, oriented by one's belief in a personal God. Religion then is the expression of the self-constituting value that is known not by what a person says but by what he is. A person reveals his horizon by how he lives far more than by what he says.

RELIGION GROUNDED IN ONE'S EXIGENCE FOR MEANING

What are some of the characteristics of a religion grounded in one's transcendental drive for meaning? First, it is not a divisive factor in a person's life. Rather than compromising his honesty and autonomy, it cannot exist without them. Fidelity to God is achieved only through fidelity to oneself. A person can never claim he is obeying or honoring God by violating his own conscience. Adherence to an open, reflective, critical conscience is the only guarantee that he is truly doing God's will and his only protection against false gods. Similarly, religion is contrary neither to common sense nor science, although its origins and verification stem from neither. These lie in reflection upon one's integrated subjectivity which is both prior to, as well as the origin and verification of, common sense and science. Religion need not spring from a pollyanna naivete or a fear-ridden conscience. If it is rooted in a critical attitude, religion tries to find the truth as it exists in reality and it seeks to promote, in its followers, living according to the true. Those who try to live within a religious horizon discover how frequently they fail to live authentically and so they experience a guilt which is both merited and realistic. A religion supported by integrated subjectivity and sustained by the drive for meaning accepts the objections brought against historical religion but is not cowed by them. The dynamic structure of knowing has an inherent self-corrective process so the person who is willing to be open in religious matters as in all others can learn from the errors of the past.

A religious horizon like all horizons is limited by historical conditions. However, religious horizon again like all horizons are capable of limitless expansion. In this thesis, however, we are prescinding from any account of the specific forms that religious expression can take within a religious horizon and are simply indicating the general direction Lonergan takes in his treatment of the person as open to religious conversion. For Lonergan, belief in God or religion is the fullest realization of a person's capacity for self-transcendence. Religion rooted in fidelity to the drive for meaning is also rooted in fidelity to oneself as a person. In discovering oneself as an originating value, he claims, one discovers God as the originating value. Authenticity in living in the world of interiority mediates conversion to the world of transcendence. The lived-commitment to what it is to be a person (one who demands and constitutes meaning) leads simultaneously to personhood and to God. To seek one is to seek the other for a person, in Lonergan's philosophy, is naturally religious.

No matter however much religious expression differs among men or from culture to culture or era to era, Lonergan insists that at their most fundamental depth they spring from the single transcendental tendency of the human spirit that questions, that questions without restriction, that asks about the possibility of an intelligible world, about the ground reality of facticity, about the worthwhileness of deliberating, and so about God. Unless a person is reaching forth, reflectively or unreflectively, for the intelligible, the unconditioned, the worthwhile, his transcendental and self-transcending integrated subjectivity is mutilated. How well he succeeds in achieving is another thing; what cannot be denied is his intending, his native orientation for the Transcendent.

RELIGION AND VALUE

Having a religious horizon is more than acknowledging the existence of God. It must include a response to his goodness and the adoption of a Weltanschauung. Conversion entails the active choosing of religious values. In deliberately choosing religious values, the person attains a unique self-transcendence in that the existential subject is thereby constituting himself not just in relation to the human good or value (his fellow men, their needs and developments) but also to God as the originating value and to the world as his originated value. Thus, the human good or value is taken up within the all encompassing value. Before the only originating values were human persons but from the transformed horizon of the world of transcendence, God is the originating value. Before originated values were merely human achievements but now the universe is the originated value of God's self-transcending love. Before the account of human good and value related persons to one another and to their world but now human concern goes beyond the subject and his world to God and God's world. Persons meet now and form communities not only to settle human affairs but also to worship. They develop not only in talents and skills but also in holiness and the limit of human expectation ceases to be the grave. God created all persons in his image and their authenticity consists in being like him: in self-transcendence, in being the origins of true values, in genuine love.

Love as a state of being-in-love has already been treated. However, religious conversion allows love as a first principle to achieve its highest and fullest realization. All loving is self-surrender but love of God is love beyond criticism. There is on his part no ground for qualifications, conditions, or reservations. Thus, love of God is a unique total loving; one that actuates the unrestricted character of human conscious intentionality. So this love is basic fulfillment. As fulfillment, it is joy that remains despite failure, pain, privation, betrayal. As fulfillment, it is peace; peace the world cannot give.

Such love, joy, and peace for Lonergan has the potential to transform a person. They can banish the emptiness, alienation, and flight from one's subjectivity that haunts lives lived without God. Full love, joy, and peace enhance all a person's virtues and press against his defects. They make him a power for good. In relating a person to God, they likewise relate him to all mankind, and to the whole cosmic and historical process. On all persons and things, on all events and deeds, Lonergan declares, they shed a new dimension of meaning and value. The person as a being who demands and constitutes meaning and value achieves his fullest, richest *Existenz* in the world of transcendence.

RELIGION AND PROGRESS

The natural corollary of this is that true religion and progress are bound together. They have a common root in the person's intentional and real self-transcendence and to promote either is to promote the other indirectly. Religion, for Lonergan, places human efforts in a personal universe. It reveals the ultimate value and significance of human achievement and strengthens the undertaking of reform and renewal with the confidence born of the realization that such endeavors are worthwhile. Above all, religion can assume the supreme task of undoing decline.[4]

Decline disrupts a culture with its conflicting ideologies. It inflicts on individuals and groups the social, economic, and psychological pressures that for human frailty amount to determinisms. Decline, in Lonergan's words, multiplies and heaps up the abuses and absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, and violence. It is not propaganda nor argument but religious faith that will liberate human reasonableness from its ideological prisons. It is not the promise of men but religious hope that enables men to resist the vast pressures of social decay. Finally, if passions are to quiet down, if wrongs are not to be ignored or just palliated but removed, human possessiveness and human pride have to be replaced by self-sacrificing love. All persons have to come to acknowledge their personal and group inauthenticity and sinfulness, to accept their real guilt, to strive for the openness essential for conversion, and to learn that the task of conversion is life-long.

RELIGION AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

As intellectual and moral, so also is religious conversion a modality of self-transcendence. Intellectual conversion is to truth attained by intentional self-transcendence. Moral conversion is to values apprehended, affirmed, and realized by a real self-transcendence. Religious conversion is to a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence whether in the pursuit of truth or in the apprehension, affirmation, and realization of human values or in the orientation a person adopts to the universe, its ground, its goal. Because intellectual, moral, and religious conversions all have to do with self-transcendence, it is possible, Lonergan tells us, when all three occur within a single consciousness, to conceive their relationships in terms of sublation. (Lonergan's use of this term, as we said in an earlier footnote, is not Hegel's. Rather, Lonergan is indebted to Rahner for his meaning of sublation). Sublation means that if a person views moral conversion as higher than intellectual and religious as higher than moral, then the higher goes beyond the lower by introducing something new and distinct. This "going beyond" puts everything on a new basis; yet, far from interfering with the lower or destroying it, the higher needs, includes, preserves all the proper features and properties of the lower and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context.

For example, moral conversion goes beyond the values and truths to value generally. It lifts the subject to a new, existential level of consciousness and establishes him as an originating value. Doing this, however, in no way interferes with or weakens his devotion to truth. The person still needs truth, for he must apprehend reality and real potentiality before he can respond to its value. The truth he needs is still the truth attained in accord with the exigencies of rational consciousness. But, now his pursuit of it is all the more meaningful and valuable since it occurs within and plays an essential role in the far richer horizon of the pursuit of all values.

In similar fashion, religious conversion goes beyond moral. Questions for intelligence, for reflection, for deliberation reveal the eros of the human spirit, its capacity and its desire for self-transcendence. But that capacity meets fulfillment, that desire turns to joy, when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a subject-in-love. The person now is a subject held, grasped, possessed through a total and so, other-worldly love. There is a new basis for all valuing and doing good. In no way are the fruits of intellectual and moral conversion negated or diminished. On the contrary, all human striving for the true and the good is included within the religious horizon. More, within the religious horizon, human striving is furthered by an ultimate cosmic context and purpose. From this ultimate source there accrues to the person the power of love to enable him to accept the pain involved in offsetting the tendency to inauthenticity and to grace his efforts to live authentically.

CONCLUSION

The final and crucial question must now be asked: granting the existence of these worlds, how does a person integrate them?

Considering the horizon each of the worlds affords, it is evident that a person should not be contented with living in only one of them. He may be tempted to do so or, at least, to eliminate whichever of them gives him trouble, but to do this would be to cut off the possibility for becoming a full human person. Tracy quotes Lonergan as saying that if one eliminates the worlds of transcendence, theory, and interiority one is left with the world of Time magazine.[5] While the world of Time is surely not uninhabited, it could not claim to be the sole dwelling place of a highly critical, sensitive, and perceptive person. No one world nor even the selective combination of two has the solution to the question of full, human living.

There are alternatives to elimination which meet the question of integrating the worlds with varying degrees of success. One is synthesis or the elimination of the opposition among the worlds. Kierkegaard tries to do this in his work Either/Or. Hegel's use of the dialectic and Lonergan's notion of higher viewpoints are solutions of this type. Some try to integrate the worlds by oscillating between them, never settling in one permanently. The theorist reverts to the world of common sense when he drives his car, plays with his children, eats or sleeps. "A time to be born, a time to die, a time for every purpose under heaven" is the way a biblically inspired folk-song puts it.

Another method of integration is through transposition, a change of context or problematic. For instance, evil can be responded to by fighting (symbolized by St. George and the Dragon) or endurance (symbolized by Jonah and the Whale). However, the context of evil can be transposed to what is symbolizes by the Christian symbol of the Cross and Resurrection. Evil, previously considered as external, is interiorized and allows for the possibility of a higher integration. Finally, mediation is a means of integrating the various worlds. Authentic living in one world mediates the possibility of conversion to the next. The spontaneous subject who lives authentically in the world of common sense becomes aware of the need for theory through the systematic exigence. The critical subject in the world of interiority if he is authentic will discover the urge to ground his values in a transcendent source. For Hegel, the world of transcendence (religion) mediates the world of interiority (philosophy); while for Lonergan, the world of interiority mediates the world of transcendence.

Through horizon analysis one can critically examine the basic operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The differentiation of these operations and their dynamic structuring in consciousness grounds the different worlds. However, as has been seen, the consciousness of the person while structured and therefore capable of different operations is, nevertheless, essentially a unity in that it is the consciousness _of a person_. Therefore, the consciousness of the person is the source both of the differentiation of his worlds and the possibility of their integration. The person can through reflection on his operations develop a differentiated consciousness. Such a consciousness can sharply distinguish the four worlds. Neither attempting to eliminate any of them nor seeking to give them the homogeneity of an undifferentiated consciousness, it rather leaves them in their proper diversity. The person who has a differentiated consciousness can live an integrated life without divisions into unrelated compartments. This person, Lonergan insists, finds in himself through self-knowledge the grounds of this diversity and, through self-appropriation, he acquires the flexibility and dexterity that enables him to shift with ease from any one to any other world and find himself at home in all four. In living such an integrated life, he becomes an authentic person: one who demands and constitutes meaning.

Lonergan's notion of person as self-transcendence, then, is integrally connected to his theory of consciousness as experience. Because a person can experience himself as a subject and not merely as an object, he can verify in his own consciousness that he is the source and subject of his self-transcendence. For, by heightening his consciousness, he can become aware of himself as the subject who now experiences and seeks to understand his experience, who next comes to understand and pushes on to affirm his understanding as correct, and who finally decides to act on the basis of the judgment he has reached. At each successive stage of self-transcendence, the person assumes greater responsibility for himself and his actions. Thus, Lonergan's person cannot be contained in a static definition since, for Lonergan, personhood is a dynamic, on-going process by which one constantly grows through fidelity to the demands of his constitutive operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.

Further, it is through these constitutive operations that a person discovers or constitutes the worlds of meaning in which he lives. The person does this whether or not he adverts to it. The value of Lonergan's contribution to the philosophy of person is precisely that Lonergan offers a method by which the person can differentiate and appropriate both his operations and the various worlds in which he lives. Lonergan's method gives the person the opportunity to experience himself as the subject who experiences, understands, judges, and decides. This experience can lead him to an understanding of himself as the subject of these operations and can "convert" him to a willingness to accept responsibility for himself and his actions. Such conversions (intellectual and moral) affect him as a person and simultaneously affect his worlds. For, the "convert" now realizes that he is the source of the meaning of the worlds which he constitutes through his operations. The conversions transform both the person and his world because they are correlative to one another. Together they form the horizon of the person which delimits the range of his knowledge and interests but which is always open to further expansion and conversion. Because the person is capable of self-transcendence, he can transform his horizon; i.e., he can continue to develop the meaning that he is and the meaning that he gives to reality. Ultimately, Lonergan sees in the person's ability to transcend himself an occasion which can bring him into contact with a reality that transcends all his human possibilities--God. Lonergan claims that the question of God is within man's horizon. For, the person in his unrestricted drive for meaning can raise questions not only about meaning but also about the meaning of meaning. Such questions can, if the person is open, lead to a religious conversion. By a religious conversion, the person assumes a new basis for all his valuing and living: they are now grounded in God as the source of all love and goodness.

Finally, it is Lonergan's contention that the person as self-transcendence is the source and subject of an unrestricted, dynamic drive to understand. This inherent exigence causes him to transcend his present horizon, thereby transforming both himself and his worlds in his ceaseless effort to be an authentic person.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

[1] See *Method in Theology*, unpublished notes from the lectures given by Bernard Lonergan during the Institute in Methodology in Religious Studies held at Boston College in July, 1968.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] This concept is a constant one in Tillich's theological writings. See for example Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 220-222 *passim*.

CHAPTER ONE

[1] Most of the data of this chapter is taken from Lonergan's Latin work *De Constitutione Christi*, (Romae: Apud Aedes Universitatis Gregorianae, 1956).

[2] *Ibid*., p. 83.

[3] This example is found in "Christ as Subject: A Reply," *Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan*, ed. by F. E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 176-77.

[4] *De Constitutione Christi*, p. 84.

[5] "Cognitional Structure," *Collection*, pp. 226-27.

[6] *De Constitutione Christi*, pp. 89-92.

[7] *Ibid*.

[8] *Ibid*., p. 88.

[9] Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961), pp. 324-25.

[10] *Ibid*., p. 325.

CHAPTER TWO

[1] Insight, p. ix.

[2] Ibid., pp. 3-6.

[3] Great Dialogues of Plato, trans. by W. H. D. Rouse, ed. by Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse (New York: Mentor Books, 1956), p. 47.

[4] For a full treatment of Aquinas' theory of knowledge, see Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Bernard Lonergan, ed. by David S. Burrell, C.S.C. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

[5] Ibid., p. 185.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Insight, p. xxviii.

[8] Ibid., pp. 181, 182.

[9] Ibid., p. 183.

[10] For the intellectual pattern, see Insight, pp. 185-186; for the dramatic pattern, Ibid., pp. 187-89.

[11] "Notes on Existentialism," Bernard Lonergan (Lecture given at Boston College in the Summer of 1957) Thomas More Institute (mimeographed.)

[12] Verbum, p. 2.

[13] David Tracy, Eschatology: A Christian Approach to Time and History (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, School of Theology) 1967, p. 3.

[14] This division is used by Tracy in his work Eschatology, pp. 17-23. The material found on this topic is taken from Tracy's work and also from the lectures given by Bernard Lonergan on Method in Theology during the Institute in Methodology in Religious Studies held at Boston College in July, 1968.

[15] As quoted by Tracy in Eschatology, p. 21.

CHAPTER TWO CONTINUED

[16] "Meaning," (Lecture Five from Method in Theology, unpublished notes from the lectures given by Bernard Lonergan during the Institute in Methodology in Religious Studies held at Boston College in July, 1968. Hereafter referred to as MiT.)

[17] "Dimensions of Meaning," Collection, p. 258.

[18] For a detailed account of Lonergan's notion of Judgment, see Chapters IX and X of Insight, pp. 271-316.

[19] Ibid., p. 280.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., p. 281.

[22] Ibid., p. 282.

[23] Ibid., p. 284.

[24] Ibid., p. 549.

[25] Ibid., p. 378.

[26] Ibid.

[27] The material on the Structure of Cognition is taken from the unpublished notes of a series of five lectures given by Bernard Lonergan at University College, Dublin, Ireland in the Summer of 1961 under the title "Insight.")

[28] Lonergan's meaning of sublation is not Hegelian. For Lonergan, sublation means going beyond or transcending a lower form so that the higher introduces new and distinct elements, providing a new basis, in such a way that the lower is not destroyed but rather, is needed, included, and preserved in the higher.

[29] "Meaning," MiT, Lecture Five.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] "Religion," Lecture Six, MiT.

[33] "The Human Good, Values, and Beliefs," Lecture Four, MiT.

CHAPTER TWO CONCLUDED

[34] *Ibid*.

[35] *Ibid*.

[36] *Ibid*.

[37] *Ibid*.

[38] "Religion," Lecture Six, MiT.

[39] "The Human Good, Value, and Belief," Lecture Four, MiT.

CHAPTER THREE

[1] See *Insight*, pp. 608-616.

[2] Value-judgments are also treated in Lecture Four, MiT.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] See footnote 28 of Chapter Two.

[5] "Notes on Existentialism," p. 4.

[6] Harvey Cox. *On Not Leaving it to the Snake* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1969), p. ix.

CHAPTER FOUR

[1] *Collection*, p. 243.

[2] Jean Piaget has authored numerous books explaining and validating his theories. See *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: The Free Press); *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York: International Universities Press, 1952); *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood* (London: W. Heinemann, 1951).

[3] *Collection*, p. 257.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 258.

CHAPTER FOUR CONTINUED

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 259.

[6] "The Future of Thomism," Bernard Lonergan (unpublished notes given at the Pax Romana Symposium on Faith, Pittsburgh, March 16, 1968.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[8] *Collection*, p. 244.

[9] David Tracy, *God: One and Three* (Catholic University, School of Theology) Spring, 1968, pp. 233-34.

[10] Michael Novak, "Christian and Atheist," *The Meaning of the Death of God*, ed. by Bernard Marchland, (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 78.

CHAPTER FIVE

[1] Material for this chapter is taken from the Dublin Lectures and *Insight*, Chapters VI and VII, pp. 173-244.

[2] *Insight*, p. 176.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 177.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[5] Dublin Lectures, p. 32.

CHAPTER SIX

[1] For a fuller treatment of this topic see *Insight*, pp. 185-86; Dublin Lectures.

[2] *Insight*, p. 186.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[4] Tracy, *Eschatology*, p. 10.

CHAPTER SEVEN

[1] Tracy, Eschatology, p. 9.

[2] "Meaning," Lecture Five, MiT.

[3] "Notes on Existentialism," p. 6.

[4] Ibid., p. 7.

[5] Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[6] Ibid.

[7] "Notes on Existentialism," p. 9.

[8] Ibid., p. 11.

[9] Dublin Lectures, p. 39.

[10] Ibid., p. 40.

[11] Ibid., pp. 41-42.

[12] For a more complete treatment on belief, see Insight, pp. 703-718; also "Belief: Today's Issue" (unpublished lecture given at the Pax Romana Symposium on Faith, Pittsburgh, March 16, 1968).

[13] Bernard Lonergan, The Subject, The Aquinas Lecture, 1968, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968), pp. 19-33.

[14] Collection, p. 245.

[15] "The Human Good, Value, and Belief," Lecture Four, MiT.

[16] See Insight, pp. 191-244 on the various biases; also Chapter XVIII "The Possibility of Ethics," especially pp. 619-633 on "The Problem of Liberation."

CHAPTER EIGHT

[1] "Religion," Lecture Six, MiT.

[2] "Meaning," Lecture Five, MiT.

[3] Michael Novak, Belief and Unbelief (New York: Mentor-Omega, The New American Library, 1965), pp. 150-165.

CHAPTER EIGHT CONTINUED

[4] "Religion," Lecture Six, MIT.

[5] Tracy, *Eschatology*, p. 10.

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